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Chapter 1
Introduction
June 24, 2016, The Guardian: “UK votes to leave EU after
dramatic night divides nation” (Asthana et al., 2016)
January 30, 2019, The Conversation: “EU-Japan trade deal
comes into force to create world’s biggest trade zone” (Kirchner,
2019)
May 30, 2019, The President of the United States (U.S.)
Donald J. Trump on Twitter: “On June 10th, the United States
will impose a 5% Tariff on all goods coming into our Country from
Mexico, until such time as illegal migrants coming through Mexico,
and into our Country, STOP. The Tariff will gradually increase until
the Illegal Immigration problem is remedied,..”
May 30, 2019, africanews.: “Historic African free trade zone
comes into force” (Africanews, 2019)
1
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1.1 Motivation
The four quotes above mark recent events showing the controversial develop-
ments of the current time with regard to global trade policy. June 24, 2019
marks the day after the United Kingdom (UK) held a referendum to decide
whether the UK should leave or remain in the European Union (EU) and there-
fore also to decide whether to be part of the EU free trade zone or not. The
country voted to leave the EU with a thin majority of 51.9 percent towards 48.1
percent voting to remain. This narrow result already shows the large opposing
forces which coexist at the moment. While the exit of the UK from the EU, in
the media referred to as “Brexit”, is probably one of the most prominent topics
in the European media, rising nationalism occurs also in other European coun-
tries where right-wing parties gain support as for example the Freedom Party
in Austria, the Alternative for Germany or the National Rally in France. They
all unite the believe of individually negotiating trade agreements and that the
sovereignty of their country would make their economies stronger than today.
Furthermore, we see the president of the United States, Donald J. Trump, pur-
suing a nationalist strategy by withdrawing from the Trans Pacific Partnership
(TPP), which would have been the world’s largest free trade zone, only ten days
after his inauguration on 20 January 2017 and announcing on Twitter to impose
tariffs on imports from Mexico on 30 May 2019.
At the same time we can observe an ongoing trend of regional integration and
the signing of new trade agreements. One recent example is the EU-Japan Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreement, which entered into force on February 1, 2019 and
which is the largest free trade area in the world. Together, the EU and Japan
account for more than 25 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP). On
May 30, 2019, which is just the same day as when US President announces to
2
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impose tariffs towards Mexico, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement
(AfCFTA) became effective, which is now the world’s largest free trade zone
between African countries. This shows how closely related in time the opposing
trends are.
If the UK leaves the EU, it will have to negotiate a new trade agreement with
the EU to secure trade flows with its European trading partners. Furthermore,
leaving the EU results in the loss of trade access for the UK arising from EU
trade agreements with third countries around the world. As the UK’s market is
much smaller compared to the EU, the UK will have to negotiate trade agree-
ments with a different bargaining position compared to the EU to gain market
access to large markets, as for example with the United States, which might
result in challenging trade talks. Another way of defining unequal trading part-
ners is by the difference regarding their per capita income. Trade agreements
between countries with a different per capita income are often considered as
“North-South” trade agreements. More precisely, they describe trade agree-
ments between developed countries with a high income level, the global North,
and the global South, including developing countries with a relatively lower
income level. Trade agreements between similar countries are signed between
developed countries from the North or between developing countries from the
South, considered as “North-North” and “South-South” trade agreements, re-
spectively. The number of singed North-South trade agreements has constantly
increased in the past years since the beginning of the 1990s. Recent examples
are trade agreements between Australia and China in 2015, the EU and Coˆte
D’Ivoire in 2016 or between the member states of the “European Free Trade
Association” (EFTA) and Georgia in 2017.
3
1.1. MOTIVATION
One major difference characterizing countries from the North towards countries
from the South is the quality of institutions, which plays a central role in ex-
plaining differences in economic performance (c.f. Acemoglu et al., 2005,0; La
Porta et al., 1997; Rodrik, 2007). Institutions are constraints established by
humans to form the interaction of humans in their society. They can be formal
or informal. While formal institutions officially set rules, like the rule of law, the
constitution of a country or trade agreements, informal institutions are norms,
traditions and culture. Both dimensions help a society to organize life and to
build incentives (North, 2005, pp.3 ff).
The global South typically has inferior institutions compared to the North.
While in general people in the North are well educated, have a higher life ex-
pectancy and entrepreneurs can do business and investments, which are secured
by the presence of appropriate laws and an effective judicial system, people
in the South live a different life. Their weak judicial systems leads to high
rates of crime making business opportunities risky and thus making growth less
likely. The population of the global South has gained a higher awareness of
these inequalities through the increased availability of internet, social networks
and mobile phones in those countries. This awareness has finally lead to the
uprisings of the population of North Africa and Middle East during the “Arab
Spring”. This process of revolution showed that change in institutions is pos-
sible and has raised my personal interest in the drivers of institutional change
and institutions as a factor of development.
4
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1.2 Contribution
This thesis contributes to the actual controversial development of trade cooper-
ation in view of the newly signed large trade agreements on the one hand, as
opposed to the increase in nationalist and protective policies on the other hand.
In this regard, I also address the rise of trade agreements between developed and
developing countries. I analyze factors and effects of trade agreements distin-
guishing between asymmetric (North-South) and symmetric (North-North and
South-South) trading partners. I argue that the quality of institutions is an im-
portant characteristic, which distinguishes countries from the North relative to
countries from the South, which also drives the characteristics of today’s trade
and investment flows and the existence of trade agreements.
Throughout this dissertation, I focus on preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
and refer to the definition in line with Lima˜o (2016) who defines a PTA as “an
international treaty with restrictive membership and including any articles that
(i) apply only to its members and (ii) aim to secure or increase their respective
market access.” The main characteristics of PTAs correspondingly are (i) the
discriminatory nature of such an agreement including rules which apply to its
member countries and (ii) the inclusion of rules generating market access at
least to some extent.
My analysis contains three essays, which I present in chapter 2 to 4, followed by a
conclusion where I summarize and discuss my results. In chapter 2, I analyze the
effects of North-South preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on the institutional
quality in the South, while in chapter 3 I examine the factors of the formation of
PTAs, distinguishing between North-South, North-North and South-South and
in chapter 4 I extent my analysis with regard to factors of global integration on
5
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global capital flows in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) focusing on
institutional quality.
Table 1.1 lists the topics, the main research questions and the applied methods
of the three essays of this dissertation, which I summarize in the following.
Table 1.1: Overview of topics
Essay Topic Research question Estimation method
1 North-South Trade
Agreements and the
Quality of
Institutions: Panel
Data Evidence
Do deep North-South
trade agreements
promote institutions
in the South?
Generalized method of
moments (GMM)
2 Formation of
North-South Trade
Agreements and
Institutional Distance
Does institutional
distance promote the
formation of
North-South trade
agreements?
Linear probabilty
model (LPM)
3 Explaining the Global
Landscape of FDI:
Knowledge Capital,
Gravity, and the Role
of Culture and
Institutions
What are the general
drivers of global FDI?
Pseudo maximum
likelihood (PPML)
estimation &
cross-validation of
models
In the first essay, in chapter 2, I refer to PTAs as an institutional setting, in-
cluding rules which organize the trade relationship between its member states.
In the past years, PTAs have become deeper in the way that they include more
comprehensive rules, which go way beyond tariff reductions, such as property
rights, competition or investment provisions. Such behind-the-border rules ap-
ply in the respective partner countries and thus should also affect the domestic
institutions of the partner country. I argue that especially in North-South trade
agreements there is a diffusion of institutional quality from developed countries,
6
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where institutions are typically advanced, to developing countries, where insti-
tutional quality is typically low. First, a PTA may affect institutions because
it can serve as a network for political exchange and second, the regulations and
commitments stipulated in it may affect local institutions in the South.
To examine if there is a diffusion of institutional quality resulting from PTA
membership, I empirically investigate if there are positive effects of being a
member in a PTA on the quality of institutions in developing countries by ac-
counting for the number and the depth of PTAs. For my analysis I use the
Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database, established by Du¨r, Baccini
and Elsig (2014), which includes a large set of trade agreements and data on
their content by creating an index measuring the depth of a PTA. I create a large
panel data set covering a long period of 32 years to account for endogeneity of
several controls and the fact that institutions need time to develop. I use the
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to account for endogeneity
and provide several robustness checks with regard to the type of rules covered
by the used measure of depth, the underlying choice of countries in the sample
and the choice of instruments to support my results.
In chapter 3, I analyze the drivers of PTA formation focusing on institutional
quality. I argue that the increased prevalence of complex production networks
raises the risk that contracts cannot be enforced and that PTAs can serve as
a legal instrument to alleviate that risk of institutional quality. This motive
behind PTAs seems to be particularly relevant for trade relationships that in-
volve (i) a high share of trade in contract-intensive goods where the hold-up
problem is more severe and (ii) developing countries where institutional quality
is typically low.
7
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A high level of contract-intensity is related to a high share of relationship-specific
intermediate inputs, for which there is only a low number of potential buyers,
resulting in an increased probability of hold up and increased gains from the
formation of a trade agreement. For my empirical estimation I create a large
bilateral data set including 132 countries over 21 years and create a measure
for the contract-intensity of exports between two country pairs. I estimate a
linear probit model and create instruments for the potentially endogenous ex-
planatory variables. I compare the factors for the formation of PTAs between
North-North, North-South and South-South country pairs to see whether the
factors are specifically important for the emergence of North-South trade agree-
ments.
In the forth chapter, which is joint work with Konstantin Wacker, we also ad-
dress institutional quality as a factor for FDI but take a more general view
compared to the previous chapter with respect to PTA determinants. We use
a novel data set on bilateral FDI positions with extensive coverage of emerging
and developing economies to empirically re-assess the question which key theor-
etical models and motives are most suitable to explain global FDI. We assess the
performance of the gravity model and the knowledge capital (KK) model and
add cultural, institutional and financial factors as suggested by other theories
on the determinants of FDI.
1.3 Related research
The chapters 2 and 3 relate to the general literature on trade agreements, which
has focused on three main areas, (1) the motives of trade agreements, (2) the
8
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design and institutions of trade agreements and, (3) regional trade agreements.
One strand of the literature on the motives of trade agreements argues that inef-
ficiencies resulting from externalities in the absence of trade agreements consti-
tute motives to sign trade agreements (Bagwell and Staiger, 2004; Ossa, 2011,1).
Another strand argues that trade agreements represent commitment devices to
promote the implementation of domestic policies (Lima˜o and Tovar, 2011; Maggi
and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998; Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2007).
The literature on the design of trade agreements results from the presence of
transaction costs, which lead to the presence of incomplete and inefficient con-
tracts. Without transaction costs contracts would be complete and the design
of contracts and trade agreements would be redundant. The literature differen-
tiates two types of frictions, (1) contract frictions as analyzed by Helpman and
Razin (1991), Bagwell and Staiger (2001) or Maggi and Staiger (2011), and (2)
imperfect enforcement, meaning the lack of external enforcement, which requires
that trade agreements need to be self-enforcing. This second type of friction is
addressed for example by Maggi (1999) or Bagwell et al. (2007), who study the
optimal design of enforcement rules.
The first two essays can be allocated to the third research area focusing on
regional trade agreements. This research area includes the determinants and
impacts of regional trade agreements. Regional trade agreements (RTAs) in
this regard characterizes the exclusiveness of a trade agreement, which applies
to two or more member states while there are also nonmember states, where the
rules do not apply. In this regard this definition is in line with the definition of
PTAs used in the following analysis. The first essay contributes to the empirical
9
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literature on the effects of PTAs. Existing empirical studies focus on the effcts
of RTAs on external tariffs, as for example Estevadeordal et al. (2008); Lima˜o
(2006) and Karacaovali and Lima˜o (2008). But so far, to my knowledge, there
is only one study by Busse et al. (2007), which examines empirically the effects
of trade agreements on institutions and which is part of the general empirical
literature on the drivers of institutional change. They test several factors, which
drive the change in institutional quality and in this regard also test for the ef-
fects of the implementation of NAFTA on Mexico and of the EU accession on
the accessing countries. I add on this literature by including a more compre-
hensive set of countries and include the depth dimension with regard to trade
agreements, arguing that the content of trade agreements is what matters in
addition to the sole membership in a trade agreement.
The second essay is part of the literature on the determinants of trade agree-
ments and based on the first empirical study analyzing the economic determ-
inants of PTAs by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), which intents to serve as a
benchmark empirical model, which can be extended by political factors. This
benchmark model has subsequently been applied by other empirical studies on
the determinants of PTAs, such as the study by Egger and Larch (2008) who
account for interdependence of already existing PTAs and the formation of new
PTAs. The empirical studies, which are most closely related to the second essay
are the two papers by Manger (2012) and Orefice and Rocha (2014), since they
differentiate between North and South member countries of PTAs and focus on
the content of trade between the respective partner countries. While Manger
(2012) finds that vertical intra-industry trade between North-South trading part-
ners promotes the formation of PTAs, Orefice and Rocha (2014) find that the
presence of production networks measured as traded intermediate goods lead to
10
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deeper integration. Although Orefice and Rocha (2014) analyze the effects on
the depth of trade agreements they also apply the benchmark model by Baier
and Bergstrand (2004). They analyze the effect for North-South, North-North,
South-North and South-South PTAs but focus mainly on Asian countries. So
far, to my knowledge, only Baier and Bergstrand (2004) have accounted for
institutional and political factors by including nine additional measures, which
include market orientation, common legal origin or common language but find
no significant effects. I add on that literature by accounting for the institutional
quality arguing that institutional differences matter specifically in North-South
relationships where institutional differences are large so that PTAs serve as a
legal instrument and furthermore, relate these effects to the trade in goods which
are sensitive to the quality of institutions.
The third essay focuses on explaining international capital flows and contrib-
utes to the literature analyzing the determinants of FDI flows, which have, so
far, focused either on horizontal (Brainard, 1997; Helpman et al., 2004) or ver-
tical motives (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009; Badinger and Egger, 2010). But until
now there is no consensus on one general model which explains global FDI.
As emphasized by Davies (2008), to detect vertical motives a sufficiently large
set of developing countries needs to be included in the analysis. But so far
the literature has focused on explaining FDI flows using data on certain re-
gions, specifically Asian and African countries as for example Abeliansky and
Martinez-Zarzoso (2019); Chen et al. (2017); Gold et al. (2017). Papers focus-
ing on specific factors of FDI such as cultural and institutional factors (e.g.
Azemar et al. (2012); Benassy-Quere et al. (2007); Beugelsdijk et al. (2018);
Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008); Demir and Hu (2016)) often focus on spe-
cific geographic regions, while van Hoorn and Maseland (2016) emphasize, that
11
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comprehensive bilateral variation is required to detect effects of cultural and in-
stitutional factors. We add on that literature by using a new data set including
a broad set of countries of different income levels, which we apply for testing
and evaluating a global FDI model accounting for FDI from and to the North
and South, respectively.
This chapter motivated and summarized the topics and research questions ad-
dressed in the three essays, which are presented in the following three chapters,
and set them into context of the related literature and pointed out the knowledge
gap or missing research. After the presentation of the three essays I summarize
the main results in the final chapter and provide concluding remarks drawn from
the results and finally provide a short outlook.
12
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The Effect of North-South Trade
Agreements on the Quality of
Institutions in the South: Panel
Data Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, a surge in the number of preferential trade agreements
(PTAs)1, signed per year, can be observed. While there were 161 PTAs signed
until 1990, the cumulative number of trade agreements increased to 621 agree-
ments in 2015. Figure 2.1 shows the cumulative number of PTAs which have
been signed since 1948 until 2015 by stance of development of the trading part-
ners involved, i.e. between developed countries, North-North, between develop-
ing countries, South-South, and between developed and developing countries,
1In this paper, PTAs are referred to all types of preferential trade agreements, including
regional trade agreements.
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North-South. The overall number has risen but especially North-South trade
agreements (solid line), and South-South trade agreements (short-dashed line)
show the largest increases.
Figure 2.1: Number of Signed Trade Agreements by Region
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What is the motive to enter a PTA? In the first place, regional integration hap-
pens due to economic reasons. Gaining market access is the traditional motive,
as for example stated by Hillman and Moser (1996). In accordance to this, since
the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which later became the World Trade Organization (WTO), tariffs have been de-
creasing on a multilateral level so that even developing countries enjoy tariff-free
market access to important markets. Zero most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs
have lead to increased trade by developing countries (United Nations, 2013).
On average, developed countries have lower levels than developing countries.
But the latest WTO round of negotiations, the Doha Round, which has started
14
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in 2001, has come to a halt, while regional integration continues to accelerate
(Lima˜o, 2016).
It seems that market access plays a more important role in symmetric agree-
ments, that is in North-North and South-South relations. This can also be
seen in the actual debate between the US and the EU and the US-President’s
threat to increase tariffs on EU products to gain more favorable trade terms.
Freund (2004) argues that countries with similar cost structures are likely to
require reciprocal trade liberalization to be self-enforcing. This is less the case
in North-South trade agreements. She finds empirical evidence that reciprocity
is important in symmetric trade agreements while there is only modified recipro-
city in North-South trade agreements. North countries, in general, gain more
market access compared to developing countries.2 At the same time, developing
countries already have good market access generated by the “Everything but
Arms” (EBA) provision by the EU or the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), where developing and least developed countries are provided additional
tariff concessions, which do not fall within the scope of the most favored nation
(MFN) principle. So this cannot explain the ongoing increase in signature rates
of PTAs.
Besides the increase in the number of trade agreements, it can be observed
that the newly signed PTAs tend to include a broader set of provisions, which
go beyond at-the-border rules, like the reduction of tariffs, export subsidies or
taxes and beyond WTO rules. There are “WTO+” rules, which expand or
deepen existing WTO rules and countries define beyond-market-access commit-
ments in areas, which do not directly affect trade flows, such as intellectual
2A ten percent reduction of a tariff in a developing country leads to a tariff reduction in
the developed country of only 2 percent (Freund, 2004).
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property rights, competition policy, anti-corruption and human rights, public
administration, innovation policies, data protection and statistics and indus-
trial cooperation (World Trade Organization, 2016, p. 129).
Figure 2.2: Depth of Trade Agreements over Time
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
D
ep
th
 in
de
x 
(t
w
o-
ye
ar
 a
ve
ra
ge
s)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Mean depth index of all agreements where depth index is available. For the whole period in total 618
agreements are included.
Source: Author's calculation using DESTA database.
These commitments are behind-the-border rules and affect domestic policies.
The more provisions are defined, which go beyond at the border rules, the deeper
are the agreements. In other words, the depth of an agreement indicates the
extend of the commitments, which the member states have bargained on. The
more rules are specified in different areas of an agreement and the more those
rules regulate the cooperation between the member states, the deeper is this
agreement. Figure 2.2 shows the development of the mean depth of all signed
trade agreements where data on depth is available. This measure is calculated
on the basis of an additive index created by Du¨r et al. (2014), adding up the
16
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key provisions, which can be included in a PTA. One point is added if a PTA
is more than a partial scope agreement or if it includes substantive provisions
in one of the six areas: (1) services, (2) investments, (3) standards, (4) public
procurement, (5) competition and (6) intellectual property rights. The index
can range from 0 (when a PTA is only a partial scope agreement and does not
include any provisions in one of the above areas) to 7 (for PTAs, which are
more than a partial scope agreement and includes substantive provisions in all
areas). A substantive provision is a definite regulation in one of the areas, while
for example the desire to start trading in the services area is not treated as a
substantive provision. So, while there has been a sideways movement to a higher
number of PTAs there is a parallel movement to an increase in depth starting
only slightly earlier in the mid 1980s.
The increased depth of PTAs provides additional motives for the formation
of PTAs. One motive for developing countries, is that trade agreements have
become an instrument to promote development. They intend to implement do-
mestic reforms, which go beyond trade liberalization and import higher policy
standards to foster growth. Schiff and Winters (1998) argue that developing
countries might use PTAs to lock in policies because there is a higher credibility
of enforcement in those agreements. Developing countries may chose a partner,
who helps them to credibly promote policy agendas, accompanied by financial
and knowledge transfers. Compared to multilateral agreements, PTAs offer less
coordination effort and a targeted choice of a partner. Levy (2009) investigates
the function of a PTA to increase a country’s commitment to better governance
by having a particular look at the United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement.
Peru has gone through a period of very poor political and economic manage-
ment and thus has an urgent motive to achieve credibility in pursuing better
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policies and reforms. He finds that Peru was preferably interested in locking
in policies instead of gaining market access, since it already had virtually free
market access to the US. Interviews with Peruvian officials, academics and busi-
nessmen showed clearly that the agreement was expected to have a significant
improvement on the rule of law and a better investment environment. This case
study suggests that countries from the South sign PTAs with the North to pro-
mote the international attractiveness as well as domestic and foreign investment.
Also countries from the North aim at promoting the development process in
countries from the South (Lima˜o, 2016, p.50). They intend to improve institu-
tions and governance in developing countries because the legal system in those
countries is poor and often there are no secured property and human rights, miss-
ing democratic structures and courts, while political leaders are corrupt. Many
RTAs contain regulations on pro-competitive practices, transparency, stronger
anti-corruption and intellectual property rights, movement of capital and labor
and investment. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for ex-
ample, represents a very broad and far-reaching agreement with a depth index of
7. Besides chapters on trade in goods and technical barriers to trade, it contains
chapters on investment, services, administrative and institutional provisions and
intellectual property. Article 1110 of the investment chapter, for instance, in-
terdicts expropriation of any investment of any party and regulates exceptions
and compensations. The Cotonou Agreement on the other hand remains more
general and only has a depth index of 1. It focuses on the aim to gradually
remove all trade barriers, cooperate politically and promote dialog and poverty
reduction without a concrete schedule. Article 17(2), for example, states that
the agreement commits to the promotion of democratic processes through dia-
logue and consultation and to promote institutional reform. Still, this shows
18
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that PTAs now also serve as a promoter of institutions and political change.
The intention of this paper is to analyze whether trade agreements between
North and South do affect the quality of institutions in the South. First, I argue
that the membership in a PTA, without considering the depth, may improve in-
stitutions in the South because PTAs can serve as a platform where politicians
can discuss policies and and interchange political experience and skills. Often
political leaders in a developing country lack experience and skills when they
come into position (Afegbua and Adejuwon, 2012). Especially African countries
lack competent leaders (Adeyemi, 2017). One reason might be that patrimonial-
ism is persistent (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010) and new political leaders lack
a previous political career. The exchange of knowledge is especially intensive
in the period when the agreement is negotiated, so already before it is actually
signed and an effect should be seen in the period afterwards. Second, the deeper
the agreement, the higher the improvement in institutional quality. That means,
rules as, for example, defined in the investment chapter of NAFTA, might pos-
itively affect the institutional quality in the South. These rules compensate for
missing institutions in the developing country, which are standard in the North.
In the literature, institutions play a prominent role in explaining economic per-
formance and growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005,0; La Porta et al., 1997; Rodrik,
2007) or trade pattern (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Berkowitz et al., 2006;
de Groot, Henry L. F. et al., 2004; Nunn, 2007). Thus it is important to de-
termine the factors of good institutions. The research on drivers of institutional
change is growing. There are studies focusing on political factors of institu-
tional change, such as free media (Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Norris, 2008) or
foreign aid (Ear, 2007; Knack, 2004; Tavares, 2003) and on economic factors like
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trade (Busse et al., 2007; Islam and Montenegro, 2002; Levchenko, 2013) or FDI
(Larrain and Tavares, 2004; Pinto and Zhu, 2016). Most of those studies use
cross-sectional data. The paper most closely related to the present analysis is
Busse et al. (2007). They also investigate the effect of trade agreements on in-
stitutions but focus on the effects of NAFTA on Mexico and of the EU accession
on the accessing countries, while I work with a comprehensive country sample.
Furthermore they model the agreements as a single dummy variable, while the
depth of the trade agreements plays a central role in my analysis.
For the analysis, I utilize the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database
by Du¨r et al. (2014) for measures relating to PTAs and the International Coun-
try Risk Guide (ICRG) to measure institutional quality. I create a data set
including PTAs between North and South and concentrate on the effects on the
institutional quality in the developing country. The use of a comprehensive data
set allows for more general conclusions. Furthermore, I work with a panel data
set covering a period of 32 years. The time dimension is useful in an economet-
ric sense to correct for endogeneity and the long period of time includes more
changes in the institutional quality, which only slowly develop. For the main
explanatory variables I include the number of signed PTAs and the depth for
each developing country and period.
I find that depth is an important driver, which positively affects institutional
quality. However, the results differ with respect to the type of agreement and
regions included.
As the literature on institutions suggests, institutions play an important role
for development and thus the analysis of factors of change in institutions may
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provide important insides for politicians of developing countries or developed
countries who promote development abroad or for international organizations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next chapter summarizes the
related literature on the factors of change in institutional quality and outlines
related work on learning and the diffusion of knowledge and political reform.
Chapter 2.3 presents the estimation framework, the data used for the estimation,
and the discussion of results. The final chapter concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
The related empirical literature on the factors of change in institutions sheds
light on important control variables to be included in the empirical analysis.
Furthermore, the literature on learning provides an intuition why PTAs are a
suitable instrument to transfer knowledge and experience.
An important part of the related literature reveals the critical factors of institu-
tional quality, which need to be included in the empirical analysis. It can be seen
that most of the related empirical literature uses cross-sectional data. Factors
of change can broadly be divided into political, social, geographic and economic
factors. One strand of the cross-sectional literature relate the initial conditions
of a country to its subsequent level of institutional quality. These studies explain
why institutions in some countries are well-developed, while in other countries
institutions are weak. Acemoglu et al. (2001), for example, use settler mortality
rates and other controls (latitude, climate, religion and natural resources) to
explain the level of current institutional quality. European colonialism is also
linked to differences in institutional quality by referring to the associated legal
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system. La Porta et al. (1997), Straub (2000) and Chong and Zanforlin (2000)
analyze the effects of different legal origins on the quality of institutions and find
that inferior institutions are developed in countries with a French legal origin,
where the government is much more interventionist and investor protection is
weakest. La Porta et al. (1999) also show that ethnic heterogeneity is related to
poor institutions.
However, these factors do not explain how institutions change over time and
thus are inappropriate for the empirical analysis over time. Important drivers
of institutional quality, which include a time dimension are mainly political and
economic ones. The freedom of the press as, for example, revealed by Norris
(2008) and Brunetti and Weder (2003), is an important political driver. Foreign
aid is also analyzed as a factor of change in a number of papers but its effect
is inconclusive. While Tavares (2003) results indicate that foreign aid has a
positive effect on corruption, meaning a reduction of corruption, Knack (2001),
Ear (2007) and Djankov et al. (2008) find a negative effect of aid on differ-
ent measures of institutions, including corruption. With respect to economic
determinants, empirical work focuses on openness and FDI, which are often re-
lated to corruption. The effects of FDI on institutions do not show clear results.
Larrain and Tavares (2004) and Okada and Samreth (2012) study the effects of
FDI on corruption and show that FDI reduces corruption, while Pinto and Zhu
(2016) also account for the development level of host countries, which reveals
that FDI increases corruption in least developed countries while there are no
effects resulting from FDI in all remaining countries. Ades and Di Tella (1999)
and Wei (2000) show that more open economies tend to have lower corruption
levels due to higher competition. Busse et al. (2007); Giavazzi and Tabellini
(2005); Islam and Montenegro (2002); Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) find a posit-
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ive and significant effect of openness on different measures of institutions. But
Knack and Azfar (2003) show that the results for openness are very sensitive
to the choice and number of countries. For data sets including more countries
than those used by other authors the effect of openness is no longer present.
In all studies, income and population size represent essential further control
variables for institutional quality, which change over time. Busse et al. (2007),
Gassebner et al. (2011) and Quazi and Alam (2015) add to the literature by
including the time dimension in their empirical work. These panel studies add
human capital and political freedom as further controls, which change over time.
Another part of the related literature focuses on the diffusion of knowledge and
policies between economies and provides intuition for the link between trade
agreements and institutional reform. First, it is stated, for example, by Islam
and Montenegro (2002) that policies can diffuse from one country to another,
especially when countries trade with each other. They argue that the risk that
arises from trading with unknown partners increases the incentive to improve
domestic institutions as domestic and foreign firms demand for reform. Then,
open economies learn from trading partners where successful and effective insti-
tutions are implemented. Second, Simmons et al. (2006) explain this process of
learning by the theory of Bayesian updating and outline the factors, which play
a role for successful transmission of knowledge or reform. They explain that
learning from other economies is based on the successful outcome of policies
abroad, which is then transferred to the domestic country. The success of this
transmission depends on the availability of information on the outcome and the
expertise and experience to evaluate the information. The diffusion of policies is
more effective, the closer countries are linked to each other so that a better com-
munication is possible. By signing trade agreements, countries intensify their
relationship and facilitate communication for a better exchange of knowledge.
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Empirical evidence for the diffusion of reforms is provided by Gassebner et al.
(2011), who study whether implemented economic reforms in one country af-
fect the reforms in other countries. They find empirical support for reform
spillovers and furthermore, find that trade itself is not promoting diffusion of
political reform while cultural and geographic proximity are important drivers.
The positive effect of spacial proximity for learning is supported by the results
of Mancusi (2008) who analyzes the effect of knowledge spillovers on innovation
on a sectoral level. She finds evidence that knowledge spillovers are fostered due
to technical and spacial proximity between source and recipient. These results
show that spatial proximity promotes the ability of spillovers and supports the
argument that trade agreements promote these effects. PTAs can serve as a
communication network where information and knowledge is exchanged. When
countries negotiate on a PTA, spatial proximity is reduced and knowledge ex-
change is possible.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
2.3.1 Data
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of trade agreements between
North and South on the quality of institutions in the South over the period of
1984 until 2015. To account for the effects of the sole membership in a PTA I
introduce the number of PTAs, signed by a country from the South.3 To cap-
ture the effects of the depth of PTAs, I use the additive index from DESTA,
3In the Appendix, I include a list of all North and South countries, as well as a description
of all variables and sources.
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which measures the amount and extent of commitments included in a PTA. As
noted above, there are important other determinants of the quality of institu-
tions, which I include as further controls. For the choice of controls, I refer to
the related literature on the determinants of institutional change with a focus
on those determinants, which change over time. These controls include income,
population, education, freedom of the press and the presence of conflicts.
Dependent Variable
The measure for the quality of institutions comes from the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) database. There are further available measures for institu-
tions, like the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) by the World Bank or the
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Index by the Fraser Institute. But the
ICRG data set is the most comprehensive data set covering 141 countries and
starting in the year 1984. It includes the largest number of observations without
gaps.
The ICRG data set measures the risk of a country in three categories, polit-
ical, financial and economic risk. Each category consists of components, which
are added together to an index for each category and finally to an overall risk
rating for each country. To achieve consistency of the rating between countries
and over time, a number of basic questions are predefined to create the index.
All categories consist of several components, which have a minimum value of
zero, indicating the highest risk and the maximum value indicating the lowest
potential risk. The maximum values, varying from 4 to 12, represent the im-
portance with respect to the overall risk, measured for each category. Table 2.1
lists the 12 components of the Political Risk rating and its maximum points,
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Table 2.1: Political Risk Components
Component Points (max.)
Government Stability 12
Socioeconomic Conditions 12
Investment Profile 12
Internal Conflict 12
External Conflict 12
Corruption 6
Military in Politics 6
Religious Tensions 6
Law and Order 6
Ethnic Tensions 6
Democratic Accountability 6
Bureaucracy Quality 4
Total 100
adding up to a total score of 100 points. While “Bureaucracy Quality” for
example is assessed least important with 4 maximum points, “Government Sta-
bility”, “Socioeconomic Conditions”, “Investment Profile”, “External Conflict”
and “Internal Conflict” are considered most important with a maximum of 12
points, when assessing the overall risk.
In this analysis the Political Risk component “Investment Profile” is used to
measure the institutional quality. It accounts for institutional aspects, which
are particularly important with regard to trade or foreign direct investment
and consequently are expected to be affected by trade agreements and their
contents. It measures the general risk to investment and is composed of three
sub-components. One component is ”Contract Viability/Expropriation”, which
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quantifies the potential risk that any contracts are modified or completely can-
celed or the risk that foreign owned assets are expropriated. This reflects an
important risk for exporting firms, having contracts with foreign firms or for
investors, investing in foreign countries. Another component measures “Profits
Repatriation”. This component assesses how well profits can be transferred
out of the host country and thus also evaluates the bureaucratic efficiency, the
banking system and exchange controls, all of which are aspects, trading firms
and foreign investors have to deal with. The third component, measures “Pay-
ment Delays”, which is also affected by a poor banking system and an inefficient
bureaucratic system. In addition, this component assesses other factors, which
influence delays in payments, like foreign exchange position and formal and in-
formal government policies or motivations. The overall component sums up over
the sub-components and has a maximum score of 12 points.
Data on Trade Agreements
For measures related to trade agreements, i.e. for the number of PTAs signed
and their depth, the DESTA database Du¨r et al. (2014) is used. The data set
not only provides a comprehensive list of trade agreements, but also includes de-
tailed information on various characteristics of each agreement, especially on the
scope of the specified provisions, (i.e. the depth of an agreement). In the most
recently available data set, a total number of 810 trade agreements are listed
in DESTA over a period between 1948 and 2015. Detailed information on the
depth of trade agreements and other information like the type of agreement in
terms of integration level, membership (i.e. bilateral, plurilateral, plurilateral-
bilateral, etc.), number of member states, regional dummies, and information on
the language is available for 618 PTAs. Furthermore, for each PTA, all member
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states are listed, which is required to get country-level data. To create a variable
that counts the number of signed PTAs for each country and year, the data was
transformed accordingly. In a next step, for each country the cumulative sum
of signed agreements in each year was calculated. There are some countries,
who have already signed PTAs before the first period, which is covered in this
analysis. So not all countries start with zero PTAs.
Figure 2.3: Number of PTAs Signed on Average by a Country from Different
Regions between 1948 until 2015
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Figure 2.3 shows the number of PTAs, countries with a different status of devel-
opment or from different regions (North, South or SSA) have signed on average
(1) over the whole period included in the DESTA data set, which means since
1948 (dark blue bar), (2) since 1990, the period when the overall signature rates
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of trade agreements increases (light blue bar), and (3) all PTAs, signed only
between North and South (North-South) since 1948 (mid blue bar). South in-
cludes all countries from the South excluding countries from Sub-Sahara Africa
(SSA). SSA plays a specific role as it performs poorly in economic and polit-
ical development compared to other developing countries. Its role is discussed
in more detail in chapter 2.3.3. It can be observed that, on average, countries
from the North sign most PTAs compared to countries from the South and that
Sub-Sahara African countries on average sign less PTAs than other developing
countries. Furthermore, the figure shows that for North and South most of the
PTAs were signed since 1990. Only for SSA this trend is not identifiable. For
a developing country (excluding SSA), about half of the signed PTAs is with a
country from the North. This reveals that North-South PTAs depict a substan-
tial part of PTAs for the South.
For the depth of a PTA, the additive depth index from DESTA is used.4 The
index consists of seven subordinate variables, which take values of either zero
or one. The first variable takes the value one, if the agreement is more than
a partial scope, i.e. if the agreement is a full free trade agreement and zero
otherwise. The other six variables indicate whether the agreements contain sub-
stantive provisions in the areas (1) services, (2) investments, (3) standards, (4)
public procurement, (5) competition and (6) intellectual property rights by a
value of one or zero if this is not the case. So if an agreement includes substant-
ive provisions in all areas and foresees the elimination of all tariffs, the value for
the depth index adds up to seven. Since there are many countries, which have
signed several PTAs per year, the mean of the depth index is calculated for each
4DESTA also provides a second measure of depth, using a latent trait analysis, which was
conducted for binary data. As in the following analysis binary data is not used, the additive
index is applied as a measure of depth
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year.
Figure 2.4: Mean Depth by Region over all PTAs (since 1948) and over all PTAs
Signed since 1990
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Figure 2.4 shows, again for North, South and SSA, the mean depth of signed
PTAs since 1948 (dark blue bar), since 1990 (light blue bar) and of North-South
(N-S) PTAs since 1948 (mid blue bar). It reflects that, on average, PTAs signed
after 1990 are deeper compared to all PTAs signed since 1948. But this is
only the case for North and South but not for countries in SSA. Furthermore,
North-South PTAs are, on average, deeper compared to other PTAs. Especially,
when looking a countries from the South, agreements signed with the North are
distinctly deeper, with an average index of almost 4, than the average depth
index of all agreements signed since 1948, which takes a value slightly above 2.
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This suggests that potential effects of deep trade agreements are expected to be
present especially in North-South PTAs.
Further controls
Further explanatory variables are the number of armed conflicts, freedom of the
press, income, population, inflation and education. These controls are relevant
in this context and have been investigated in related empirical studies.
Conflicts are expected to affect institutions negatively. To measure conflicts, the
UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence data set from the Uppsala Con-
flict Data Program (UCDP) and the Study of Civil War at the International
Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) is used. This data set is a country-
year version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data set v.4-2014, which is
structured for a quantitative analysis. For this analysis, I use a variable, which
measures the incidence of at least one active intrastate conflict as a dummy for
each country-year. Intra-state conflicts refer to all conflicts between a govern-
ment and a non-governmental party without intervention from other countries,
which result in no less then 25 battle-related deaths per year.
Data on the press freedom is taken from Freedom House. It measures the degree
of press freedom in three categories, i.e. no press freedom (taking the value 0),
partly free (taking the value 1) or completely free (taking the value 2). I expect
that a higher press freedom positively affects the level of institutional quality as
it can reveal bad institutions and inform the public about missing rules or the
violation of rules and how institutions can be improved.
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For income, education and population, I use data from the World Bank. In-
come is measured as the log of GDP per capita in current US dollars. Data is
available for the period between 1960 and 2015 for 217 countries (World Bank,
2016). For income, I expect a positive effect on institutions as with a higher
available income, people demand better institutions, and at the same time, more
financial resources are available to build them up.
Population is measured by the size of a country, which I measure as the total
number of people in million for each country. The effects on institutional quality
are ambiguous. On the one hand, in a larger country it might be more likely
to push through reforms and necessary rules, as it has a critical financial mass.
On the other hand, a larger population increases transaction costs and ethnic
conflicts might be more intensive, which constitutes a burden on the ability to
promote institutions.
Years of schooling are used as a proxy for education. I expect a positive effect on
the quality of institutions, since a well-educated population has a higher interest
in political participation and reform and will demand good institutions.
2.3.2 Estimation Framework
The final data set includes 123 countries, 101 Southern and 22 Northern coun-
tries, over 8 periods starting from 1984 until 2015. To analyze long term effects
and to reduce business cycle effects, 4-year averages are used. For the estimation
framework, I stick closely to the related empirical literature analyzing the effects
on institutions. I estimate the effect of the number of PTAs and the depth of
PTAs on the quality of institutions in a linear dynamic panel model using the
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following baseline equation:
INSTit = β1INSTi,t−1+β2PTAsi,t−1+β3Depthi,t−1+β4PTAsi,t−1∗Depthi,t−1
+ γ′Xit + δt + µi + εit (2.1)
The dependent variable, INSTit, measures the quality of institutions of country
i in period t. A lagged dependent variable, INSTi,t−1, is included to capture the
persistence of institutional quality since only small adjustments are possible in
one period and a process of adaption is needed to implement better institutions.
That is, if the quality of institutions is low in the former period, a country will
not be able to improve institutions to a high level immediately in the next period.
The main explanatory variables are PTAsit, indicating the cumulative number
of trade agreements, which a country has signed until period t and Depthit,
measuring the mean depth of all agreements signed until period t. Furthermore,
an interaction term of the two variables PTAsit × Depthit is included to test
if the effect of one of the variables differs if the value of the other one changes.
It could be, for example, that the more trade agreements a country has signed,
the larger or smaller the effect of depth might be. Similarly, the deeper trade
agreements are, the greater might be the effects of the number of signed PTAs.
Xit includes a number of time-varying control variables, which are commonly
used in the literature as determinants of institutional change. µi represents indi-
vidual specific effects (here country fixed effects) and δt denotes time dummies
for all periods. Finally it is the idiosyncratic error term, capturing all other
omitted factors.
Estimating this equation using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) will lead to
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biased results as the lagged dependent variable correlates with the individual
specific effect, which is part of the error term, i.e. E(µi|Yit−1) 6= 0 which is
referred to as the “dynamic panel bias” or “Nickell-bias” (Nickell, 1981). This
makes OLS inconsistent and leads to an upward bias in the coefficients. Fur-
thermore, results are biased due to other endogenous variables.
Most explanatory variables are likely to be endogenous. There are two poten-
tial sources of endogeneity. First, endogeneity may arise from omitted variables
bias. The inclusion of country fixed effects deals with this source of endogeneity.
Second, endogeneity arises due to simultaneity. The number of PTAs is poten-
tially endogenous with respect to β1 and β2 because of reverse causality arising
from the quality of institutions, which are not only affected by the number of
PTAs but, which might affect the number of PTAs itself. North countries might
want to sign more PTAs with countries, which have a higher level of institutional
quality. This problem of reverse causality might also occur with respect to the
depth of PTAs since the level of institutional quality in the South might affect
how deep a PTA is. If institutions are poor in the country from the South, a
trading partner from the North may seek to compensate for missing institutions
by forming a deeper PTA to protect domestic firms. The other control vari-
ables, namely income, freedom of the press and conflicts are also expected to be
endogenous due to simultaneity. Obviously, if institutions are poor and there
are no rules defined which secure (physical and intellectual) property, this also
produces a risk to the freedom of the press and may also result in conflicts.
Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that institutions are a source of economic growth.
In endogenous growth models it is the amount of resources allocated to innova-
tion, which explains differences in income. Innovation activities highly depend
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on property rights. If property rights for the technology of the innovation are
not secured, there are no incentives for innovation.5 And if there are secure
property rights, this depends on the implemented institutions. So institutions
also affect income. Empirical evidence for a causal relationship of institutions
on growth is provided, for example by Dollar and Kraay (2003), Glaeser et al.
(2004) and Levine (2005).
Education and population are assumed to be exogenous. Education is not ex-
pected to be endogenous because the current level of institutions may only affect
the educational system of future periods and then primarily the part of pupils,
newly entering school but less those who are already enrolled in school and it
should not have any effect on the current educational system.6
The difference generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator, proposed by
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) as well as the system
GMM, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
address the above noted problems. The estimator is constructed for linear dy-
namic panel equations with a small number of periods and a large number of
individuals, a dynamic dependent variable, which is influenced by its past values,
further endogenous explanatory variables, fixed individual effects and heterosce-
dasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but not across them (Arellano
and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Furthermore, it is assumed that
the only instruments available are internal, i.e. they are based on lags of the
5See also North (1990) for a detailed discussion of the importance of institutions for eco-
nomic development.
6For example, the German schooling system had a reform, where pupils could earn the
diploma “Abitur” after 12 years instead of 13 years. But this affected only pupils newly
entering high school and it took at least another 8 years until the first students graduated
(Huebner and Marcus, 2017).
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instrumented variables. This is an important characteristic as it appears to be
very difficult to find suitable instruments for endogenous variables from outside
the model. These instruments have to be highly correlated with the endogenous
variables, but at the same time, they need to be uncorrelated with the quality
of institutions and to vary over time. The model to be estimated takes the
following general form of an autoregressive panel data model, which is used to
explain the estimation framework:
yit = αyi,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + ζXit + µi + εit (2.2)
The basic idea which is incorporated in the difference GMM is to remove the
individual fixed effects and thus the potential for omitted variable bias by taking
first differences as in equation (3). By this transformation, the lagged dependent
variable ∆yi,t−1 = yi,t−1−yi,t−2 is still related to the error term ∆εit = εit−εi,t−1
via the terms yi,t−1 and εi,t−1 and thus needs to be instrumented. But now
∆yi,t−2 and yi,t−2 become valid instruments, which are related to the lagged de-
pendent variable but not to the error term as long as the errors are not serially
correlated. Other explanatory variables also remain endogenous and need to be
instrumented by their lags. After instrumenting, the transformed equation can
be estimated using GMM.
∆yit = α∆yi,t−1 + γ∆Xi,t−1 + ζ∆Xit + ∆µi + ∆εit (2.3)
This estimation is performed by creating a system of equations of moment con-
ditions as in equation (4), which indicates that all instruments are uncorrelated
with the errors. With z being a vector of j instruments, there is a system of
equations equal to the number of instruments.
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E(ε|z) = 0 (2.4)
If there are more instruments, i.e. more equations than parameters to be estim-
ated, in general, there is no solution. The system is over-identified and usually
all moment conditions cannot be satisfied. The GMM estimator now estim-
ates equation (3) by minimizing the vector EN(zε) of N observations, that is,
forcing the empirical moments as close to zero as possible. For this minimiza-
tion problem, the one-step GMM estimator defines a weighting matrix, which
weighs each moment condition. That means, in the optimal case, large weights
are provided to moments with small variances, while instruments with large
variances are deemphasized by smaller weights. Through this procedure, the in-
formation from instruments with relatively small variances is not lost. In infinite
samples the GMM estimator is consistent and efficient.7 So when N increases
the weighting matrix converges to the optimal matrix. But as the sample size is
limited, the instruments are expected to correlate at least slightly with the en-
dogenous part of the regressors. So in a finite sample it is crucial not to include
too many instruments.
Estimating GMM using a second step can lead to a gain in precision. The two
step GMM estimator uses the estimated residuals from the first step to create
a covariance matrix of estimated residuals and then does the GMM estimation
again. In difference GMM, two step GMM generally leads to lower bias and lower
standard errors compared to one step GMM. But in small samples, the two step
estimator can produce severely downward biased standard errors, which indicate
a deceptive precision. This is due to the second step, where the efficient weight
matrix is constructed using parameter estimates without accounting for their
7See Hansen (1982).
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variability. Windmeijer (2005) derives a small-sample correction term, which
corrects for the extra variation in a small sample.
Blundell and Bond (1998) find that in small samples, which include a persistent
and short time-series the results of the difference GMM contain a small sample
bias and lose precision. As already suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995), one
reason is that lagged levels incorporate little information about future changes
if the dependent variable is close to a random walk and thus lagged levels are
poor instruments for differenced endogenous regressors. They are the first to
propose the use of lagged differenced instruments for the levels equation. Blun-
dell and Bond (1998) show that additional moment conditions for the levels
equation, which create a system of equations, contain information even when
data is persistent and instruments for the first-difference transformed equation
are poor. They formalize necessary assumptions to instrument endogenous vari-
ables in the levels equation. The additional moment conditions indicate that
changes in any instrumenting variable z are orthogonal to the individual spe-
cific effects µi: E(∆zit|µi) = 0. As long as the εit are not serially correlated
∆zi,t−1 = zi,t−1 − zi,t−2 can be used as an instrument for the endogenous vari-
able zi,t−1, which does not correlate with the idiosyncratic error εit in the levels
equation. As the levels equation still includes fixed effects, the assumption that
the change in the instrumenting variable ∆zi is orthogonal to the fixed effects,
µi, is not obvious.
But Blundell and Bond (1998) show that under certain conditions this assump-
tion is satisfied. Specifically, they show that the initial conditions process of the
data, generating the dependent variable, is crucial. In the long run, based on
µi, the initial value of a dependent variable y in a simple auto-regressive model,
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where the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is smaller than 1, yi1 con-
verges to µi/(1 − α) with εit indicating the deviation from this long-run level:
yi1 = µi/(1−α)+εit. Then, the necessary assumption is fulfilled if the deviation
from the long-run level is not correlated with the level itself. In other words,
the assumption holds if the original series have a constant correlation over time
with the individual specific effects, also referred to as the “mean stationarity”
assumption.
However, the performance is reduced if the coefficient of the lagged depend-
ent variable approaches unity. When the constant correlation assumption is
violated, taking first differences does not completely remove the unobserved
individual-specific effect and lagged differenced instruments for the levels equa-
tion will not be exogenous anymore. As a result, the system GMM will not be
valid anymore. In general, the Sargan or Hansen test statistic provide informa-
tion on the validity of used instruments. Details on the appropriate range, which
suggest the validity of instruments are given in the following chapter, where the
results are discussed.
Using system GMM, the two-step estimator is, in general, more efficient than
one-step, when Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors are applied. Then
the standard covariance matrix is robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity. Taking the efficiency gains of the system GMM into account,
the two-step system GMM is used for the analysis. In the two-step GMM es-
timates, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors is
employed. To test appropriate lags as instruments for each endogenous variable,
first stage regressions were implemented for all endogenous variables and lags.
All results are presented in the following section.
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2.3.3 Results
A useful check for the GMM estimation are the estimation results from OLS and
within transformation, which can be interpreted as a bound for the true estim-
ate of the lagged dependent variable (Bond, 2002). While the OLS estimate is
upward biased, the estimate resulting from the within transformation is down-
ward biased as it does not remove the dynamic panel bias completely. As the
within transformation subtracts the mean of each variable over all periods, the
transformed terms still include parts of the lagged dependent variable, which are
correlated with the error term. The true parameter estimates should lie within
the range of the coefficients of OLS and the within transformation.
In a first step, the quality of institutions is regressed on the lagged depend-
ent variable and the main controls, which earlier empirical studies proved to be
significant determinants of institutions, namely, the natural logarithm of popula-
tion, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (income), press freedom, conflicts
and education. I implement three different estimations using the OLS estimator
(OLS), the within estimator (FE) and the system GMM estimator (sysGMM).
The results are reported in table 2.2.
The estimate of the lagged dependent variable, 0.433, lies within the bound of
the OLS and FE (0.492 and 0.293, respectively) and is significant at the one
percent level. So system GMM can be applied as a consistent and efficient es-
timator.
While first order serial correlation in differenced residuals is expected, as ∆εi,t =
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Table 2.2: Comparison of System GMM Results with OLS and FE
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE sysGMM
INST (t-1) 0.492∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.035) (0.062)
Ln(Population) 0.053 -0.426 0.099
(0.034) (0.438) (0.082)
Ln(GDPpc) 0.367∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.294) (0.140)
Press Freedom 0.216∗∗∗ 0.009 0.156
(0.070) (0.164) (0.197)
Conflicts -0.257∗ -0.193 -0.490
(0.149) (0.328) (0.438)
Education -0.006 -0.004 -0.010
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Obs. 493 493 493
Countries 87 87
No. Instruments 77
Lags t-3, t-4, t-5
AB(2) p-value 0.021
AB(3) p-value 0.944
Hansen p-value 0.227
(i) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(ii) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted
by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
(iii) All models include year fixed effects.
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εi,t − εi,t−1 and ∆εi,t−1 = εi,t−1 − εi,t−2 both contain εi,t−1, the p-value of the
Arellano-Bond test of second order serial correlation in differences, AB(2) p-
value, of 0.021 shows that there is also second order serial correlation. That is,
∆εi,t correlates with ∆εi,t−2, which indicates first-order correlation in levels as
these terms show the relationship between εi,t−1 and εi,t−2. This makes the first
lag inappropriate as an instrument since the first lag is now endogenous.
Table 2.3 presents the first estimations of system GMM, where PTAs and depth
of PTAs is included. The Hansen p-value, which is reported in every column,
is used to assess the applied set of instruments. It indicates if the applied in-
struments are valid. If a model is over-identified, which means that too many
instruments are included, the test will show unreliably high p-values. Such high
values reveal a very good instrument set by mistake, since the test is weakened
by too many instruments. One has to be cautious if the p-value becomes too
large, while on the other hand too small values would indicate that instruments
are invalid. Roodman (2009) suggests, one should be cautious about values be-
low 0.1 and values well above 0.25. Although this does not constitute a strict
threshold, it provides a range of reference.
Table 2.3 presents the results when the number of PTAs of the previous period
(PTAs (t-1)) and depth of PTAs signed in the previous period (Depth (t-1))
are included separately in model (1) and (2) and together in the third model
and, finally, when both variables are interacted in the forth model. In the first
regression, lag 4 is used for instrumenting, which leads to a p-value of 0.173 and
a suitable set of instruments. If lag 3 is used for this estimation, the Hansen
p-value becomes (0.095), which gives rise for invalid instruments. In models (2)
to (4) lag three is used for instrumenting. In all regressions of table 2.3 instru-
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Table 2.3: Two-step System GMM Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INST (t-1) 0.364∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.095) (0.084) (0.067)
Ln(Population) 0.138∗ 0.151∗ 0.116 0.107
(0.082) (0.082) (0.078) (0.071)
Ln(GDPpc) 0.583∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.201) (0.153) (0.165)
Press Freedom 0.424∗ -0.040 0.217 0.108
(0.245) (0.200) (0.245) (0.229)
Conflicts -0.735 -0.647 -0.329 -0.232
(0.596) (0.564) (0.515) (0.447)
Education -0.014 -0.007 -0.013 -0.007
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
PTAs (t-1) -0.024 -0.023 0.080
(0.026) (0.024) (0.091)
Depth (t-1) 0.151∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.046) (0.059)
PTAs(t-1)×Depth(t-1) -0.032
(0.028)
Obs. N 493 493 493 493
Countries 87 87 87 87
# Instruments 49 59 69 79
Lags t-4 t-3 t-3 t-3
AB(2) p-value 0.027 0.010 0.010 0.005
AB(3) p-value 0.990 0.915 0.948 0.882
Hansen p-value 0.173 0.225 0.204 0.216
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
(iii) All models include country and year fixed effects
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ments are uncollapsed.8
Even when the instruments are collapsed, the significance levels of the variables
in any regression reported in table 2.3 remain basically the same. In model
(2) Depth remains highly significant, when instruments are collapsed. When
Depth(t-1) is included together with PTAs in column (3) the significance level
of Depth(t-1) is reduced and in column (4), where the interaction term is in-
cluded, Depth(t-1) becomes insignificant.9 The Hansen p-values reported in
table 2.3 are within the range, which is not too close to 0.1 but still not too
large, that is well above 0.25. The overall results show that the depth of PTAs
matters for institutions. That means higher levels of depth can lead to better
institutions, while the number of PTAs itself does not have any effect on in-
stitutions. PTAs(t-1) is never significant, which indicates that changes in the
number of signed trade agreements do not significantly explain changes in the
institutional quality. That means, simply signing trade agreements does not
help to promote institutions.10
The other coefficients have the expected signs except for Education, which is
negative and significant at the 5 percent level. PressFreedom is positive and
8In section 3.3.3 the estimates of the main significant variables, for which conclusions are
drawn, are presented when also different lag structures are used as instruments and when all
instruments are collapsed, to test whether the results are robust to different sets of instruments.
9The results where, for each model, instruments are collapsed is reported in the Appendix
(table 2.A.4).
10I also checked for different ranges of the number of signed PTAs. That means, one can
argue that the first 5 or 10 PTAs may affect institutions but there might be a threshold
where an additional PTA might not have any significant effect anymore. In other words,
signing an additional 11th or 21st PTAs may not have the same effect as signing the first,
5th or 10th PTA. I test for this by interacting the number of PTAs with dummy variables
for having signed PTAs of the following ranges: one PTA, between 2 and 5 PTAs, between
6 and 10 PTAs, between 11 and 20 and between 21 and 30 PTAs. The results do not show
any significant effect. So there is no evidence that there is a threshold for the number signed
PTAs.
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significant only at the 10 percent level. All else equal, a one within standard
deviation (0.318) in the press freedom would lead to a 0.103 point increase in
institutional quality. Conflicts, is negative but also only significant at the 10
percent level. A highly significant effect at the one percent level is shown by
income, ln(GDPpc), which positively affects the institutions. The effect is more
than three times larger compared to PressFreedom. A one within standard
deviation (0.536) increase in ln(GDPpc) would lead to a 0.332 increase in the
institutional quality.
In the following regressions (columns (2) to (4)), when Depth(t-1) is included,
PressFreedom is no longer significant. Depth might absorb some of the vari-
ation of the two variables. When Depth(t-1) is included without PTAs(t-1) in
column (2), it shows a positive effect on institutions, which is highly significant
at the one percent level. An increase of a one within standard deviation (1.411)
of Depth(t-1) would lead to a 0.213 point increase in the level of institutional
quality. When the number of trade agreements and depth are both included,
PTAs(t-1) still does not show any effect on the quality of institutions and, al-
though the significance level and the effect is reduced, the effect of depth is
still positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The reduction in significance
levels for depth and also for population, which is not significant anymore, can be
a result of the reduction in the degrees of freedom due to additional regressors.
In the final column, an interaction term of PTAs and Depth is included ad-
ditionally to analyze whether changes in PTAs (Depth) influence the effect of
Depth (PTAs) on institutions. The results do not indicate a joint effect of depth
and the number of trade agreements. The effect for depth now becomes larger
again and highly significant. Except for ln(GDPpc), all other controls remain
insignificant.
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Check for heterogeneity of countries
So far, the regressions include all developing countries. But looking at different
country groups, it can be seen that SSA performs very poorly with respect to
several factors of development and institutions compared to other developing
countries.
Figure 2.5: Investment Profile and GDP per capita by Region (2001-04)
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Source: Authors' calculations using ICRG and World Bank data.
Figure 2.5 shows the means of institutional quality and GDP per capita for the
years 2001 to 2004 for SSA, compared to all other developing countries (South)
without SSA and developed countries (North). It shows the poor performance
of SSA with respect to institutions and income. Among the group of all develop-
ing countries, SSA lags behind, which constitutes a persistent situation, which
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does not change in other periods covered in the sample. Furthermore, the same
pattern can be observed for all other dimensions of institutions of the ICRG
data, like law and order, corruption or government stability. With respect to
GDP per capita, this deficit is even more severe.
Table 2.4: Mean for Main Variables by Region
Variable SSA South North
INST 6.552 7.601 9.340
Education 63.735 88.786 104.095
Conflicts 0.218 0.217 0.035
Press Freedom 0.659 1.097 1.978
GDPpc 991.536 7049.104 32556.290
Depth 1.983 1.965 2.584
PTAs 4.806 2.940 26.725
TIPs 2.554 0.860 3.339
This situation, of low income with a low level of institutions is not specific for
Sub-Sahara Africa, but it is the region with the highest density of the poorest
economies in the world. Better levels of institutional quality cannot be observed
for any developing country exhibiting as low per capita income levels as in SSA.
Because they have such poor institutions, it might be more difficult for a country
from SSA to implement reforms in general, as well as provisions of very deep
trade agreements.
Beside the bad economic situation, those countries have to deal with a lot of
other problems like intra- and interstate conflicts, diseases and bad infrastruc-
ture. Table 2.4 reveals that SSA performs poorer compared to other developing
countries with respect to factors, which are also included in this analysis. The
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Press Freedom is distinctly lower than in other developing countries. A higher
press freedom might serve as a provider of information and as a control on gov-
ernment policies and thus can also promote the successful implementation of
policies. Low press freedom instead impedes this positive effect. There is much
lower school enrollment, while the presence of conflicts is similarly large as the
South without SSA. But in this context, it should be pronounced that this vari-
able does not provide information on the intensity of conflicts.
Overall, this shows the poor performance of SSA and it can be expected that
SSA governments do not have the capacity to address all issues at once and
even processes in general might be less efficient. Furthermore, a country needs
to have some basic rules implemented before other rules, which are included in a
PTA, can be implemented. Moreover SSA countries tend to sign a larger number
of PTAs compared to other developing countries. Until the final period of this
data set, the mean number of agreements signed by SSA countries lies above
the average of other developing countries. Up to period 5 the mean is even more
than twice as large. Over the whole period observed, on average a SSA country
signs almost 5 trade agreements while other developing countries on average
sign three PTAs. So SSA seems to sign relatively more PTAs, whereby this
even might increase the burden on the national institutions to implement the
agreements properly. Following these considerations, I expect, that the effects
of Depth (t-1) and PTAs(t-1) are different for SSA countries.
Table 2.5 reports the results of a regression, where PTAs(t-1) and Depth(t-1)
are now interacted with dummies, indicating SSA countries (PTAs SSA (t-1),
Depth SSA (t-1)) and all other developing countries without SSA (PTAs w/o
SSA (t-1), Depth w/o SSA (t-1)), respectively. All other control variables (ex-
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Table 2.5: Effects of PTAs and Depth by Country Group
(1)
PTAs w/o SSA (t-1) -0.041
(0.037)
Depth w/o SSA (t-1) 0.181∗∗∗
(0.051)
PTAs SSA (t-1) 0.258∗∗
(0.111)
Depth SSA (t-1) -0.310
(0.295)
Obs. N 595
Countries 90
# Instruments 32
Lags t-3, t-4
AB(2) p-value 0.001
AB(3) p-value 0.749
Hansen p-value 0.157
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted
by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
49
2.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
cept for Education) are included but not shown.11 Education is not significant
in any regression where Depth (t-1) and PTAs (t-1) are included. To have more
observations education is excluded. Due to the additionally included interac-
tion terms, which need to be instrumented, all instruments are collapsed to
avoid a too high instruments count, which would lead to too large p-values for
the Hansen test statistic.
For developing countries without SSA, it can be seen that the positive effect of
depth becomes larger compared to the effect of all developing countries includ-
ing SSA and it is significant at the one percent level. A one within standard
deviation increase in the depth index now leads to an increase in the institution
index by 0.254 points. The effect of the number of signed PTAs for this group
remains insignificant. For SSA, the effect of depth is not significant, while the
effect of the number of signed PTAs now becomes positive and significant at the
5 percent level. This supports the argument that even if those countries sign
deep PTAs, they are not able to implement them effectively. On the other hand,
for all other developing countries without SSA the positive effect of deep trade
agreements becomes even larger compared to regressions when SSA is included.
While for SSA simply signing trade agreements has an effect, this supports the
argument that simply joining networks with trading partners has a positive ef-
fect in these countries.
Finally, it should be noted that the different effects, when SSA is excluded, do
not only result from an overall lower institutional quality related to SSA but
other factors related to SSA must play a role. I also check, whether the effects
of PTAs(t-1) and Depth(t-1) for all developing countries differ with regard to
11For detailed results including all control variables see in the Appendix (table 2.A.5).
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different levels of institutional quality. For this, I perform regressions, where
PTAs(t-1) and Depth(t-1) are interacted with a dummy for having an institu-
tional quality index larger (smaller) than 5, 7 or 8 but this interaction term
never becomes significant.
Check for heterogeneity of agreements
At this point all types of PTAs are included, which have the potential to liber-
alize trade in any form. This includes partial scope agreements as well as full
free trade agreements.
Besides the number of PTAs, signatures of (bilateral) investment treaties have
increased, especially in the course of the 1990s. The main motive to sign invest-
ment treaties is to protect foreign investment. This is why developed countries
were the initiators of those agreements. They are typically exporting capital
into developing countries where the legal system usually is less developed and
standards are lower compared to the laws, that investors are used to rely on in
their domestic country. By the means of an investment treaty, countries can
set additional legal standards, which are missing in the host country. This pro-
tects the domestic investors, while, for the developing country, this will promote
investment inflows, which are beneficial for development. Consequently, invest-
ment treaties might play an important role in developing the legal institutions
in a developing country and it should be analyzed at this point if treaties, in-
cluding essential provisions with regard to investment, are the driving factor in
promoting institutions or, if the effect does not differ from other PTAs.
To address this question, a new variable, TIPs(t−1), is included. For each coun-
try and year, it sums up all signed treaties with investment provisions (TIPs).
This means, that these agreements include a chapter with substantive provisions
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in investment. Now the variable Depth (t-1) changes to Depth w/o IP (t-1) as
this depth index now does not include investment provisions (IPs). Depth w/o
IP (t-1) now only varies from 0 to 6 instead of a range from 0 to 7. For each
of the provisions, which are covered in the six areas intellectual property rights
(IPRS), procurement, standards, services or competition a value of one is added.
So, if an agreement includes provisions in all areas a depth index of 6 is assigned.
PTAs w/o IP (t-1) similarly now only includes PTAs without any provisions in
investment.
The results are presented in table 2.6. Now only the third lag is used as an in-
strument and the instruments are collapsed to avoid too large Hansen p-values.
The first column shows that, when TIPs are considered separately, the number
of trade agreements signed without investment provisions becomes negative and
significant. A one standard deviation increase in PTAs w/o IP (t-1) leads to
a 1.038 point reduction in the quality of institutions. This value is relatively
large compared to the effects from previous regressions. An explanation for
this negative effect can be that the effort, dedicated to the signature of PTAs,
might reduce the efficiency of government policies with regard to other areas
such as investment. Furthermore, the significant, positive effect of depth now
disappears. This means that the provisions in areas, like intellectual property
rights or standards do not affect institutions, while trade agreements containing
investment provisions seem to play a crucial role. The effect is positive and
significant at the 5 percent level. Now also PressFreedom has a positive and
significant effect. All else equal, an increase in one within standard deviation of
the PressFreedom (0.318)results in an increase of 0.516 points in institutions.
The effect of TIPs (t-1) is only slightly smaller with a 0.458 points increase due
to a one within standard deviation increase (1.483), but larger than the effect
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Table 2.6: Effects for PTAs with and without Investment Provisions (IPs)
(1) (2)
INST (t-1) -0.440∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.113)
Ln(Population) -0.022 0.034
(0.139) (0.146)
Ln(GDPpc) 0.586∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.233)
Press Freedom 1.622∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗
(0.557) (0.592)
Conflicts 2.575 2.615
(1.665) (1.632)
PTAs w/o IP (t-1) -0.206∗∗∗ -0.072
(0.067) (0.224)
Depth w/o IP (t-1) 0.035 0.048
(0.127) (0.134)
PTAs w/o IP × Depth w/o IP (t-1) -0.043
(0.072)
TIPs (t-1) 0.309∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.115)
Obs. N 595 595
Countries 90 90
# Instruments 22 24
Lags t-3 t-3
AB(2) p-value 0.082 0.056
AB(3) p-value 0.514 0.557
Hansen p-value 0.136 0.224
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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of ln(GDPpc), where an increase of one within standard deviation (0.536) leads
to an increase of 0.314 in the institutional quality. Conflicts and Population
do not show a significant effect on institutions.
Column (2) shows that PTAs and depth are independent. The included interac-
tion term of PTAs w/o IP (t-1) and Depth w/o IP (t-1) is not significant. The
same regression as in column (1) is done with PTAs w/o IP (t-1), Depth w/o IP
(t-1) and TIPs (t-1) being interacted with dummies for SSA and all other de-
veloping countries without SSA. The respective results are presented in table 2.7.
A problem, which arises here, is that the inclusion of another control variable,
TIPs(t− 1), and additional interaction terms lead to an increase in the instru-
ment count. To reduce the number of instruments, only the third lag is used and
the instruments are collapsed. Again, all other control variables are included
with the exception of Education.12
For countries from SSA, distinguishing between different types of agreements,
leads to insignificant effects. Signing PTAs with or without investment pro-
visions does not show an effect on institutions. The depth of PTAs without
investment provisions, as in previous regressions, where investment chapters are
included, is not significant. But for all other developing countries without SSA
the positive effect of TIPs increases slightly. Now a one standard deviation in-
crease in TIPs(t−1) (1.719) leads to an increase in institutions by 0.543 points.
The negative effect of PTAs without investment provisions also becomes larger.
A one within standard deviation increase amounts to a 1.144 point reduction
in the institutions index. This is an important result, which suggests that the
12A table with the respective results with all included explanatory variables is included in
the Appendix (table 2.A.6).
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Table 2.7: Effects for PTAs with and without Investment Provisions for SSA
and without SSA
(1)
PTAs w/o IP (t-1)× no SSA -0.195∗∗∗
(0.064)
Depth w/o IP (t-1)× no SSA 0.145
(0.112)
TIPs (t-1)× no SSA 0.316∗∗∗
(0.113)
PTAs w/o IP (t-1)× SSA 0.297
(0.379)
Depth w/o IP (t-1)× SSA 0.142
(0.437)
TIPs (t-1)× SSA -0.131
(0.374)
Obs. N 595
Countries 90
# Instruments 28
Lags t-3
AB(2) p-value 0.019
AB(3) p-value 0.702
Hansen p-value 0.402
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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negative effect of signing a large number of PTAs is more severe than the posit-
ive effect, which results from the number of TIPs. So the overall effects, when
differentiated between the type of trade agreement, again show different results
when SSA is excluded.
Check for robustness of instruments
As discussed in chapter 2.3.2, using system GMM raises the risk of instrument
proliferation, which causes the Hansen test to show implausibly high p-values
close to one and thus fails to indicate that the model is over-fitted due to a high
number of instruments, resulting in too small standard errors. Consequently,
using different lag structures can affect the results. To show how the results
develop for Depth (t-1) and TIPs (t-1) using different numbers of lags as instru-
ments, figure 2.6 shows the parameter estimates for both variables (graphs on
the left) and when interacted with a dummy for the South without SSA Depth
w/o SSA (t-1) and TIPs w/o SSA(t-1), respectively on the right) using different
lag lengths as instruments.
The estimates for Depth (t-1) and Depth w/o SSA (t-1) are based on the results
presented in table 2.3 column (3) and table 2.5, respectively. The estimates
for TIPs (t-1) and TIPs w/o SSA(t-1) are based on the regressions shown in
the first column of table 2.6 and in table 2.7, respectively. The solid lines
indicate the parameter estimates, while the dashed lines indicate 95 percent
confidence intervals (CIs). At the very left point of the solid line Depth (t-1)
is instrumented with the difference lagged by three periods, now with collapsed
instruments. Moving from here to the right along the solid line, an additional
lagged difference is included in the set of instruments, up to a total of differ-
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Figure 2.6: Robustness of Estimates using Different Lags as Instruments
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ences, lagged by 8 periods. The estimate for Depth (t-1) varies more, relative
to uncollapsed instruments. But when instruments are uncollapsed, including
more than one lag leads to an increase instruments, leading to a suspiciously
large Hansen p-value. The parameter estimates become smaller the more lags
are included. It varies from 0.140 when only lag 3 is used, leading to a number
of 21 instruments, to 0.065 when lags 3 to 8 are used, which leads to 45 instru-
ments in total. Moreover, the estimates are not significant anymore when lags
6 and longer are included.
The estimate Depth w/o SSA (t-1) depicts the point on the solid line at lag
depth 4 in the top right graph, where differences lagged by period 3 and 4 are
included in the instrument set. At lag depth 8 all periods from 3 to 8 are used as
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instruments. The estimates of Depth w/o SSA (t-1) vary only little and remain
relatively stable. It ranges from 0.186, when only lag 3 is used, to 0.126, when
all lags are used, starting in period 3 and leading to a total number of 36 instru-
ments. The effect remains highly significant at the 1 percent level, independent
of the lag length.
The estimates of TIPs (t-1) and TIPs w/o SSA(t-1) depict the starting point
of the solid line at lag length 3. So the estimation results, which I report above,
are already very conservative with respect to the set of instruments since the
minimum number of instruments is included. Increasing the lag length from 3
to 5 periods, the estimates for TIPs (t-1) and TIPs w/o SSA(t-1) reduce by
more than 0.1 points, but then remain stable and significant, independent from
the lag length used for the instrument set.
2.4 Conclusion
The phenomenon of the increase in signature rates of trade agreements since
the 1990s, has experienced a lot of attention in the academic research. A sub-
stantial part of the agreements is between developing and developed countries
i.e. between North and South. Almost simultaneously, the content of trade
agreements has changed. PTAs have become deeper. They distinctly exceed
regulations from the WTO. PTAs more and more specify political cooperation
and include “behind-the-border” rules in different areas such as investment, in-
tellectual property, competition policy or the rule of law. It can be observed that
North-South PTAs on average are deeper compared to other types of PTAs, i.e.
North-North and South-South PTAs. This development is one result of missing
or poor institutions in developing countries trading with developed countries,
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where firms can do business in a good institutional environment.
This paper provides evidence on whether trade agreements can serve as a driver
of institutional quality in developing countries by accounting for the number of
signed PTAs as well as the depth of PTAs. I build the anaylsis on the compre-
hensive DESTA database, including a very broad set of trade agreements and a
measure for the content of PTAs. I am specifically looking at the effects on the
quality of institutions with regard to investment, since these institutions play
an important role for trading firms and firms investing abroad. Rules affecting
this type of institutions are expected to be essential in trade agreements. I use
a long panel to account for the changes over time and to address endogeneity
issues.
The results confirm that deep trade agreements have a positive effect on insti-
tutions. But at the same time, the effects differ with regard to different regions.
SSA appears to play a specific role. Compared to other developing countries,
in SSA the economic and political performance is distinctly poorer. The results
show that signing deep PTAs does not have any effect on institutions in SSA.
Focusing on developing countries excluding SSA, the positive effect of depth
becomes even larger, compared to the effect when SSA is included, it is highly
significant and robust to different lag structures of instruments.
When looking at different types of trade agreements, investment treaties, i.e.
those agreements, including substantive investment provisions (TIPs), show to
be the important drivers of change in institutional quality. However, signing
PTAs in general has no effect. The positive effect of TIPs on institutions even
exceeds the overall effect of the deep PTAs. This effect, again, is not present
59
2.4. CONCLUSION
for SSA, where the signing of neither TIPs nor deep PTAs does have an effect
on institutional quality.
These results reveal positive aspects of the increase in the number of signed
North-South trade agreements, especially those including investment provisions.
It can be a chance for developing countries to improve domestic institutions,
which again has a positive effect on the overall development of the country.
However, it should be emphasized, that the analysis focuses on specific insti-
tutions related to trade and investment abroad. Besides, this paper has also
highlights once more, the specific role of SSA as a region of developing coun-
tries, which performs poorer relative to other developing countries with regard
to political and economic variables.
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2.A Appendix
Table 2.A.1: Description of Variables and Sources
Variable Description Source
INST Investment Profile, component
of the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG)
ICRG database by PRS Group
(2016)
PTAs Cumulative sum of the number
of signed trade agreements for
each country
Design of Trade Agreements
(DESTA) database by Du¨r,
Baccini and Elsig (2014)
Depth Average depth of all
agreements signed
Design of Trade Agreements
(DESTA) database by Du¨r,
Baccini and Elsig (2014)
TIPs Number of signed Treaties
with investment provisions
Authors calculations based on:
Design of Trade Agreements
(DESTA) database by Du¨r,
Baccini and Elsig (2014)
Education Gross enrollment ratio,
primary and secondary, both
sexes (in percent)
The World Bank (2016)
Conflicts Conflicts of intrastate conflict.
Coded 1 in all country-years
with at least one active conflict
The UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset: Gleditsch
et al. (2002); Allansson et al.
(2017)
Population Population (in million) The World Bank (2016)
Press Freedom Degree of the freedom of the
press, 0 (not free), 1 (partly
free), 2 (completely free)
Freedom House (2016)
GDPpc GDP per capita (current USD) The World Bank (2016)
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Table 2.A.2: List of Countries Categorized as North or South
Northern countries Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States
Southern countries Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo,
Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Rep. of Korea, Kuwait,
Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Lithuania, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Moldova,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar,
Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Province of
China, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Table 2.A.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
INST overall 761 7.09 2.27 0.50 12.00
between 1.56 2.44 10.55
within 1.66 1.66 10.29
PTAs overall 792 3.18 3.33 0.00 33.50
between 2.49 0.03 15.03
within 2.23 -11.85 21.65
Depth overall 792 1.80 1.61 0.00 7.00
between 0.75 0.00 4.61
within 1.43 -2.81 6.51
TIPs overall 792 1.30 1.56 0.00 10.75
between 1.20 0.00 3.84
within 0.99 -1.94 8.81
Education overall 652 80.45 20.95 14.60 113.28
between 19.56 17.20 103.63
within 9.43 46.28 113.45
Conflicts overall 768 0.20 0.37 0.00 1.00
between 0.31 0.00 1.00
within 0.20 -0.58 1.05
Ln (Population) overall 783 16.01 1.66 12.33 21.03
between 1.66 12.55 20.93
within 0.21 15.13 17.06
Press Freedom overall 714 0.85 0.73 0.00 2.00
between 0.65 0.00 2.00
within 0.35 -0.55 1.85
Ln (GDPpc) overall 747 7.58 1.47 4.19 11.41
between 1.36 5.28 10.39
within 0.54 6.17 9.46
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Table 2.A.4: Two-step System GMM Results (Baseline with Collapsed Instru-
ments)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
inv prof inv prof inv prof inv prof
INST (t-1) 0.314∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗
(0.169) (0.096) (0.108) (0.128)
Ln(Population) 0.206 0.079 -0.033 -0.012
(0.177) (0.080) (0.091) (0.104)
Ln(GDPpc) 0.716∗∗ 0.442∗∗ 0.460∗∗ 0.381
(0.318) (0.200) (0.232) (0.268)
Press Freedom 0.245 0.320 0.592 0.955
(0.873) (0.410) (0.490) (0.659)
Conflicts -1.104 0.135 0.413 0.955
(2.226) (0.886) (1.017) (1.182)
Education -0.017 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
PTAs (t-1) -0.007 -0.028 -0.203
(0.060) (0.039) (0.128)
Depth (t-1) 0.200∗∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.074
(0.068) (0.071) (0.085)
PTAs(t-1)×depth(t-1) 0.057
(0.035)
Obs. N 493 493 474 474
Countries 87 87 86 86
# Instruments 19 19 21 23
Lags t-4 t-3 t-3 t-3
AB(2) p-value 0.098 0.008 0.019 0.096
AB(3) p-value 0.872 0.885 0.596 0.395
Hansen p-value 0.196 0.266 0.026 0.134
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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Table 2.A.5: Effects for Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) and all other Southern Coun-
tries without SSA (w/o SSA)
(1)
INST (t-1) 0.371∗∗∗
(0.084)
ln(Population) 0.096
(0.119)
ln(GDPpc) 0.667∗∗∗
(0.235)
Press Freedom 0.372
(0.303)
Conflicts 0.106
(1.005)
PTAs w/o SSA (t-1) -0.041
(0.037)
Depth w/o SSA (t-1) 0.181∗∗∗
(0.051)
PTA SSA (t-1) 0.258∗∗
(0.111)
Depth SSA (t-1) -0.310
(0.295)
Obs. N 595
Countries 90
# Instruments 32
Lags t-3, t-4
AB(2) p-value 0.001
AB(3) p-value 0.749
Hansen p-value 0.157
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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Table 2.A.6: Effects for PTAs with and without Investment Provisions without
SSA and for SSA
(1)
INST (t-1) 0.423∗∗∗
(0.098)
ln(Population) -0.038
(0.133)
ln(GDPpc) 0.578∗
(0.301)
Press Freedom 1.199∗∗
(0.470)
Conflicts 2.577
(1.553)
PTAs w/o IP (t-1)×no SSA -0.195∗∗∗
(0.064)
Depth w/o IP (t-1)×no SSA 0.145
(0.112)
TIPs (t-1)×no SSA 0.316∗∗∗
(0.113)
PTAs w/o IP (t-1)×SSA 0.297
(0.379)
Depths w/o IP (t-1)×SSA -0.142
(0.437)
TIPs (t-1)×SSA -0.131
(0.374)
Obs. N 595
Countries 90
# Instruments 28
Lags t-3
AB(2) p-value 0.002
AB(3) p-value 0.667
Hansen p-value 0.189
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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Formation of North-South Trade
Agreements: The Role of
Institutional Distance and the
Content of Trade
3.1 Introduction
Although today there is a prominent debate about disintegration due to the daily
report about the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European
Union (EU), the “Brexit”, we see a constantly increasing number of signed trade
agreements at the same time.
Figure 3.1 shows the cumulative number of signed trade agreements since 1948,
differentiated according to the income level of its member countries. Here North
is denoted as industrialized countries and South as developing countries with
a GDP per capita below 11,115. At the beginning of the 1990s there is a
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substantial increase in overall signature rates. Although most agreements are
signed between countries of similar income, between industrialized countries
(North-North, dashed line) and between developing countries (South-South,
long-dashed line), trade agreements between asymmetric countries (North-South,
solid line) have increasingly been signed and are still being signed. The largest
increase is attributed to South-South agreements. But still there is a substantial
number of North-South trade agreements with almost 200 agreements between
developed (North) and developing (South) countries.
Figure 3.1: Cumulative Number of Trade Agreements in Force
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Source: Author’s own illustration based on the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) data-
base by Du¨r et al. (2014).
Only recently different types of trade agreements were implemented. With the
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, which entered into force in Feb-
ruary 2019, the largest free trade zone has been established between Northern
countries. In June 2018, with the EFTA-Philippines Free Trade Agreement,
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a new North-South trade agreement went into force between the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA, including Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and
Switzerland) and the Philippines. This was only about one year after the most
recent South-South trade agreement between Peru and Honduras went into force
in January 2017.
Besides the increase in the number of PTAs, the content of PTAs has changed.
There are rules and commitments included in PTAs, which go beyond market
access rules but cover provisions referring to investment, protection of intellec-
tual, industrial or commercial property rights, or competition policy (Du¨r et al.,
2014). This shows that trade agreements are not only related to trade integra-
tion but also political and legal aspects.
In this paper, I examine empirically the determinants of preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs) and argue that institutional distance plays an important role in
the formation of PTAs. Furthermore, I argue that the effect of institutional
distance is specifically relevant if trade includes (i) a high share of contract-
intensive goods where the risk of potential hold-up is high and (ii) developing
countries where institutions are typically weak.
I refer to PTAs following Lima˜o (2016), who defines a PTA as “an international
treaty with restrictive membership and including any articles that (i) apply only
to its members and (ii) aim to secure or increase their respective market access.”
On the one hand, this definition describes the discriminatory nature of a treaty
since it includes rules which apply only to its members. On the other hand, it
implies that only treaties, which provide market access at least to some extent,
are included while treaties which only refer to trade-related topics without gen-
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erating additional market access are not covered.
Institutional distance, describes the difference in institutional quality between a
country pair. The focus of institutional quality in the following analysis will be
on a country’s legal system and the implementation of the law and on financial
aspects, assessing the ability to enforce contracts, transfer secure payments and
the general risk of expropriation.
Contract-intensity refers to a measure created by Nunn (2007), which specifies
for each good the share of the intermediate inputs that require relationship-
specific investments. Relationship-specificity refers to the market thickness of a
product. That means, if an input is highly relationship-specific the market is
not thick and there is only a very low number of potential buyers.
So far, there is little empirical research on the determinants of PTAs. Baier
and Bergstrand (2004) constitute the first empirical examination in this regard
and they develop a benchmark model of economic determinants of free trade
agreements.
Since then we can observe an increase in the complexity of global production
networks (Johnson and Noguera, 2017; Timmer et al., 2014). Since the begin-
ning of the 1990s and with the exception of a short downturn during the financial
crisis, we can observe an expansion of global value chains where large producers
allocate their production phases all over the world. Low unit labor costs have
made developing countries become attractive participants in global value chains
(Degain et al., 2017). We can see this in an increase in exports of manufactured
goods from low-income to high-income countries (The World Bank, 2017). This
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leads to a high interdependence between developed and developing countries and
their domestic firms, which may generate a factor for the formation of PTAs,
specifically between asymmetric countries.
To some extend the literature on the determinants of PTAs addresses this is-
sue by accounting for vertical intra-industry trade (VIIT) and production net-
works as factors for PTA formation and specifically consider North-South PTAs
(Manger, 2012; Orefice and Rocha, 2014).
To my knowledge, no empirical research links institutional distance and the
characteristics of traded goods as factors to explain the formation of PTAs.
The following analysis relates to the fact that global production networks involve
multiple agents and countries where different legal systems apply, which leads to
a higher complexity of contracting and an increase in the risk of incomplete con-
tracts and hold-up. As argued by Dollar and Kidder (2017), well-developed legal
and enforcement institutions of the trading partner reduces these risks. Good
legal institutions support commercial transactions by effectively implementing
the law and mechanisms for contract enforcement and by securing property.1
I argue that institutional differences between country pairs and poor enforce-
ment institutions in the partner country can increase the probability that two
countries form a PTA because a PTA can serve as a legal instrument to com-
pensate for missing institutions. Since PTAs include an increasing set of laws
and commitments, which regulate domestic policies and institutions, they con-
stitute a good mechanism to incorporate missing institutions. This positive
effect may not be linear. If distance in institutional quality is too large a con-
1Rubin (2008), for example, illustrates the importance of legal institutions for transactions,
the protection of property rights and investment.
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tract in the form of a PTA may become too complex, resulting in a potentially
negative effect at a certain level of institutional distance.
I expect that two factors potentially promote the positive effect of institutional
distance. First, if one partner trades a large share of contract-intensive goods
this further increases the risk of hold-up since the market thickness for those
goods is low, which makes well-implemented enforcement institutions specific-
ally important. Thus, trading contract-intensive goods increases the demand
for good enforcement institutions and reinforces the need for a PTA when in-
stitutional distance is large. Antra`s and Staiger (2012) for example address
the link of relationship-specific goods and the arising problem of hold-up in
connection with off-shoring, arguing that increases in global off-shoring require
effective trade agreements and deep integration. I create a bilateral measure of
distance in contract-intensive goods, which accounts for large one-way trade of
contract-intensive goods, which is related to a high need of institutional quality.2
Second, institutional distance is specifically present between North-South coun-
try pairs because institutions in developing countries are on average weaker
compared to developed countries. The left panel of figure 3.2 shows exactly
this pattern. Institutional distance on average is larger between North-South
country pairs compared to country pairs with similar incomes (that is, North-
North and South-South). The right panel of figure 3.2 also reveals that large
distances in trade of contract-intensive goods are specifically present in North-
South relationships. Industrialized countries from the North typically trade
more contract-intensive goods (like aircraft, automobile or computer manufac-
turing) compared to the South, which is reflected in the large mean value for
2A more detailed description of this measure is provided in chapter 3.3.2.
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North-South country pairs, while the difference for North-North trade is relat-
ively small.
Figure 3.2: Mean Institutional Distance and Distance of Contract-intensive
Goods Traded for Different Groups of Country Pairs (North-North, North-
South, South-South)
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Institutional distance
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Distance in trade of contract-
intensive goods
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) and COMTRADE database.
For my empirical analysis I create a bilateral data set of 132 countries includ-
ing 89 developing countries and 3495 trade agreements between unique country
pairs notified over 21 years. I differentiate between different types of PTAs
with respect to the income level of the member countries. The empirical find-
ings support the existence of an interdependence between institutional distance
and trade in contract-intensive goods. Institutional distance promotes the like-
lihood of PTA formation, although the effect is nonlinear and it is reinforced
by the distance of trade in contract-intensive goods. The positive effect of in-
stitutional distance is only present when developing countries are involved and
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it is strongest for North-South country pairs. The joint effect of institutional
distance and trade in contract-intensive goods is also most relevant in a North-
South relationship, but is mainly driven by members of the European Union
(EU), which export large shares of contract-intensive goods.
The paper continues in the next section with an overview of the previous re-
search in the field of international trade agreements focusing on the empirical
literature of the determinants of trade agreements. In section 3.3, I present
the estimation framework, the data and data sources and the estimation results.
The final section concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
According to Maggi (2014) the literature on international trade agreements can
be categorized into three main research streams, namely (1) the motives for
trade agreements, (2) the design of rules and institutions and (3) regional trade
agreements. The three areas cannot be regarded as completely separate cat-
egories. To some extend they are all interrelated.
Studies dealing with the motives of trade agreements focus on two main strands.
On the one hand, they demonstrate the externalities, which lead to inefficien-
cies, which dissappear or diminish in the presence of PTAs and thus explain
why governments want to sign PTAs. These externalities include terms-of-trade
externatlities (Bagwell and Staiger, 2004) or imperfect competition, which ap-
pears in the new trade theory with firm delocation (Bagwell and Staiger, 2004;
Ossa, 2011) or profit shifting (Ossa, 2012). On the other hand, PTAs constitute
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an instrument to help implement domestic policies. It can be a commitment
device helping countries to stick to certain policies, which is based on models
by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998), Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2007) or
Lima˜o and Tovar (2011) or as Lima˜o and Maggi (2015) state, PTAs can serve
as an instrument to reduce uncertainty arising from an unstable economic or
political environments.
The research on the design of trade agreements originates from the presence of
frictions or transaction costs, which provide reasons for why governments are not
able to write complete and fully efficient contracts. The literature categorizes
two types of frictions. One type focuses on contract frictions as for example Horn
et al. (2010) or Bagwell and Staiger (2001) who differentiate between ‘deep’ and
‘shallow’ agreements and Maggi and Staiger (2011) who analyze how to com-
plete an agreement. Another type of frictions is the self-enforcement of trade
agreements. In this regard, Maggi (1999) and Bagwell et al. (2007) examine the
optimal design of trade trade agreements.
The third stream of literature focuses on regional trade agreements (RTAs), in-
cluding the determinants and the impacts of trade agreements. The impacts
of RTAs deal with the effects they have on its member countries compared to
the “outsiders”. This already relates to the definition of RTAs, which implies
that integration does not take place on a multilateral basis but applies only to
a “region” excluding nonmembers, which is also the main focus of this strand
of the literature. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) RTAs
are reciprocal trade agreements including two ore more partners, and thus this
definition is in line with the definition of a PTA, which I use in this analysis.3 A
3Different sources use different definitions of PTAs or RTAs. The WTO differentiates
between “regional trade agreements”, which, according to the WTO, are reciprocal while
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large strand of theoretical literature deals with this topic. Driving work which
focuses on the effects of member countries, is done by Richardson (1993), Bag-
well and Staiger (1999), Lima˜o (2007) and Ornelas (2005), while Levy (1997)
and Krishna (1998) allow for the effects of RTAs on a multilateral level. Empir-
ical studies include Estevadeordal et al. (2008), Lima˜o (2006) and Karacaovali
and Lima˜o (2008).
The focus of this analysis can mainly be allocated to the determinants of trade
agreements. The theoretic research on the economics of trading blocs is primar-
ily based on competitive and monopolistic competition frameworks by Bald-
win and Venables (1995) and Krugman (1991). While Grossman and Helpman
(1995) analyze if trade agreements promote global welfare, Krishna (1998) fo-
cuses on the profits of domestic firms and claim that trade agreements only arise
if profits in both countries increase, which appears to be more likely if there is
trade-diversion. Krugman et al. (1995) state that PTAs are more likely among
‘natural’ trading partners where gains from mutual trade liberalization are spe-
cifically large, that is, if they are close in geographical distance or because of
their comparative advantage structure.
Freund (2000) analyzes the interrelation of multilateral trade liberalization with
the formation of PTAs in a model with imperfect competition and finds that
multilateral tariff reductions should be followed by an increase in signature rates
of PTAs.
As summarized in table 3.1, five main empirical studies drive the empirical work
on the determinants of PTA formation.
“preferential trade arrangements” are non-reciprocal. In this analysis PTAs are reciprocal
and in line with WTO’s definition of RTAs.
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Table 3.1: Literature on the determinants of trade agreements.
Reference Main Topic Most important ideas/findings
Baier and
Bergstrand
(2004)
• Economic determin-
ants of the formation
of preferencial trade
agreements (PTA)
• Trade-creating and
trade-diverting factors
are important determ-
inants of a PTA
• Creation of a bench-
mark model
Egger
and Larch
(2008)
• Extension of ap-
proach by Baier and
Bergstrand (2004)
• Determinants of PTAs
• Highlights the import-
ance of the interde-
pendence of PTAs by
drawing on spatial eco-
nometrics
• Pre-existing PTAs in-
crease the probability of
bilateral PTAs forma-
tion
• The effect is reduced if
geographical distances
are increased
Mansfield
and Milner
(2012)
• Analysis of importance
of domestic politics as a
factor for the formation
of trade agreements
• Political economy of
PTA formation
• Democracies are more
likely to enter PTAs
• Number of veto players
reduces likelihood of en-
tering a PTA
Manger
(2012)
• Vertical intra-industry
trade and PTA forma-
tion
• North-South PTAs
• Vertical intra-industry
trade in a North-South
relation promotes the
formation of a PTA
Orefice
and Rocha
(2014)
• Production networks
and deep integration
• North versus South
PTAs (with focus on
Asia)
• Positive effect of pro-
duction networks
• Effect mainly driven by
Asia
Source: Author’s illustration and summary of empirical studies.
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The first empirical study to name is by Baier and Bergstrand (2004). They
are the first to analyze empirically the economic determinants of the forma-
tion of PTAs. With their work they create a benchmark model of economic
determinants, which can be extended by further explanatory variables such as
political factors. Based on a general equilibrium model with monopolistic com-
petition and intercontinental and intracontinental transport costs, they estimate
a cross-section of 54 countries in the year 1996. They find that overall, trade-
creating and trade-diverting factors are important determinants in explaining
the probability of an FTA. Their results further show that the probability of two
country pairs forming an FTA increases (1) the closer the distance between the
two countries is, (2) the larger the distance of two continental trading partners
is to the rest of the world (ROW), (3) the larger or more similar in economic
size the countries are, (4) the more different capital-labor ratios are between the
potential members and (5) the higher the similarity of their capital-labor ratios
are with respect to the ROW.
Egger and Larch (2008) extent the approach by Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and
address the interdependence of the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs)
with other trading blocs and already existing trade agreements. They highlight
the importance of joining existing FTAs and build on the ”domino theory of
regionalism” introduced by Baldwin (1997). Furthermore, they allow for the
case that two countries form a new agreement if joining an existing agreement is
no opportunity due to political reasons. They add the time dimension and use
a data set of 145 countries over a period of 1955-2005. They find that already
existing FTAs positively affect the formation of bilateral FTAs. This effect be-
comes smaller as geographic distance increases.
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Mansfield and Milner (2012) focus on the importance of domestic politics for the
formation of PTAs. In their analysis they include 194 countries over a period
from 1950 to 1999. Their results suggest that democracies have a higher prob-
ability to enter PTAs. But the effect declines in the number of veto players.
Manger (2012) and Orefice and Rocha (2014) add on the literature on the de-
terminants of trade agreements by looking at PTAs between asymmetric coun-
tries. Manger (2012) examines the reasons why countries of different economic
size and development status form a PTA. He argues that a main factor of the
increase in PTA formation between asymmetric countries is the specialization
in manufacturing exports according to the development level of a trading part-
ner. He builds a framework where he includes vertical production specialization.
He argues that while developing countries specialize in relatively labor-intensive
goods, developed countries do so in relatively capital-intensive goods. This in-
creases the incentive of two countries to form a trade agreement. He builds a
panel data set of nine developed and 148 developing and transition countries for
the period from 1995 until 2007. To measure the effects of vertical production
specialization he includes his key explanatory variable, measuring the share of
vertical intra-industry trade in the bilateral trade between a North and South
country in a given year. The results indicate that higher vertical specialization
increases the probability of PTA formation.
Although Orefice and Rocha (2014) do not study the determinants of the forma-
tion of trade agreements, they rely on the benchmark model suggested by Baier
and Bergstrand (2004) to examine the factors of the integration level of trade
agreements. Thus the empirical approach is closely related to the other em-
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pirical studies on PTA formation. They argue that production networks trade
drive the level of integration of PTAs. Similar to Manger (2012), they distin-
guish between North and South and analyze whether the effect of production
networks trade is larger for North-South country pairs and especially look at
countries in the Asian region. They find that a higher share of production net-
works trade relative to overall trade increases the probability of signing a deeper
trade agreement. For North-South agreements this effect is even larger. They
use cross-sectional data and include the share of trade in parts and components
over total trade as their main variable of interest.
In the next chapter, I present the empirical model and estimation framework
including potential identification threats, the data and the results of the estim-
ation and some robustness checks.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Estimation Framework
The econonemtric framework to estimate the determinants of PTAs builds on
the qualitative choice model by McFadden (1975) and McFadden (1976), which
is derived from a latent variable model. Here, the dependent variable for prefer-
ential trade agreements, PTA∗ij, reflects differences in the utility of membership
versus non-membership for each country-pair. As utility cannot be observed,
it is modeled as a binary variable, taking the values 0 or 1. As indicated by
equation (1), it takes the value 1, if there is a positive utility change for country
i and j from entering a trade agreement and zero otherwise:
80
Chapter 3
PTA∗ij = min(∆Ui,∆Uj) (3.1)
PTAij = 1, if PTA
∗ > 0
PTAij = 0, if PTA
∗ ≤ 0
The dependent variable shown in the set of equations (1) takes the form of
a binary response model, which seeks to explain the effects of an explanatory
variable xijt on the response probability p(Xijt) ≡ P (PTA = 1|Xijt), where
Xijt can include time-varying and time-invariant regressors, interactions and
time dummies. A binary response model with panel data could be estimated
using a pooled probit model, which is also in line with previous literature on
PTA formation (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004; Egger and Larch, 2008). As I
will discuss in the following, the framework to be estimated makes nonlinear
regressions much more complicated and subject to very strong assumptions, so
that here a linear probability model is applied. Following Egger and Larch
(2008), the panel data is pooled over all periods and the following equation is
estimated:
PTAijt = α + βXijt + β¯X¯ij + ijt. (3.2)
Xijt reflects a matrix of the bilateral explanatory variables including the main
variables of interest and further bilateral controls from the benchmark model by
Baier and Bergstrand (2004). According to Chamberlain (1980) and Wooldridge
(2002) one way to correct for the possibility that time-varying explanatory vari-
ables correlate with time-invariant parts of the error term, is to include averages
of all regressors over all periods for each country pair as additional variables.
X¯ij reflects this procedure and denotes a vector of the mean of all time-varying
independent variables over all periods by country pair. In line with Egger and
81
3.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Larch (2008), I assume that the time-invariant geographical variables are uncor-
related with the error term.
The following analysis focuses on the effects of institutional quality and contract-
intensive goods traded between two countries on their likelihood to form a PTA.
To estimate this relationship, I create two bilateral variables: (i) institutional
distance (InstDist) and (ii) the distance of contract-intensive exports (DistXci)
between each country pair. The effects on the likelihood that a country pair
forms a PTA is visualized in figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Relationship of Institutional Distance and Distance in Relationship-
specific Goods Traded
𝑃𝑇𝐴
+
-++/-
As argued above, for institutional distance I expect a positive effect on PTA
formation. An increase in institutional distance should lead to an increase in
the demand for a PTA as a legal instrument to reduce institutional discrep-
ancies. Additionally, I expect that this relationship is nonlinear and turning
negative for large values of institutional distance, which I account for by includ-
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ing a squared term (InstDist2).
To account for the joint effect of institutional distance and distance in contract-
intensive goods, I interact distance in contract-intensive goods (DistXci) with
institutional distance (InstDist) and the squared term (InstDist2) to examine
whether the positive effect of institutional distance is promoted by a higher dis-
tance in trade of contract-intensive goods and whether it can reduce a potential
negative effect of large institutional distances.
For distance in trade of contract-intensive goods alone the effect is unclear. If
it is small both country pairs are trading contract-intensive goods, which could
promote a utility increase for both countries if a PTA is formed since specific
regularities can be implemented, which secure those trade flows. On the other
hand, if distance in trade of contract-intensive goods is large, one partner is ex-
porting or importing more contract-intensive goods relative to the other country.
Then the effect is expected to become specifically important if it is related to
institutional distance. If distance in trade of contract-intensive goods and in-
stitutional distance are large at the same time, the need for a contract, which
compensates for missing institutions, is enhanced. So a positive joint effect is
expected.
The estimation equations including institutional distance (InstDist) and dis-
tance of traded contract-intensive goods (DistXci) become:
PTAijt = α + βZijt + β¯Z¯ij + γInstDistijt + δInstDist
2
ijt + ζDistX
ci
ijt
+ηInstDist×DistXciijt + ijt
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where institutional distance is interacted with the distance of contract-intensive
goods traded, and
PTAijt = α + βZijt + β¯Z¯ij + γInstDistijt + δInstDist
2
ijt + ζDistX
ci
ijt
+θInstDist2 ×DistXciijt + ijt
where squared institutional distance (InstDist2) and distance of contract-intensive
goods traded are interacted. This set of estimations is implemented for the whole
set of PTAs and for different types of country pairs (North-North, North-South
and South-South) to see whether the expected effects are especially important
in North-South relationships.
Threats to identification
The dotted lines in figure 3.3 indicate that there is a potential problem of re-
verse causality resulting from institutional distance and distance in trade of
contract-intensive goods. Being part in a trade agreement can also influence
both partners’ level of institutional quality, i.e. institutional distance. The rules
and commitments included in a PTA and the cooperation and communication
resulting from negotiations and meetings between the partner countries can lead
to the implementation of better institutions and convergence of institutional
quality between the member countries and thus affect institutional distance.
Furthermore, being part in a trade agreement can influence the composition of
imports and exports between both trading partners and thus can also have an
effect on the distance in the share of contract-intensive exports.
As suggested by Wooldridge (2002), the null of exogeneity can be tested by the
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t-statistics of predicted residuals from the first stage regressions. The results of
the first-stage regressions confirm the assumption of endogeneity. To correct for
this simultaneity bias, an instrumental variable (IV) approach is implemented.
In a panel, however, an IV approach is very demanding.4 According to Wooldridge
(2002), in the case of a binary response model with endogenous regressors, a lin-
ear probability model (LPM) estimated by two stage least squares (2SLS) can
be a good estimate near the average values of the probit estimated partial effects
and LPM is standardized.
The main difference of the LPM compared to probit is that it assumes constant
marginal effects, while probit assumes diminishing marginal scales of the partial
effects. In other words, LPM assumes the same effects of a variable independ-
ent from its initial value and the values of the other regressors. That means,
independent from how large differences in institutional quality are, a one point
increase is associated with the same effect on the probability of PTA formation
as when differences are small.
Using probit one can compute partial effects at different values of explanatory
variables. This makes specifically sense in the case of binary explanatory vari-
ables, when it is useful to plug in zero or one and compare the effects. In this
analysis the focus lies on the interpretation of the effects of continuous variables,
for which it is useful to see the average effects. Furthermore, the nonlinear condi-
tional expectation function (CEF) is approaching linearity in the middle so that
the probit model is expected to generate average marginal effects which are close
4In a binary response model with continuous endogenous explanatory variables the reduced
form and structural form error need to have a zero mean, follow a bivariate normal distribution
and need to be independent of the other regressors (c.f. Wooldridge (2002)).
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to OLS and 2SLS in the case of included endogenous regressors. Consequently,
the relationship can be appropriately estimated by a LPM. Moreover, analyzing
the effects for different country groups (North-North, North-South and South-
South) also accounts for the different effects of different levels of means.
One major disadvantage of using an LPM is that, different from a probit model
where a standard normal distribution is assumed, estimates do not necessarily
lie within a 0 to 1 range, but in practice this shows to be less of a problem and
also in the following analysis the main variables of interest are within this range
(c.f. Wooldridge (2002)). So in the following analysis, I estimate the model us-
ing 2SLS.5 Following Orefice and Rocha (2014), I use the average lagged values
as instruments for endogenous explanatory variables.
3.3.2 Data
The data set consists of 132 countries over 21 years from 1995 until 2015 in-
cluding 43 developed countries (North) and 89 developing countries (South).6
Over the whole period 3.495 trade agreements between unique country pairs are
notified. All country pairs appear only once in each period t. That means, a
country pair like “Chile-Peru” is the same country pair as “Peru-Chile”.
In the following, I explain in detail the data on trade agreements for the de-
pendent variable and the measures and data sources on institutions and contract-
intensive goods traded. Furthermore, I summarize basic control variables, which
I include, as suggested in the benchmark model by Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
5In chapter 3.3.3 the LPM results are compared to the probit estimates to show that using
LPM provides good estimates in this setting.
6A complete list of all countries from North and South is in the Appendix table 3.A.1
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and, which have also been applied in previous empirical studies analyzing the
determinants of PTAs.7
Trade agreements
The data on trade agreements is taken from the Design of Trade Agreements
(DESTA) database by Du¨r et al. (2014). They have collected a very large and
detailed data set on trade agreements including many characteristics on each
agreement for the periods from 1948 until 2015. Figure 3.4 shows the total num-
ber of PTAs in the data set for all unique country pairs (left column) and for
different types of PTAs (that is, North-North, North-South and South-South).
Countries are classified into North and South according to their income level.
The following analysis uses the classification of income levels defined by the
World Bank, where countries are classified as high income (HI), upper middle
income (UMI), lower middle income (LMI) and low income (LI). In this ana-
lysis a threshold of GDP per capita of 11,115 current US-$ in 2006 is used to
classify countries into North and South. According to this threshold all high
income countries are categorized as North and all countries with a GDP per
capita in 2006 below this threshold are categorized as South. Using this clas-
sification, there are 89 countries from the South and 43 countries from the North.
The DESTA database is the most comprehensive data set in terms of the number
of trade agreements covered. While the Regional Trade Agreements Informa-
tion System (RTA-IS) by the World Trade Organization (WTO) has notified
428 agreements until 2015, DESTA covers 805 treaties.8
7An overview of all explanatory variables with summary statistics is presented in the ap-
pendix table 3.A.4.
8The version of the data set used for this analysis is from February 2016.
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Figure 3.4: Number of PTAs Between Country Pairs by Different Types of
Country Pairs (North-North, North-South and South-South)
3495
838
1800
857
TOTAL NORTHSOUTH
South-South
North-South
North-North
All
Note: All high income countries (with a GDP per capita of 11,115 current US-$ in 2006 and
higher) are classified as North and all other countries below that income level are classified
as South. Source: Author’s illustration and calculation based on trade agreements data from
DESTA database by Du¨r et al. (2014)
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Since the data set, used for this analysis, is a bilateral data set, multilateral
agreements appear as separate agreements between a pair of two countries, which
leads to more positive outcomes (PTA = 1) than agreements covered in the ori-
ginal DESTA data set. Correspondingly, a country entering the European Com-
munity (EC) is represented in the data as several agreements with each country
of the EC. Since in 1958 the European Commission decided to negotiate trade
agreements of its members, this means that by one conclusion of a PTA with
the EC a country enters the market to several new trading partners, which are
members of the EC. As a robustness check all EU members are excluded from
the sample.
Furthermore, it is possible that there are multiple agreements between the same
country pair in the same year, e.g. the Cotonou Agreement and the CARI-
FORUM EC EPA are two agreements, which have both been signed by the
same country pairs in the same year. In 28 cases there are two agreements
signed or accessions of agreements between the same pair of countries. In those
cases the binary character of the dependent variable accounts only for one agree-
ment. This is mainly due to the Cotonou Agreement and the agreement between
the EU and South Africa, the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
which was originally concluded in 1999. In the years 2003 and 2005 several
European countries entered both agreements at the same time. The same is
true for the EC Turkey Association Agreement and the EC Syria Agreement,
signed in 1963 and 1977, respectively. Furthermore, Vietnam, Japan and New
Zealand formed two different agreements, each pair one bilateral and a plurilat-
eral or region-region agreement in the same year (i.e. 2008 for New Zealand and
Malaysia and 2009 for Japan and Vietnam).
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In the period covered, after 1995, there are 12 cases of withdrawals, which I ac-
count for in the data. In 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden leave EFTA. In 2004,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia withdraw
from the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) before entering the
European Union (EU), followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2006. While also
in 2006 Venezuela quits 5 agreements with South American partners. Further-
more, Romania leaves the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) in 2007.
In three others cases of withdrawal the leaving countries, namely Mauritania,
Rwanda and Georgia, are not part of the final sample. A list of all withdrawals
is presented in the appendix table 3.A.3. After creating the dependent binary
variable for PTAs between each unique country pair, for each year where a coun-
try pair is in an agreement, the variable PTA takes the value one. If a country
is leaving, PTA becomes zero again.
Institutional Distance
The data to create institutional distance is taken from the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG). Compared to other available databases measuring institu-
tional quality (like the World Governance Indicators by the World Bank or the
Economic Freedom of the World Index by the Heritage Foundation), this data-
base covers the highest number of countries, with 141 countries for the longest
period of time, i.e. from 1984 until 2015.
The ICRG data set measures the risk of a country in three categories, (i)
political, (ii) financial, and (iii) economic risk. Each category consists of sub-
components, which are added together to an index for each category and finally
to an overall risk rating for each country. To achieve consistency of the rat-
ing between countries and over time a number of basic questions are predefined
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Table 3.2: Political Risk Components
Component Points (max.)
Government Stability 12
Socioeconomic Conditions 12
Investment Profile 12
Internal Conflict 12
External Conflict 12
Corruption 6
Military in Politics 6
Religious Tensions 6
Law and Order 6
Ethnic Tensions 6
Democratic Accountability 6
Bureaucracy Quality 4
Total 100
to create the index. All categories consist of several components, which are
weighted variables with the highest number indicating the lowest potential risk
and the lowest number indicating the highest risk. The maximum number of
the components is set according to its importance with respect to the overall
risk of a country. The political risk rating consists of 12 components, adding up
to a total score of 100 points, as shown in table 3.2.
For the calculation of institutional distance, I follow Demir and Hu (2016), who
adopt the method of Kogut and Singh (1988) to calculate a measure for cultural
distance. It is computed as the arithmetic average of the squared difference of
each dimension d of institutional quality between two countries relative to the
variance of each dimension. The exact formula is given as:
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InstDistijt =
1
2
2∑
d=1
(Instdit − Instdjt)2
Vd
(3.3)
where d indicates the dimension (component) of the political risk index, Instdit
and Instdjt denote the score of dimension d of country i and j, respectively, in
year t and Vd is the variance of the dth dimension of the index.
As argued above and following Nunn (2007) when trading contract-intensive
goods both, contract enforcement and a well-functioning judicial system, are
especially important with regard to institutional quality. Thus, I focus on insti-
tutions with regard to contract enforcement and the judicial quality and create
institutional distance including the two dimensions ‘Investment Profile’ and ‘Law
and Order’ of the Political Risk rating.
The ‘Investment Profile’ has a maximum score of 12 points, assessing the risk to
investment, which is not covered by any of the other components or categories of
the index. This component itself is composed of three sub-components, (i) con-
tract viability/expropriation, (ii) profits repatriation and (iii) payment delays.
‘Law and Order’ consists of two elements, each varying from 3 (high rating) to
1 (low rating), summing up to a maximum score of 6 points. (i) ‘Law’ assesses
whether there exists a well-established legal system, and (ii) ‘Order’, measures
if the law is applied and ignorance of the law is sanctioned.
Figure 3.5 shows the average institutional distance for being in a PTA compared
to not being in a PTA for all PTAs and for different sub-samples including only
North-North, North-South, or South-South country pairs. Overall, it can be
seen that average institutional distance is smaller when a country pair is in a
PTA than otherwise. Only for PTAs between country pairs from the South,
on average institutional distance is larger when pairs are in a PTA compared
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Figure 3.5: Mean Institutional Distance by Country Pair Being in a PTA vs.
not Being in a PTA
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Source: Author’s calculation based on ICRG data and DESTA.
to those which are not in a PTA. This supports that for South-South country
pairs there may be a positive relationship between institutional distance and
South-South PTA formation. For North-South country pairs the data suggest
a negative relationship but this may also be due to a negative effect of large
institutional distances, while it could still be the case that for smaller levels
of institutional distance the effect might be positive. Independent of being in a
PTA or not, on average largest institutional differences are between North-South
country pairs.
Distance of contract-intensive trade
To create the share of contract-intensive goods traded the measure of contract
intensity from Nunn (2007) is used. He uses Rauch’s (1999) classification to
define, which inputs are relationship-specific. Rauch categorizes goods on a
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disaggregated level of three to four digits of the Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC) as commodities, which are either sold on organized ex-
change, which have a reference price or, which are differentiated.
If an input is sold on organized exchange there are enough potential buyers and
even in the case that a buyer wants to renegotiate a lower price, there is enough
demand from alternative buyers to which the input is sold at the current price.
If the product’s reference price is not quoted on organized exchange but listed
in a trade publication there are still a number of potential buyers which make
hold-up less likely. So this product has an intermediate level of relationship-
specificity. The highest levels of relationship-specificity refer to differentiated
inputs, which are neither sold on organized exchanges nor listed in trade pub-
lications.
Nunn aggregates Rauch’s original 1,189 industries, which are classified according
to the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 system, into 342 industries, classified according to the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output (I-O) industry classification.
For this aggregation he first uses a concordance from 4-digit SITC to the 10-digit
Harmonized System (HS10) and in a second step he uses a concordance from
the HS10 to I-O industry classification from BEA. Finally, he creates a measure
of contract-intensity across industries, zrsk , which measure the proportion of
relationship-specific (rs) intermediate inputs of a final good for each I-O industry
classification k:
zrsk =
∑
s
θksR
neither
s (3.4)
θks denotes the value of input s used in industry k (uks) relative to all inputs
used in industry k (uk), i.e. θks ≡ uks/uk. Rneithers is the proportion of input s
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which is neither sold on organized exchange nor reference priced and thus has
a high level of relationship-specificity. To create the bilateral measure for this
analysis, I link the industries with different shares of contract-intensity to trade
data, following Nunn (2007), and calculate the distance of the contract-intensity
of exports between two country pairs i and j in period t (DistXciijt).
First, I create a measure for the share of contract-intensive exports. For this,
Nunn’s data set on contract-intensity, categorized by 6-digit input-output (I-O)
industries need to be linked to trade data, which is available at the Harmonized
System (HS) 6-digit level from 1992. Trade data is taken from COMTRADE
data from the French research center Centre d’Etudes Prospectives d’Informations
Internationales (CEPII). To link input-output categories to HS industries, the
I-O 1997 classification to HS10 1996 concordance from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) is used. Then the last four digits of the 10-digits are cut to
have the international 6-digit level for which trade data is available for most
countries. Then a HS 1996 to HS 1992 concordance from UN Trade Statistics
is used to get HS codes for 1992.
At this stage for several cases one 6-digit HS industry code maps into different I-
O categories at the same time. So these HS codes need to be matched manually
to the I-O industry categories. If possible, 6-digit HS codes, which map into
more than one industry code, are allocated to those industry codes, where HS
codes are allocated most frequently. If this is not possible, for those industries,
the simple average of the share of relationship-specific intermediate inputs of
each I-O category is calculated and assigned to this industry.
In the end 4,876 6-digit HS codes can be allocated to 381 I-O industry codes of
a final good used by Nunn (2007). Now, each industry is categorized according
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Table 3.3: The Twenty Least Contract-intensive Industries
Least contract-intensive: lowest zrsi
zrsi Industry description
0.024 Poultry processing
0.024 Flour milling
0.036 Petroleum refineries
0.036 Wet corn milling
0.053 Aluminum sheet, plate & foil manuf.
0.058 Primary aluminum production
0.087 Nitrogenous fertilizer manufacturing
0.099 Rice milling
0.111 Prim. nonferrous metal, excl. copper & alum.
0.132 Tobacco stemming & redrying
0.144 Other oilseed processing
0.171 Oil gas extraction
0.173 Coffee & tea manufacturing
0.180 Fiber, yarn, and thread mills
0.184 Synthetic dye & pigment manufacturing
0.190 Synthetic rubber manufacturing
0.195 Plastics material & resin manuf.
0.196 Phosphatic fertilizer manufacturing
0.200 Ferroalloy & related products manuf.
0.200 Frozen food manufacturing
Source: Nunn (2007)
to its contract-intensity, for which trade data is available.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the least and most contract-intensive industries, re-
spectively. The categorization in both cases appears reasonable. The least con-
tract intensive industries include mostly primary goods for which the market is
thick, which means that there are a lot of potential buyers in all types of coun-
tries, not only industrialized countries. In contrast to the least contract-intensive
industries, the most contract intensive-industries contain highly differentiated
industries like automobile, aircraft or computer manufacturing, which have in-
puts requiring a large share of relationship-specific investments, and thus are
highly sensitive to enforcement institutions.
Using the contract-intensity of each industry, the contract-intensive exports can
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Table 3.4: The Twenty Most Contract-intensive Industries
Most contract-intensive: highest zrsi
zrsi Industry description
0.980 Automobile & light truck manuf.
0.977 Heavy duty truck manufacturing
0.956 Electronic computer Manufacturing
0.904 Audio & video equipment manuf.
0.901 Other computer peripheral equip. manuf.
0.893 Aircraft manufacturing
0.891 Broadcast & wireless comm. equip. manuf.
0.888 Search, detection, & navig. instr. manuf.
0.880 Telephone apparatus manufacturing
0.873 Electricity & signal testing instr. manuf.
0.872 Aircraft engine & engine parts manuf.
0.854 Musical instrument Manufacturing
0.851 Breweries
0.840 Book publishers
0.831 Packaging machinery manuf.
0.826 Other electronic component manuf.
0.824 Other engine equipment manuf.
0.822 Analytical laboratory instr. manuf.
0.819 Air & gas compressor manuf.
0.810 Photographic & photocopying equip. manuf.
Source: Nunn (2007)
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be calculated for each country to create a bilateral measure denoting the absolute
difference of the share of contract-intensive exports (Xciijt, X
ci
jit) relative to total
exports (Xijt, Xjit). It is calculated as:
DistXciijt =
∣∣∣∣XciijtXijt − X
ci
jit
Xjit
∣∣∣∣ (3.5)
For all country pairs of i and j, contract-intensive exports are calculated as the
sum of all exports of each country over industries k, to which a specific value of
relationship-specificity (zrsk ) is assigned:
Xciijt =
∑
k
Xkijt, z
rs
k > median(z
rs
k ), (3.6)
while only those exports are summed up where zrsk is larger than the median
over all industries. For those country pairs where there is no trade at all the
difference was set to 1.
Figure 3.6 shows the average distance in contract-intensive trade for different
types of country pairs and PTAs analogously to figure 3.5. Overall, it can be
seen that on average distance of contract-intensive trade between two coun-
try pairs is smaller for being a member in a PTA compared to nonmembership.
This is true for all types of PTAs (North-North, North-South and South-South).
Largest average differences can be observed for North-South country pairs, while
the difference between being in a PTA and not being in a PTA is smallest for
North-South relationships. The largest difference for PTA membership versus
nonmembership is between countries from the South, indicating a negative re-
lationship of distance in contract-intensive goods traded and PTA formation
between pairs from the South.
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Figure 3.6: Mean Distance of Contract-intensive Goods Traded by Pair Being
in a PTA vs. no PTA
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Source: Author’s calculation based on COMTRADE data from CEPII and Nunn (2007).
Further controls
Further control variables are taken from the benchmark model by Baier and
Bergstrand (2004). They find that in general trade-creating and trade-diverting
factors play an important role in explaining the probability of a PTA:
• DCONTij is a dummy taking the value one if a country pair is on the
same continent and zero otherwise.
• naturalij is the natural logarithm of the inverse of the geographic distance
between two partners i and j. It accounts for lower transport costs for
trading partners which are closer in geographical distance, and thus can
consume and trade more. Correspondingly, the expected effect on the
likelihood of PTA formation is positive.
• remoteijt measures the remoteness of the pair from all other countries. It
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is calculated as the simple average of the natural logarithms of the mean
distance of country i (j) to all its trading partners, c, except for country j
(i). Thus, it measures the distance of two countries situated on the same
continent to other countries but takes the value zero if a country pair is
situated on different continents. The more remote a country pair is, the
higher is the expected probability that this pair is in a PTA.9
• rGDPsumijt is the total relative market size, measured as the log of the
sum of both countries’ real GDP (rGDP , in constant 2010 US-$) in period
t. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) introduce this measure to control for abso-
lute factor endowments of trading partners. Larger economies trade higher
volumes of varieties, which increases gains from a PTA. So the expected
effect is positive.10
• rGDPsimijt indicates the similarity of the two countries in economic size,
i.e. in real GDP (rGDP ). The larger differences in economic sizes are,
the larger is the loss due to lower trade for the larger country. If one of
the trading partners’ welfare is declining the lower is the probability that
a joint PTA is formed. Thus, a positive relationship of similarity in real
GDPs is expected.11
• DKLijt measures the absolute difference in real GDP per capita as a
proxy for the relative factor endowments of i and j, i.e. DKLijt =
[log(rGDPit/POPit) − log(rGDPjt/POPjt]. The reason to include this
variable is that an increase in the relative factor endowments should en-
9The exact formula is given as remoteijt = DCONT ∗ 1/2 ∗
log(
∑
c6=j Distanceic/nt − 1) + log(
∑
c 6=j Distancecj/nt − 1), with nt indicating the number
of unique pairs in year t of the sample.
10The exact formula is given by rGDPsumt = log(rGDPit + rGDPjt).
11It is measured as rGDPsimijt = log[1 − [rGDPit/(rGDPit + rGDPjt)]2 −
[rGDPjt/(rGDPit + rGDPjt)]
2].
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hance the probability of a PTA, but only up to a certain point.
• DKL2ijt = (DKLijt)2 is the square of DKLijt. This variable is introduced
to account for a nonlinear relationship of DKLijt. The effect should be
negative.
• DROWKLijt = 0, 5 { (
∑
ct 6=it rGDPct/
∑
ct 6=it POPct)−log(rGDPit/POPit)]
+ [log(
∑
ct 6=jt rGDPct/
∑
ct 6=jt POPct) − log(rGDPjt/POPjt)] } measures
the difference of any country pairs’ relative factor endowment (RFE) with
respect to the rest of the world (ROW). It accounts for the economic size
of the ROW. If the size of the ROW reduces, the losses, which result from
lower consumption of varieties from the ROW due to a PTA between i
and j, reduce as well.
Finally, it is controlled for cultural aspects by including two bilateral variables,
Col45, a dummy for having a common colonizer after 1945 and Comlang off ,
which is a dummy for having a common official or primary language.
3.3.3 Empirical Results
In the following chapter, I first compare the results of the probit estimation
with the results of the linear probability model (LPM) and show that the LPM
provides a suitable estimation model. I then present all additional estimation
results using the LPM, for the whole sample and for different sub-samples of
country pairs and finally show some robustness checks.
Probit versus LPM
As noted in section 3.3.1, I implement a liner probability model (LPM) to
estimate the determinants of PTA formation. Table 3.5 contrasts the res-
ults from a simple OLS regression to those obtained from a probit estimation.
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Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis, which are
clustered over unique country pairs.
The first column shows the coefficients of the LPM, which is estimated by simple
ordinary least squares (OLS). The second column shows the probit coefficients
and the third column shows the marginal effects, which are evaluated at the
average values of the independent variables and which can be interpreted as
the effect of the respective variable on the conditional probability of new PTA
formation P(PTA = 1|x) keeping all other variables at their mean. In the linear
probability model the estimated coefficients can be directly interpreted as the
change in the conditional probability by percentage points due to a one unit
increase in x, regardless of the initial value of x. The estimates of the marginal
effects can be compared to the estimates of the linear model. The values of the
coefficients of both models are very close, which suggests that the LPM provides
good estimates of the average effect.
Almost all estimates of the probit and LPM have the same signs and signific-
ance levels. Only being on the same continent and being remote have significance
levels, which are slightly lower when estimating probit and the effect of the dif-
ference in real GDP turns negative when estimating OLS but is still very close
to the probit marginal effect.12
The marginal effect of the squared difference in real GDP (0.006) is almost
identical to the OLS coefficient (0.007). The positive effects of being on the
same continent, having a similar real GDP, difference in real GDP and being
natural trading partners are in line with theory. That means, country pairs,
12Egger and Larch (2008) also find a small but negative effect for the difference in real GDP.
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which are more similar in size or, which are situated on the same continent have
a higher probability to form a PTA compared to others. Similarly, being closer
in geographic distance increases the probability of a country pair signing a joint
PTA. Furthermore, country pairs, which have a larger difference in real GDPs
than other country pairs tend to sign a PTA more likely than other pairs. In
contrast to the expectation, the effect of the difference in RFE with respect to
the ROW is positive, which is in line with Egger and Larch (2008) where all
PTAs are included, and the effect of the sum of real GDPs is negative.
Two-stage Least Square results
Table 3.6 presents the 2SLS results of the probability of PTA formation in-
cluding all variables of interest. The cluster-robust standard errors (shown in
parenthesis) account for the assumption of independence and identical distribu-
tion of the standard errors of the reduced form and the second stage estimation.
In all models the control variables, suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2004),
are included.
Overall, the effects do not differ from the results of table 3.5 except for the sum
of real GDP, for which the effect is positive in the first two models where insti-
tutional distance and the squared term of institutional distance is included. But
this effect is not significant and in model (2) only significant at the 10 percent
level. The effects, which are most important for this analysis are presented in
columns (1) and (2) and in columns (5) and (6), where institutional distance
and squared institutional distance are interacted with the distance in contract-
intensive (CI) goods traded. The model where the distance of trade in contract-
intensive goods is included alone is only shown for completeness and to see how
this effect develops when interacted with institutional distance. In all models
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Table 3.5: Comparison of Probit and OLS Estimation
OLS Probit
(coeff.) (marg. eff.)
Dep. var. PTA (1) (2) (3)
Same continent 1.734∗∗∗ 3.397∗∗ 0.503∗∗
(0.315) (1.526) (0.226)
Sum of real GDP -0.011∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.033) (0.005)
Similarity of real GDP 0.048∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.027) (0.004)
Diff. in real GDP -0.008∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.035) (0.005)
Sq. diff. in real GDP 0.007∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Natural 0.172∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.020) (0.003)
Remote -0.187∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗ -0.055∗∗
(0.011) (0.160) (0.024)
Diff. of RFE wrt. ROW 0.099∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.046) (0.007)
Observations 344953 344953
Log pseudolikelihood 63233.5
p-value Chi2 0.000
R-squared 0.235
Year FE Yes Yes
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered over unique country-pairs. Significance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗,
respectively. Country pair-specific mean over all periods
of the time-variant variables are included but not shown.
Marginal probit effects are evaluated at explanatory
variable mean values.
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the coefficients are estimated using 2SLS. Adding institutional distance to the
estimation leads to a loss of observations since for many developing countries,
which are included in the sample no data on institutional distance is available.
In all models the effect of institutional distance is positive, meaning that an
increase in institutional distance between two country pairs positively affects
the probability that this country pair signs a PTA, while the squared term is
negative. Both effects are significantly different from zero at the one percent
level. The size of the effects only hardly changes and significance levels remain
at 1 percent in the other models when distance of trade in contract-intensive
goods and the interaction terms are included.
When included alone, an increase of institutional distance by one unit, all
else equal, would increase the probability of PTA formation by 3.8 percent-
age points.13 The inclusion of a squared institutional distance term leads to an
increase in the effect of institutional distance but at the same time shows that
the effect is nonlinear and that if institutional quality becomes very large the
effect on the probability of PTA formation turns negative.
Taking the partial derivative of model (2) with respect to institutional distance
(InstDist) one can calculate the threshold when the effect of institutional dis-
tance turns negative. The effect of institutional distance is zero at the value
4.381. This means for institutional distances larger than 4.381 an increase re-
duces the probability of PTA formation. Until that threshold the effect of a
marginal increase in institutional distance on the conditional probability of a
PTA is positive. Using the derivative the average marginal effect on the condi-
13A one unit increase in institutional distance happened for example between Burkina Faso
and Chile over a period of ten years between 2001 and 2011.
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tional probability of PTA formation is 0.121, while at one unit above the mean
(at 2.503) the positive effect is reduced to 0.079.14
The significant coefficient of the interaction term of squared institutional dis-
tance and distance of trade in contract-intensive goods (DistXci) indicates that
there is a joint effect which is positive. Consequently, if institutional distance
between a country pair is large and depending on the level of distance of trade
in contract-intensive goods, an increase in DistXci increases the probability of
PTA formation and potentially compensates the negative effect of large institu-
tional distances.
Taking again the derivative with respect to institutional distance the overall
marginal effect (holding DistXci also at its mean) is 0.147 and thus is larger
compared to model (2).15
Assuming constant effects of DistXci and holding DistXci at 1, meaning that
there is one-way contract-intensive trade, which means all exports (or imports)
of one trading partner are contract-intensive, while the other one does not trade
any contract-intensive goods, the effect increases to 0.201. This supports the
argument that a larger share of trade in contract-intensive goods promotes the
conditional probability of PTA formation where institutional distance between a
country pair is large. At the mean value of DistXci the overall effect of institu-
tional distance becomes negative at 4.327, while at larger values this threshold
increases up to 6.25 when DistXci is equal to 1.
14 δPTA
δInstDist = βˆInstDist + 2βˆInstDist2InstDist = 0.184 + 2 ∗ (−0.021) ∗ 1.503 = 0.121
15 δPTA
δInstDist = βˆInstDist + 2× βˆInstDist2InstDist+ 2× ˆβinteractDistXci × InstDist = 0.147
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The overall effect of DistXci shows to be negative, but its size cannot be in-
terpreted directly as it takes values close to one. Taking the partial derivative
of model (6) with respect to DistXci the effect is -0.954.16 Setting this par-
tial derivative equal to zero gives the threshold of institutional distance when
a marginal increase in DistXci compensates the negative effect of large institu-
tional distance on the probability of PTA formation, under the assumption that
the effect of the distance in trade of contract-intensive goods is constant. This
threshold is at 8.116. For institutional distances larger than 8.116 an increase
in DistXci positively affects PTA membership.
The p-values of the LM Kleibergen-Paap test statistic, which is robust to non
independently and identically distributed standard errors, indicate that the ex-
cluded instruments are valid in all estimations.17 The test is an underidenti-
fication test whether the excluded instruments are relevant meaning that the
instruments correlate with the endogenous regressors. This test jointly tests for
all instruments at the same time. The first stage F-statistics by Angrist and
Pischke (2009) are tests of under- and weak identification for regressions with
more than one endogenous regressor. It tests whether one of the endogenous
regressors is under- or weakly identified. The p-values are also reported for each
endogenous regressor. The results suggest that all endogenous regressors are
sufficiently identified by their instruments. The first-stage regression results of
model (6) are reported in the appendix table 3.A.6.
16 δPTA
δDistXci = −0, 988 + 0, 015InstDist
2
) = −0, 988 + 0, 015 ∗ 1, 5032
17A rejection of the null means that the model is identified.
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North-South PTA formation
Table 3.7 presents the results of the probability of forming a PTA between North
and South countries. The first column reports the OLS coefficients of the basic
model based on Baier and Bergstrand (2004) now without the dummy of being
on the same continent. When including the dummy in the probit estimation, the
model does not converge and in some specifications of the sub-sample it perfectly
predicts the outcome. This problem is persistent in all estimations using sub-
samples of North-North, North-South or South-South country pairs. So in all
subsequent estimations the variable for being on the same continent is excluded.
Columns (2) to (7) present the same models as in columns (1) to (6) of table
3.6, but now for a sub-sample of North-South country pairs. The effects of the
variables from the benchmark model are close to the effects from the estimation
based on the full sample. Difference in real GDP is not significant anymore in
the first two models but is significant and negative again when included with
institutional distance and the squared term of institutional distance. Being
a natural trading partner, that is, being close in geographic distance has the
strongest positive effect compared to the other variables. The effect is even lar-
ger than for the full sample, while remoteness of a continental country pair to
the rest of the world is again negative. The effects of all controls are relatively
stable in all models.
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Including institutional distance reduces the number of observations by 65,000
since specifically for developing countries data on institutions is not available.
The coefficient of institutional distance remains very similar in all estimated
models and is always significantly different from zero at the one percent level.
The same is true for the squared term. Only when squared institutional dis-
tance is interacted with distance of trade in contract-intensive goods the negative
effect increases. The results show that institutional distance, again, has a non-
linear effect and that institutional distance is related to the distance in trade
of contract-intensive goods. The marginal effect of institutional distance at its
mean (InstDist = 2.232) in model (3) is 0.165, which is 4.4 percentage points
larger for North-South country pairs compared to the average marginal effect
of institutional distance for all country pairs. Without considering the effect
of distance in trade of contract-intensive goods, the effect turns negative at an
institutional distance level of 4.727. This threshold is larger compared to the
sample where all countries are included (4.381).
Again, as in the full sample, interacting distance in trade of contract-intensive
goods with institutional distance (column 6) does not have an effect which is
significantly different from zero, while the interaction with squared institutional
distance (column 7) is significant at the one percent level. Taking model (7),
a marginal increase in institutional distance at the average (2.232), holding
DistXci also at its mean (DistXci = 0.444), leads to an increase in the prob-
ability of the formation of a PTA between North and South by 0.179, which is
3.2 percentage points larger compared to the effect based on the full sample.
Comparing this effect to the extreme case where all traded goods of one trading
partner are contract-intensive, the overall effect increases to 0.223, while hav-
ing a low difference in trade of contract-intensive goods the effect is reduced
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to 0.143. This suggest that the compensating effect of distance in contract-
intensive goods is more effective in North-South relationships. Using model (7)
and holding DistXci at the mean, the negative effect of institutional distance
appears at 4.649, which is near the threshold calculated from model (2). As-
suming constant effects of DistXci, the threshold where a marginal increase in
DistXci would offset the negative effect of institutional distance is at 7.906 and
thus appears at a lower distance compared to the full sample. Again, the p-
values of the Kleibergen-Paap test and the first-stage F statistics indicate that
all instruments are relevant and correlated with the endogenous regressors.
Table 3.8 reports the same results for a sub-sample where only country pairs
from the North are included. For HI countries data on institutional quality is
available for most countries and periods, which is why the number of observa-
tions does not reduce so much when institutional distance is included compared
to the models without institutional distance (columns (1) and (4)). The main
change with regard to the benchmark control variables is that the effect of being
remote has now turned positive, as expected, while the joint country size has a
negative effect.
With regard to institutional distance the effect is now clearly negative in all mod-
els (columns (2) to (7)). When interacting institutional distance with DistXci
the nonlinear effect is no longer significant. When included without the distance
of traded contract-intensive goods the squared term is still significant although
not at a high level.
The overall marginal increase in institutional distance at the mean induces a de-
crease of the conditional probability of PTA formation between countries from
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the North by 0.392. The effect turns positive at an institutional distance level
larger than 5.986. When institutional differences become larger a PTA appears
to be more likely and the effect also shows to be related to contract-intensive
trade between the country pairs. DistXci alone has a negative effect when ad-
ded to the basic controls in column (4), but it becomes insignificant when the
interaction term is added, while the joint effect of institutional distance and
distance in contract-intensive goods traded is significant.
When interacting DistXci with institutional distance this effect dominates the
effect of squared institutional distance. A larger distance in trade of contract-
intensive goods reduces the negative effect of institutional distance but does
not fully compensate it. At DistXci the overall effect of a marginal increase in
InstDist is -0.261. Even if DistXci takes the maximum value of 1 the effect
remains negative (-0.014).
In table 3.9, I present the estimates of the same models for the sub-sample of
country pairs from the South. Again, having a large number of countries from
the South in this sub-sample, results in a loss of more than half of the observa-
tions due to the inclusion of institutional distance.
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Looking at the basic explanatory variables, different from the results of the
North-North and North-South sub-samples, the size of a potential market res-
ulting from a PTA and having a similar real GDP show a positive and significant
effect when included without distance of trade in contract-intensive goods. In
the other models the effect of DistXci and its joint effect with institutional dis-
tance seems to dominate the sum and similarity of GDPs of country pairs from
the South. Being remote to the rest of the world and being natural trading
partners has, as expected, a positive and significant effect on the probability of
PTA formation between South-South country pairs.
With regard to institutional distance the results show the same pattern as in the
North-South sub-sample and the sample where all countries are included. There
is evidence for a nonlinear effect of institutional distance as shown in model (3).
The overall marginal effect of institutional distance at the mean is positive but
smaller, with a value of 0.063. Furthermore, there is evidence for a joint effect
of InstDist2 and DistXci (as shown in model (7) of table 3.9), which, at mean
values, compensates the negative effect of institutional distance. The overall
marginal effect of institutional distance on the probability of South-South PTA
formation, when distance of trade in contract-intensive goods is at its mean
value, is 0.119. Compared to the full sample the effect is 2.8 percentage points
smaller and compared to the North-South sub-sample the effect is 6.0 percentage
points smaller.
In table 3.10, I provide an overview of the marginal effects of institutional dis-
tance for all samples at mean values. It shows that the likelihood of PTA
formation due to a marginal increase in institutional institutional distance is
particularly large for North-South country pairs where institutional distance
is relatively large. The marginal effect at the mean increases the conditional
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Table 3.10: Overview of Marginal Effects and Thresholds for Different Samples
All N-S S-S N-N
Marginal effect of InstDist
w/o interaction at InstDist 0.121 0.165 0.063 -0.392
w/ interaction at InstDist & DistXci 0.147 0.179 0.119 -0.261
Threshold when InstDist effect turns negative at DistXci
(positive in N-N sub-sample)
InstDist > 4.327 4.649 2.800 4.868
probability of North-South PTA formation by 16.4 on average. Furthermore,
a large distance of trade in contract-intensive goods between pairs of countries
where developing countries are included reinforces this effect. For North-South
country-pairs the effect amounts to 17.9 percent. Distance in institutional qual-
ity for pairs of industrialized countries on average reduces the likelihood that a
country forms a PTA with another industrialized country. Finally, holding dis-
tance of trade in contract-intensive goods at its mean value, the results indicate
that the negative effect of institutional distance appears at a larger distance for
North-South country pairs (that is for values larger than 4.649).
Robustness checks
When considering institutional differences, it is reasonable to account for his-
torical institutional differences or similarities, which are rooted in cultural dif-
ferences. I account for this historical relationship between country pairs by
including indicator variables for having a common official or primary language
and for being in a colonial relationship after 1945. Including common language
and common colonial history as control variables is standard to explain bilat-
eral trade flows in gravity equations.18 Speaking a common language facilitates
18Since Baier and Bergstrand (2004) find that in general trade-creating and trade-diverting
factors determine the formation of PTAs it provides another argument to include common
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the ability to communicate and negotiate contracts, understand the local law
or do business in general. When communicating about law and business, the
use of the language becomes very specific and complex, which makes it essential
to know the language very well. Consequently, negotiating trade agreements is
easier if country pairs have the same official language.
Being in a colonial relationship after 1945 can positively affect PTA formation
because a colonizer potentially has established similar organizations and legal
structures as domestic ones (c.f. La Porta et al. (1998)), which would again
facilitate trading and doing business and thus promote PTA formation. Fur-
thermore, there is evidence that a past colonial history leads to higher levels
of trade (c.f. Rose (2004)), while on the other hand, Mayer et al. (2010) state
that trade gradually decreases, on average, 4 decades after independence trade
between country pairs with a past colonial history declines by more than 60
percent, which would give reason to expect a negative effect on PTA formation.
I extend the preferred estimation models for the sub-samples North-North,
North-South, and South-South, which include the interaction term of institu-
tional distance and distance of trade in contract-intensive goods (models (7)
for North-South and South-South and model (6) for North-North), which are
presented in the first three columns of table 3.11.
language and common colonial history as additional control variable.
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In a next step, I estimate the model excluding the EU. In all estimations so far
the EU is included, since entering the EU should be represented in the data.
But as noted above, since the EU negotiates all trade agreements with third
countries, it is useful to check for the effects when the EU is excluded. In the
estimations excluding the EU, the dummy for being in a colonial relationship
is excluded, since most colonialists are EU countries and drop from the sample.
Doing this primarily affects the number of observations of the North-North and
North-South sub-sample since most included EU countries are categorized as
North. For better readability table 3.11 does not include the results for the
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) control variables.19
The results for institutional distance in the North-South sample are almost
identical to the results presented in table 3.7. Having a common language has
the expected positive effect and is significant at the one percent level. Being
in a colonial relationship after 1945 is also positive and significant. This effect
is much larger compared to having the same official language. This result is
similar to the effects of a colonial link in explainig bilateral trade flows in the
gravity estimation, where typical gravity variables are included and where the
effects also appear to be very large (Head and Mayer, 2014).
Without the EU the results change and the joint effect of institutional distance
and trade in contract-intensive goods is no longer significant. An explanation
for this result is that the EU drives significantly the joint effect of distance in
contract-intensive goods and institutional distance. This is reasonable as the
EU is an important exporter of contract-intensive goods.
19The results with the full set of control variables is included in the appendix.
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In figure 3.7, the share of contract-intensive exports of the EU is compared to
the share of contract-intensive exports from the North without the EU and from
the South. With almost 50 percent the share is clearly larger compared to in-
dustrialized countries outside the EU.
Figure 3.7: Share of Contract-intensive Exports of the EU Compared to the
North (w/o EU) and the South
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
EU NORTH (W/O EU) SOUTH
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from CEPII and Nunn (2007).
For the North-North sample the effects of institutional distance in the extended
model almost do not differ from the model without common language and com-
mon colonial history. Having a common language does not significantly affect
the probability of PTA formation. But without the EU the effect becomes sig-
nificant. An explanation for this result is that the EU includes countries, which
differ a lot with regard to language. So a common language may not be one
of the driving forces for joining the EU or forming a PTA with the EU. Con-
sequently, excluding the EU from the sample can result in this significant effect.
This significant change in the results is not surprising because the exclusion of
the EU leads to a substantial reduction of the sample, which is more than half
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of the observations in the sample with the EU.
At the same time the significance and size of the negative effect of institutional
distance and its joint effect with DistXci is reduced. Although the effect of the
interaction term is positive the overall marginal effect of institutional distance
at the mean of DistXci (0.418) remains negative (-0.120). But this effect is
smaller compared to the effect using the sample including the EU.
More surprising is the effect when EU countries are dropped from the South-
South sample. Although, only about 4000 observations drop out, the interaction
term, which becomes insignificant in the extended model, now turns significant
again. The only countries, which drop out are Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and
Poland. With regard to common official language, the effect is always positive
and highly significant. Having a colonial link does not show an effect. But the
main reason for this, is probably that most colonizers are from the North.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper broadens the empirical analysis of the determinants of trade agree-
ments. It builds on the growing signature rates of PTAs during the past three
centuries continuing today, and the emergence of complex global production
networks, where developing countries play an increasing role.
The focus lies on institutional differences between country pairs as a determin-
ant of trade agreements. I analyzed whether differences in institutional quality
between country pairs positively affect the likelihood that those two countries
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form a PTA and whether this effect is nonlinear and turns negative at very large
differences. I focus on legal and enforcement institutions because this type of
institutions is specifically relevant for international trade, as it has been found
by Nunn (2007). In my analysis, I examine the effect of institutional distance
in two dimension, that is, whether the effect is especially relevant (i) between
developed and developing countries (North-South) where institutional distances
are specifically large and (ii) when contract-intensive goods are traded.
These effects, I investigate using a sample of 132 countries, including 89 devel-
oping countries categorized as global South, which leads to 8,646 unique country
pairs and in total between 1995 and 2015, 3,495 incidences of PTA membership
between bilateral country pairs. I estimate a linear probability model for dis-
crete choice panel data and show that the results are in line with the marginal
effects generated from a probit model. To account for endogeneity I implement
an IV approach. To test the relevance of institutional quality, I estimate the
models for different sub-samples of countries according to their income level
(North-North, North-South, and South-South) and create a measure of distance
in contract-intensive exports.
There is significant support for a positive effect of institutional distance on the
likelihood that a country pair forms a PTA. At very large distances the effect
turns negative. Furthermore, the effect is particularly large for North-South
country pairs and also depends on the characteristics of traded goods. Large
shares of one-sided contract-intensive trade between North and South reinforce
the positive effect of institutional distance and can compensate the negative ef-
fect of institutional distance.
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But the effect of trade in contract-intensive goods is mainly driven by trade
involving EU countries. When excluding the EU the effect disappears, while the
positive effect of institutional distance is robust.
For the South-South sub-sample I find similar results but institutional distance
is not as important as in the case of North-South relationships. For North-North
country pairs differences in institutional quality, on average, show a negative ef-
fect on the likelihood of PTA formation. Only if the difference becomes large
enough, institutional distance promotes PTA formation.
The results highlight the important role of trade agreements, which provide
a legal framework beyond market access rules, promoting trade by reducing
transaction costs. Signing PTAs with developed countries can thus be a way for
developing countries to strengthen domestic institutions.
Further research may take a deeper look into the effects of institutional dis-
tance on the depth of trade agreements similar to the approach by Orefice and
Rocha (2014), who focus on production networks trade. One could extend their
approach and include institutional distance as an additional factor. Another
aspect is the way of measuring institutional distance and accounting for neigh-
boring countries’ institutional quality, by creating a measure of surrounding
institutional quality or institutional quality of a country relative to its neigh-
bors. In this regard, it would be interesting to investigate the determinants of
trade agreements which include some countries of a specific region while some
neighboring countries are nonmembers. What is the role of institutional distance
here?
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3.A Appendix
Table 3.A.1: List of Countries
North (HI) Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Brunei
Darussalam, Canada, China Hong Kong SAR, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Kuwait, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Rep. of Korea, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom, United States
South (UMI, LMI, LI) Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Fmr Sudan, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rep. of Moldova,
Russian Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Thailand, Togo,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Rep. of
Tanzania, Uruguay,, Venezuela Vietnam, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Table 3.A.2: Description of Variables and Sources
Variable Description Source
PTAijt Dummy Variable equal to 1 if
country i and j form a trade
agreement in period t.
Design of Trade Agreements
(DESTA) database by Du¨r,
Baccini and Elsig (2014)
DistXciijt Difference of the share of
contract-intensive exports
Authors calculations based on:
COMTRADE
Xciijt, X
rs
jit Share of contract-intensive
exports from i (j) to j (i) in
period t
COMTRADE, Nunn
InstDistijt Institutional distance The International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) by the
PRS Group (2016)
DCONTij Dummy variable, which takes
the value 1 if country i and j
are on the same continent and
0 otherwise.
The World Bank (2016)
rGDPsum Total relative market size
(measured as the logarithm of
the sum of both countries’ real
GDP (in constant 2010 USD)
in period t.
Author’s calculations based on
CEPII Gravity Dataset
rGDPsim Similarity of the economic size
(real GDP) of the two trading
partners.
Author’s calculations based on
CEPII Gravity Dataset
DKL Absolute difference in real
GDP per capita between i and
j at time t.
Author’s calculations based on
CEPII Gravity Dataset
natural Natural logarithm of the
inverse of the distance between
to potential trading partners i
and j.
Author’s calculations based on
CEPII Gravity Dataset
remote Remoteness of i (j) from all
trading partners but j (i).
Author’s calculations based on
CEPII Gravity Dataset
DROWKL Difference of the trading
partners’ relative factor
endowment with respect to the
factor endowment of the ROW.
Author’s calculations based on
CEPII Gravity Dataset
Col45 Dummy variable, which is
equal to one if a country pair i
and j is in a colonial
relationship after 1945 and zero
otherwise.
CEPII Gravity Dataset
Comlang off Dummy variable, which is
equal to one if country i and j
have a common official or
primary language and zero
otherwise.
CEPII Gravity Dataset126
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Table 3.A.3: List of Withdrawals from PTAs
Year Agreement Leaving country Member states (ISO
numeric-3 codes)
1995 EFTA Austria, Finland,
Sweden
246, 352, 578 756 438
40 752
2000 Economic Community
Of West African States
(ECOWAS)
Mauritania (not in the
sample)
204 854 132 384 270
288 624 430 466 562
566 686 694 768 478
2004 Central European Free
Trade Agreement
(CEFTA)
Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland,
Slovak Republic,
Slovenia
642 100 191 203 348
616 705 703
2006 Andean Community
Brazil withdrawal
Venezuela 170 218 604 76 862
2006 Andean Group
Cartagena Agreement
Venezuela 68 170 218 604 862 152
2006 Group of Three Venezuela 170 484 862
2006 Group of Three Auto
Agreement
Venezuela 170 484 862
2006 Andean Community
Auto Agreement
Venezuela 170 218 862
2007 Central European Free
Trade Agreement
(CEFTA)
Bulgaria and Romania 8 70 191 807 498 499
688 900 100 642
2007 Economic Community
of Central African
States
(ECCAS-CEEAC)
PTA/FTA/CU
Rwanda (not in the
sample)
24 108 120 140 178 266
226 678 148 180 646
2007 Global System of
Trade Preferences
(GSTP)
Romania 12 32 24 50 204 68 76
120 152 170 192 408
410 218 818 288 324
328 332 356 360 364
368 434 458 484 504
508 558 566 586 604
634 608 702 144 736
764 780 788 834 858
862 704 716 180 688
642
2009 Commonwealth of
Independent States
(CIS)
Georgia (not in the
sample)
51 31 112 417 398 498
643 762 795 804 860
268
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Table 3.A.4: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. dev. Obs. Min Max
PTA 0.203 0.402 167713 0.00 1.00
DistXcˆi 0.479 0.479 167713 0.00 1.00
Institutional distance 1.503 1.597 167713 0.00 13.80
Sq. Institutional distance 4.811 11.167 167713 0.00 190.78
Same continent 0.235 0.424 167713 0.00 1.00
Sum of real GDP 26.032 1.694 167713 20.16 30.92
Sim. of real GDP -2.000 1.380 167713 -10.26 -0.69
Diff. in real GDP 1.839 1.300 167713 0.00 6.47
Sq. diff. in real GDP 5.070 6.078 167713 0.00 41.80
Natural -8.674 0.795 167713 -9.89 -4.09
Remote 2.223 4.016 167713 0.00 10.01
Diff. of RFE wrt. ROW 1.441 0.651 167713 0.01 3.97
Common colonizer post 1945 0.008 0.090 167713 0.00 1.00
Common language 0.122 0.327 167713 0.00 1.00
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Table 3.A.6: First-Stage Estimation results - Model (6) of Table 3.6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variables InstDist InstDist2 DistXci InstDist2
× DistXci
Lrm InstDist -0.018∗∗∗ -1.198∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.626∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.038) (0.001) (0.047)
Lrm InstDist2 0.087∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.008) (0.000) (0.011)
Lrm DistXci -0.017 0.095 0.052∗∗∗ -0.764∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.071) (0.005) (0.083)
Lrm InstDist2 × DistXci -0.005 -0.007 0.005∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.013) (0.000) (0.017)
DCONT -0.152∗∗ 2.064∗∗∗ -0.044 2.162∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.479) (0.030) (0.749)
Sum of real GDP -0.233∗∗∗ -0.801∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.775∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.080) (0.006) (0.075)
Sim. of real GDP -0.118∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.064) (0.006) (0.057)
Diff. in real GDP 0.137∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.243∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.077) (0.006) (0.071)
Sq. diff. in real GDP -0.013∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.024) (0.001) (0.022)
Natural -0.009∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.001 -0.013
(0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.012)
Remote -0.118∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.229∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.050) (0.003) (0.012)
Diff. of RFE wrt. ROW 0.254∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.052
(0.023) (0.073) (0.008) (0.072)
Observations 167713 167713 167713 167713
F test excl. instr. (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The dependent variables for the first stage regressions are shown in the first
line of the respective column (1) to (4).
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered over unique
country-pairs. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗, respectively. Country pair-specific mean over all periods of the
time-variant variables are included but not shown.
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Chapter 4
Explaining the Global Landscape
of Foreign Direct Investment:
Knowledge Capital, Gravity, and
the Role of Culture and
Institutions
1
4.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key category of international capital flows
that largely reflects investment of multinational enterprises. According to the
updated and extended data set of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), FDI stocks
accounted for 21 percent of global cross-border liabilities in 2010; in more than
a third of countries, FDI is the source of over 50 percent of foreign financing.
1This chapter is joint work with Konstantin M. Wacker.
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4.1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we use a previously un(der)used bilateral data set on FDI stocks to
evaluate the performance of the key ‘big theories’ that have emerged over the last
decades to explain global FDI patterns. Notably, we apply a cross-validation ex-
ercise to assess the out-of-sample performance of the gravity model, which Klein-
ert and Toubal (2010) have shown to accommodate horizontal (‘market seeking’)
and vertical (‘efficiency seeking’) motives, the knowledge-capital model (Carr
et al., 2001; Markusen et al., 1996), which integrates horizontal and vertical
motives into a joint general equilibrium framework, theories motivated by inter-
national finance aspects like exchange rate and taxation considerations, and the-
ories that emphasize the role of institutional and cultural proximity. Moreover,
we take cross-country interdependencies in the form of export-platform motives
into account (Blonigen et al., 2007; Ekholm et al., 2007; Yeaple, 2003).
For this purpose, we draw on the IMF’s ‘Coordinated Direct Investment Stat-
istics’ (CDIS), which have a much more comprehensive country coverage than
bilateral FDI data sets previously used in the literature, especially for devel-
oping countries. This comprehensive coverage provides important advantages
over previous empirical macro exercises on FDI determinants for at least three
reasons.
First, there is a traditional interest in evaluating the horizontal vs. vertical
motives in FDI. While earlier studies have emphasized the importance of ho-
rizontal FDI motives looking at US outward FDI activities (Brainard, 1997;
Helpman et al., 2004), other contributions have highlighted that vertical motives
might be at least as important but more difficult to find in the data (Alfaro and
Charlton, 2009; Badinger and Egger, 2010). Notably, Davies (2008) has em-
phasized that detecting vertical motives in aggregate data requires a sufficiently
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large difference in endowment structures and development levels between host
and source countries.
Second, the global landscape of FDI has considerably changed over the last dec-
ades, with more FDI flowing to developing countries, often referred to as the
‘South’, and particularly more FDI originating from those countries. This trend
is depicted in figure 4.1. Today, ‘Southern’ economies are the source of over 1/4
of global FDI and account for about 40 % of global FDI inflows. The share of
intra-developing-country (South-South) flows in global FDI has grown from 3 %
of global FDI flows at the beginning of the millennial to 14 % in the subsequent
decade (OECD, 2014: figure 3.1). While UNCTAD (2006) provided an early
picture documenting the rising importance of FDI from developing and trans-
ition economies, recent systematic studies on the subject are rare and mostly
focused on certain regions, mostly on FDI either from China and/or to Africa
(e.g. Abeliansky and Martinez-Zarzoso (2019); Chen et al. (2017); Gold et al.
(2017)).
Figure 4.1: Global FDI Inflows and Outflows by Country Groups (in billion
US-$)
Global FDI inflows Global FDI outflows
Source (including country classification): UNCTAD.
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Third, studies from international business and more recently international eco-
nomics have emphasized the role of cultural and institutional distance for FDI
(e.g. Azemar et al. (2012); Benassy-Quere et al. (2007); Beugelsdijk et al. (2018);
Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008); Demir and Hu (2016)). Empirical studies in
that literature were often constrained by focusing on only few or even a single
source country. As van Hoorn and Maseland (2016) emphasize, comprehensive
bilateral variation is needed to properly identify such factors as cultural or in-
stitutional distance.
The comprehensive bilateral FDI data coverage in our paper helps to resolve all
of those three issues. Our results can be summarized as follows: We find most
support for horizontal FDI motives in the gravity and KK model. A driving
force to gain market access is the surrounding market potential. The results
of the cross-validation reveal that the best-performing model is the heterogen-
eous gravity model including surrounding market potential and that specifically
financial and cultural factors improve the performance of the models. Best
performing model reduce the mean absolute prediction error by 25 percent com-
pared to the benchmark model.
It ought to be clarified that our econometric application is not a standard iden-
tification exercise. Given the wide range of explanatory variables suggested by
various theoretical FDI models, our focus is not on pinning down all the struc-
tural model variables and resolve endogeneity biases that economists typically
have in mind. We are rather interested in an empirical assessment how far we
have come in explaining the macroeconomic factors driving global FDI decisions
and whether it is possible to discriminate among existing theories. Our results
thus help inform the theoretical macro literature on FDI but also provide some
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revelatory insights for empirical modeling of global FDI. We finally note that
by allowing for potential parameter heterogeneity in our econometric candidate
models, we address a potential endogeneity problem that ranks prominently in
the recent statistical literature but is often neglected by economists (see e.g.
Bester and Hansen (2016)) and has been mentioned as a potential problem for
empirical FDI studies previously by Blonigen and Wang (2005).
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: we start with a description
of our used CDIS data set for bilateral FDI stocks in section 4.2. In section
4.3 we explain our econometric modeling approach and discuss the related lit-
erature and explanatory variables. We thereby move model-by-model. Given
the sometimes technical discussions in the related literature this combination of
modeling, literature, and data seems the most logical presentation in our view.
Section 4.4 provides a short discussion of estimation results for the individual
models. Section 4.5 explains the setup and provides the results of our cross-
validation exercise. The final section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The CDIS FDI Data
Drawing a comprehensive picture of FDI determinants in a global perspective
requires bilateral data. Most empirical studies to date have used UNCTAD’s
Bilateral FDI Statistics that provide flow and stock data for 206 economies over
the period 2001 to 2012.2
2OECD also reports bilateral FDI positions but does not cover a relevant sample of develop-
ing countries. The data, used among others by Benassy-Quere et al. (2007), hence potentially
underestimates vertical FDI motives and does not allow to draw a global picture of FDI that
investigates determinants most relevant to South FDI.
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More recently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has put substantial effort
into compiling disaggregated bilateral FDI stock data in its ‘Coordinated Direct
Investment Survey’ (CDIS) that uses consistent definitions and best practices
in collecting FDI stock data. This data set, which starts with 2009 data,3 al-
lows for new dimensions of macroeconomic studies of FDI motives because of its
improved quality and coverage compared to the UNCTAD data set. However,
except for two papers of Haberly and Wo´jcik (2014) and Haberly and Wo´jcik
(2015) that focus on the very specific question of offshore FDI networks and tax
havens, the data have not been used in systematic empirical investigations yet.
CDIS data reporting templates have built-in validation tools for national com-
pilers before they submit FDI data to the IMF. The IMF Statistics Department
then uses ‘mirror data’ of reported FDI partners to check consistency of the
bilateral data and reaches out to national compilers in case of large bilateral
asymmetries in data reported by source and host country (see (IMF, 2015, ch:
6), for details).
Following standard convention, we focus on using the inward position of FDI,
which is usually more reliable. After dropping all values that are marked as
“confidential”, the CDIS allows us to fill missing values with the “derived” in-
ward position from the ‘mirror data’.
This further contributes to the advantage of comprehensive coverage of the CDIS
data. Before merging the FDI stock data with other variables, we observe
212,844 bilateral FDI positions, out of which 8,255 are negative and 118,536
are 0. For comparison, the UNCTAD data set only provides 65,729 bilateral
3CDIS includes some 2008 observations for Malaysia.
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observations, out of which 1,926 are negative and 19,479 are 0. This difference
is not only of quantitative relevance. Figure 4.2 depicts the coverage of the
IMF’s CDIS data set compared to UNCTAD. The vertical and horizontal axes
show the 2006 GDP p.c. of the FDI host and source country, respectively (on
a log scale). A dot indicates that for each country pair, at least one FDI obser-
vation (that might as well be 0) exists. As one can infer, both show a strongly
balanced pattern in the sense that if one observes an inward stock in country A
from country B, there is also an inward observation in country B originating in
country A, although detailed inspection shows that this is not always the case
(and need not be). Comparing both panels of figure 4.2 one can clearly see the
higher bilateral coverage of the CDIS data in the left panel. But most import-
antly, this coverage extends considerably further into the developing world, i.e.
countries with a lower GDP p.c. level. Given the above-mentioned necessity of
a sample of countries with sufficiently large differences in factor endowments,
this is a clear advantage of the CDIS data set over all other previously used
data. We finally note that despite discrepancies in FDI values for years and
country pairs where both data sets overlap, the correlation coefficient of the
20,581 overlapping observations is 0.73.
We constrain our analysis to host or source countries with a population above
one million in a given year, which also means that small island states that are
often centers for offshore FDI are dropped. The overall FDI amount covered
by our remaining CDIS data set is depicted in table 1 and compared to other
sources (for the year 2010). Overall, CDIS covered 23 trillion US$ inward stocks,
which is almost identical with the number provided by the “External Wealth of
Nations” database by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and about 3 trillion US$
above the aggregate data reported by UNCTAD Stat (which are not identical
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Figure 4.2: Coverage of CDIS (left panel) vs. UNCTAD (right panel) Data
IMF CDIS data UNCTAD data
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with the more constrained bilateral UNCTAD data). Out of those 23 trn US$,
16.4 are comprised by our final sample, which includes 6,680 observations in
2010 after dropping small countries and observations with negative FDI stock
values (which our PPML estimator cannot facilitate). This means that our most
comprehensive sample covers more than 70% of global FDI and includes import-
ant economies such as Brazil, China, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Russia,
UK, and the US among many other source and host countries.
Table 4.1: Global FDI Stocks Covered by Different Data Sets
EWN (Lane UNCTAD Stat CDIS World CDIS sample
and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2007)
(inward)
FDI stock 23,8 trn US$ 20,3 trn US$ 23,0 trn US$ 16,4 trn US$
For our econometric analysis, we have deflated CDIS (and UNCTAD) FDI data
by the US GDP deflator (using the PWT9.0 series pl gdpo) and use the data in
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millions in our regressions.4
Figure 4.3 depicts overall bilateral FDI positions from CDIS over time, broken
down by different country-groups.5 Two key features are worth highlighting.
First, there is little variation over the years since 2009. Second, figure 4.3 re-
veals that the large majority of FDI positions exist between ‘Northern’ countries,
followed by North-South FDI. Although this is generally well-known, the mag-
nitude is still worth highlighting.
Figure 4.3: FDI Stocks by Income Groups over Time
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Source: Authors’ illustration based on CDIS data
4One may argue that year fixed effects account for global inflation. This is incorrect if the
model includes a combination of ‘real’ variables (like education, institutions etc.) and nominal
variables, like in our case. It is thus necessary to bring both to a common level. We presume
that the price level of US output-side GDP is the most appropriate simple deflator for global
asset prices.
5We code economies as South if they are classified as ‘emerging market’ or ‘low income
country’ by the IMF and as North otherwise. Country-group doubles are ordered as ‘source-
to-host’, e.g. ‘South-North FDI’ is FDI from a Southern source country to a Northern host
country.
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Figures 4.4 and 4.5, respectively, show the top-10 source and host countries of
FDI in our sample for the year 2015. There are little surprises in those figures
which contain large industrialized economies like US, UK, Japan, Germany, and
France. The existence of relatively small countries like the Netherlands and
Switzerland as FDI hubs is as much known as the round-tipping of FDI via its
Hong Kong SAR (and Singapore) or the peculiar situation of Ireland as a host
for FDI. Japan is still relatively closed to FDI; it is thus consistent that it only
shows up as a top-10 source country but not as a top-10 host.
Figure 4.4: Top-10 FDI Source Countries (in absolute terms)
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Those descriptive statistics generally support the notion that our sample is an
adequate representation of global FDI patterns, with all their drawbacks.6 We
6For general discussions about the adequacy of FDI data, refer to Beugelsdijk et al. (2010)
and Wacker (2016). The key finding of those studies is that there are some discrepancies
between FDI data and the economic concepts that researchers often presume or intend to
measure with these data but that these discrepancies to wide extent have a meaningful eco-
nomic interpretation.
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Figure 4.5: Top-10 FDI Host Countries (in absolute terms)
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Source: Authors’ illustration based on CDIS data
think that economics still needs to be explain FDI peculiarities like Ireland or
round-tipping in Asia but also want to avoid that individual outliers considerably
distort our analysis of determinants of global FDI. We hence create identifiers for
outliers that enter our model as bilateral fixed effects in the following way: we
first regress FDI stocks on all variables contained in the ‘homogeneous gravity’
and ‘homogeneous KK’ model (explained below). The residuals of this regres-
sion are plotted against predicted FDI in figure 4.A.1 in the appendix. Outliers
are visually identified and must additionally fall into the bottom 1% or top
99% of the residual distribution. Not surprisingly, the resulting outlier identifi-
ers involve UK, Netherlands, US, Ireland, Hong Kong SAR of PRC, and China.7
Having introduced our FDI stock variable, we now move to the econometric
model used to explain global bilateral FDI positions including its relevant vari-
7More precisely, UK-Netherlands 2015, Netherlands-UK 2009&2010, US-Netherlands 2011-
2016, US-Ireland 2015-2016, HK-China 2010-2016.
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ables.
4.3 Modeling FDI: Theory and Related Liter-
ature
Our paper aims to asses how certain variables collected in the matricesX1, X2, Z
influence FDI positions at year t between source and host countries s and h, re-
spectively. Formally, this can be written as:
FDIstocksht = X1,stβs +X2,htβh + Zshtδ + as + ah + dt + sht, (4.1)
where as, ah, and dt are source-, host-, and time-fixed effects, respectively, and
 is an idiosyncratic error term.8
The notation of our variables highlights that identification of the parameters in
βs, βh, δ results from three different types of variation: identification of βs (βh)
comes from variation of source (host) country variables in X1 (X2) over time,
while identification of δ comes from variation of Z between source and host
countries over time and over country pairs. The former, for example, includes
source country GDP which is the same for all host countries, whereas the latter
includes differences in GDP that varies over country pairs.
8We are aware of the fact that gravity literature in trade uses more restrictive fixed effect
settings but this is not meaningful in our setup because of the short time dimension and
particularly the little over-time variation in many variables, notbably FDI stocks as depicted
in section 4.2. As previously stated, our goal is not a structural identification exercise, thus
the individual parameters of our estimations should be interpreted with some caution. We are
willing to take that cost for the benefit of providing a global assessment how well key theories
explain global FDI and for being able to give an informed judgement how non-time-varying
factors (such as cultural distance) matter in this context.
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We estimate equation 4.1 using PPML, following the standard literature (Benassy-
Quere et al., 2007; Demir and Hu, 2016; Kleinert and Toubal, 2010). Moreover,
we allow for some heterogeneity in the parameters βs, βh, δ as we detail below.
Note that a homogeneity restriction of parameters, which is often implicitly
assumed in econometric applications, will lead to biased estimates if the true
data-generating process is heterogeneous. Conversely, allowing for heterogen-
eity will inflate the variance of estimates. Our cross-validation exercise allows
an assessment of this standard bias-variance tradeoff that receives increasing
attention in the heterogeneous panel literature (e.g. Bester and Hansen (2016)).
In the remainder of this section, we explain which variables enter X1, X2, Z
according to the different theoretical models of FDI, and how they are measured.
4.3.1 Gravity model
Kleinert and Toubal (2010) have shown that structural models for horizontal
and vertical FDI motives can be assessed in reduced form by substituting
bs1 ln(GDPst)+ bh1 ln(GDPht)+δ1 ln(Dsh)+δ2RSkEsht+δ3 ln(GDPst+GDPht)
into equation (4.1). We measure GDP by the rgdpna series from PWT9.0, which
is most appropriate to track GDP developments in countries over time (Feenstra
et al., 2015), D by population-weighted distance from the CEPII gravity data
set, and relative skill endowment RSkE as:
RSkEsht := ln
( skilledst
skilledst + skilledht
)
− ln
( unskilledst
unskilledst + unskilledht
)
,
where ‘skilled’ is the sum of ‘secondary completed’ and ‘tertiary total’ in the
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Barro and Lee (2010) data set, and ‘unskilled’ is defined as 100-‘skilled’.9 RSkEsht >
0 hence indicates that the source country is more skilled in year t.
The first three terms in equation (4.2) are well-known gravity components,
whereas the latter two represent vertical motives. More precisely, Kleinert and
Toubal (2010) show that parameter restrictions as depicted in table 4.2 apply
for the horizontal and vertical model, respectively.10 Kleinert and Toubal (2010)
derive the gravity equation (i) from a proximity-concentration model explain-
ing the emergence of horizontal FDI, which is negatively related to distance
costs and (ii) from the factor proportions theory, implying vertical motives for
FDI, which suggests that multinational enterprises fragment their production
processes into stages, located globally according to international differences in
factor prices. Fragmentation takes place when different production stages use
different factors intensively and countries have different endowments.
Table 4.2: Predictions for Parameters in the Horizontal and Vertical Model
horizontal model vertical model
bs1 = 1 < 0
bh1 = 1 > 0
δ1 < 0 < 0
δ2 0 > 0
δ3 0 = 1
Source: Kleinert and Toubal (2010).
One concern in estimating the gravity component is the likely possibility that
horizontal motives may be more present in one part of the sample (notably in
9Barro-Lee data were interpolated since they only come in 5-year intervals. Our measure
essentially follows the idea of Kleinert and Toubal (2010) but we have to take educational
attainment instead of occupational task data to gauge skill levels because the latter (provided
by the ILO) are available for much less countries.
10Note that Kleinert and Toubal (2010) derive their predictions for affiliate sales. Since the
respective parameters are elasticities, the same predictions can be applied to FDI data if the
latter are a homogeneous function of the former, as Wacker (2016) suggests.
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“North-North” FDI), whereas vertical motives may be more important in other
parts of the sample where factor price differences are larger (such as “North-
South” FDI). Putting a homogeneity restriction on the parameters bs1, bh1, δ2, δ3
may thus be restrictive and mask the true FDI motives. We hence allow for het-
erogeneity in those 4 parameters among the North-North, North-South, South-
North, and South-South pairs and label the respective model the ‘heterogeneous
gravity’ model.
4.3.2 KK model
Given the analytical complexity of the knowledge-capital (KK) model, which
already involves 30 non-linear (in)equalities for a bare-bone partial equilibrium
representation, deriving a testable reduced-form equation is not straightforward
and has been subject to some debate in the literature (Blonigen et al., 2003;
Carr et al., 2001). The core of the argument concerns the non-symmetry in the
parameter for skill differences depending on whether one looks at FDI relation-
ships where the host or source country is more skill-intensive. Davies (2008)
thus suggests substituting the following terms into equation (4.1):
δ4(GDPst +GDPht) + δ5(GDPst −GDPht)2 + δ6(skilledst − skilledht) +
δ7(skilledst − skilledht)2 + δ8(skilledst − skilledht)(GDPst −GDPht) +
δ9Dsh + δ10(skilledst − skilledht)2tradecostht + β3tradecostst +
+β4tradecostht + β5investmentbarriersht. (4.2)
We measure GDP, D, and skilled as defined above, tradecost by 100× [1 -
X/GDP + M/GDP] using the export and import shares csh x and csh m×(-1)
from PWT9.0, and investmentbarrier by investment freedom from the Heritage
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Foundation, where 100 indicates the highest freedom.
As the KK component (4.2) indicates, the knowledge-capital model is ‘global’ in
the sense that differences in GDP and skill/factor endowments rank prominently
within the model, such that a split along the “North” and “South” dimension
(as for the gravity model) does not appear meaningful. However, to account
for the above-mentioned non-symmetry in the skill-difference parameters, we
allow for a ‘heterogeneous KK’ model variant, where parameters for variables
involving skill differences are allowed to differ between skill-intensive host vs.
source country pairs.
The KK model combines motives for horizontal and vertical FDI. First, hori-
zontal FDI arises to reduce trade costs by serving the foreign market through
local production and head quarter costs by jointly using headquarter activities
in all subsidiaries. Since production of a multinational firm is skill-intensive
relative to non-FDI sectors, increasing skill differences reduce the presence of
horizontal FDI. Second, vertical FDI emerges to exploit factor price differences,
which arise when skill differences increase.
Accounting for both motives the KK model implies a nonmonotonic relationship
between skill differences and FDI. In the presence of reasonably large trade costs,
moving from a negative skill difference of source relative to host (skill abundant
host), to larger values of skill differences, total FDI, which is now horizontal,
increases as skill differences become less negative, that is skill endowments of
the countries become more similar. After a peak of FDI, increasing positive skill
differences of source relative to host (skill abundant source) leads to a decrease
in (horizontal) FDI, while vertical FDI starts to become profitable due to emer-
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ging factor prize differences. Vertical and horizontal FDI coexist, until vertical
FDI dominates as skill differences go to infinity.
Consequently, for a negative skill difference (skill-intensive host), we expect a
positive relationship of skill difference, while for a positive skill difference (skill-
intensive source), we expect a nonmonotonic effect, meaning a negative coeffi-
cient for δ6 and a positive effect for δ7.
For the sum of real GDPs and the squared difference in real GDPs we expect a
positive and negative effect, respectively. The coefficient of the interaction term
of skill difference and real GDP difference (δ8) should be negative. Distance
(D) is included to account for transport costs and thus should show a negative
relationship, too. The coefficient of the interaction term of squared skill differ-
ence and trade costs in the host country (δ10) captures the effect of host trade
costs promoting horizontal FDI but not vertical FDI, while horizontal FDI is
most important when skill differences are small. Thus, we expect a negative
effect. Correspondingly, the coefficient of trade costs in the host should be pos-
itive. For the effect of trade costs in the source, we anticipate a negative effect,
as an increase in trade costs of the source reduces the incentive to ship back,
goods produced by a subsidiary located abroad. Finally, we capture investment
barriers by investment freedom which should positively affect FDI.
4.3.3 Export platform FDI
The literature has highlighted possible spatial interdependencies in FDI motives
(see Blonigen et al. (2007), and Antra`s and Yeaple (2014), for summaries).
Probably the most common among them is ‘export platform FDI’ (Ekholm et al.,
2007; Yeaple, 2003), which is essentially an extension of horizontal motives to
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countries surrounding the host country, can hence quite easily be included in
our reduced form exercise. Export-platform FDI depicts the investment activity
of a parent country in a particular host with the aim to serve ‘third’ markets by
exporting final goods produced by the affiliate in the host. Formally, we include
the term βh2 ln(SMPsht) into our model, where ‘surrounding market potential’
is calculated as:
SMPsht :=
S∑
si 6=s
GDPsit
Dsih
,
where GDP and D are defined as above.
4.3.4 Institutional and cultural aspects
While FDI generally requires some form of market imperfection that gives rise
to an internalization argument, an interesting literature for our purpose has fo-
cused on the specific similarity of market imperfections across source and host
countries (e.g. Azemar et al. (2012); Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008); Darby
et al.; Desbordes et al.. Their rationale can be summarized as follows: while
FDI is generally distracted by weak institutions, firms’ previous experience with
institutional risk at home lets them develop the skills that render similar prob-
lems overseas less problematic which creates an advantage for those firms to
invest in other host countries with potentially weak institutional environments,
thus creating a strong incentive for South-South FDI.11 Recent work by Demir
and Hu (2016) is, in our view, the most elaborate empirical assessment of this
idea. They investigate whether institutional distance has heterogeneous effects
on FDI flows with respect to institutional development and the direction of flows
from and to developing and developed countries. Their results show that the
11Relatedly, Dippenaar (2009) argues that Southern firms may face less risk of expropriation
since they may not be tackled as colonizing companies by populist leaders.
150
Chapter 4
effects of institutional distance depend on the direction of FDI flows and de-
velopment level of host and source. Although institutional differences appear
as an entry barrier for investment flows in both North-South and South-North
directions, this effect is smaller if the source country is from the South. On
the other hand, South-South flows show to be positively driven by institutional
differences, which can be an explanation for the increase in South-South FDI.
To some of the econometric models, we hence add
δ11InstDistsht + δ121(InstDist)h>s,t × InstDistsht, (4.3)
where 1(InstDist)h>s,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if institutional quality
is higher in the host country than in the source country (in year t). We expect
δ12 > 0 > δ11 because institutional distance should generally have a negative
effect on FDI but this effect should be mitigated with increasing institutional
development of the host economy (conditional on all other factors).
Our measure for institutional distance aggregates the 12 dimensions d of the
ICRG political risk index Inst, following Demir and Hu (2016):
InstDistsht =
1
12
12∑
d=1
(Instdst − Instdht)2
Vd
,
where Vd is the variance of each dimension d.
Similarly, especially the international business literature has emphasized that
cultural distance makes firm integration more difficult and thus detracts FDI
(e.g. Beugelsdijk et al. (2018)). We thus control for a number of cultural factors
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including the dummy variables common colonizer, common official language,
colonial relationship after 1945 from the CEPII gravity data set, and two di-
mensions of cultural distance, calculated as the values of host-source values of
the Hofstede et al. (2010) measures for ‘long-term orientation vs. short-term
orientation’ and ‘indulgence vs. restraint’. Note that those measures do not
vary over time and the latter two have been selected due to the fact that they
have wider availability than the other 3 cultural dimensions of Hofstede et al.
(2010). Nevertheless, the Hofstede et al. (2010) measure is the key sample con-
straint in our data set.
Similar to the model component (4.3) we additionally interacted both Hofstede
et al. (2010) measures with a dummy variable equal 1 if the value in the host
country exceeded the value in the source to allow for asymmetry.
4.3.5 International finance aspects
An interesting aspect of FDI research is that it allows to combine trade aspects,
which are generally ‘real’ (as opposed to monetary) and often studied from a
general equilibrium perspective, with international finance aspects that by defin-
ition include a monetary and thus frictional aspect. A close integration of the
two is still at its infancy (see Foley and Manova (2015); Manova et al. (2015),
for important contributions) but the international finance perspective generally
suggests inclusion of the following variables.
Exchange rates are important as they influence international asset prices (Blo-
nigen, 1997; Froot and Stein, 1991). We thus include the series xr for source
and host from PWT9.0.
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Similarly exchange rate volatility and thus the exchange rate regime may mat-
ter, as discussed extensively in Harms and Knaze (2018). We hence include their
bilateral de jure regime measure in our regressions.
It is also well-known and extensively studied that tax considerations play an im-
portant role in FDI allocation.12 To gauge this effect, we include the difference
in corporate tax rates, extracted from KPMG documents, into the ‘international
finance’ specification of our model.13 Again, we additionally interact this dif-
ference with a dummy variable equal 1 if the host tax rate is higher than the
source tax rate.
Donaubauer et al. (2016) discuss why and how financial development matters for
bilateral FDI. To gauge this effect, we take differences between source and host
country’s aggregate “broad-based index of financial development” developed and
provided by the IMF, which again is additionally included with a dummy vari-
able interaction indicating higher financial development in the host country.
4.4 Results for Individual Models
The first two tables report the results for the gravity and KK model, respect-
ively. Each starts with the homogeneous model, then adds (surrounding mar-
ket potential) SMP, then heterogeneous model, then adding SMP to that. All
presented models include a full set of time, source and host country fixed effects.
12see Davies et al. (2018), for a recent contribution and references
13We interpolate some missing values of corporate tax rates.
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In table 4.2, we summarize the results of the homogenous and heterogenous
gravity model. For the homogenous model we do not find strong support for
the theoretical predictions. The GDPs of source and host are both positive
but only host GDP is significant and it is different from the expected value of
unity. Only the negative and significant effect of distance is in line with theory.
The negative coefficients of relative skill endowment and joint size of source and
host do not support horizontal FDI but also do not have the appropriate sign
to explain vertical FDI. More interesting is that the inclusion of surrounding
market potential in column (2) shows a positive effect, which is significant at
the 10 percent level and which leads to a reduction of the size and significance
of host GDP. Thus, we find supportive evidence for horizontal FDI driven by
the incentive of export-platform foreign investment activity.
While the inclusion of SMP in the homogenous model does not improve the
overall model fit, allowing for heterogeneity in country pairs, leads to an im-
prove of almost 5 percentage points, as reported in columns (3) and (4). Again,
source GDP is not significant, while host is positive and significant but different
from one. When adding SMP to our model we see again a reduction of the sig-
nificance and size of the effect of host GDP for North-North and South-North
pairs where we expect market access motives to be particularly present.
We find that relative skill endowment seems to play a significant role for North-
South FDI but the negative effect is hard to explain. In line with theory re-
lative skill endowment does not drive FDI between symmetric countries, that
is between North-North and South-South, where we expect horizontal motives
to matter most and factor price differences to be small. Consistent with these
findings and in support for the presence of horizontal FDI motives we see pos-
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itive and highly significant effects of the surrounding market potential for pairs
of symmetric countries (North-North and South-South) and also for FDI from
developing countries to industrialized countries (South-North), which aim at
gaining access to a large market. The importance of the surrounding market
for South-North FDI seems to dominate the positive effect of host GDP, which
disappears in the model with SMP.
With regard to the joint size of source and host we do not find a significant
impact on FDI as predicted by the factor proportions model, which suggests
a coefficient of unity. This result is nevertheless in line with the findings by
Kleinert and Toubal (2010).
In the next step we move to the results of the KK model where we present our
findings in a similar structure as in table 4.3, but now differentiating between
different skill levels in the heterogenous model.
Table 4.3: Results Gravity Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Hom. PPML Hom. PPML Het. PPML Het. PPML
SMP SMP
Ln (Source GDP) 0.541 0.518
(0.811) (0.818)
Ln (Source GDP) North-North 0.992 1.060
(0.775) (0.768)
Ln (Source GDP) North-South 0.593 0.627
(0.846) (0.839)
Ln (Source GDP) South-North 0.357 0.105
(0.629) (0.658)
Ln (Source GDP) South-South -0.0846 -0.287
(0.620) (0.651)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.3 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Hom. PPML Hom. PPML Het. PPML Het. PPML
SMP SMP
Ln (Host GDP) 1.361*** 0.902*
(0.486) (0.536)
Ln (Host GDP) North-North 2.212*** 1.443**
(0.534) (0.569)
Ln (Host GDP) North-South 1.732*** 1.757***
(0.508) (0.572)
Ln (Host GDP) South-North 1.114** 0.392
(0.546) (0.576)
Ln (Host GDP) South-South 1.215** 1.214**
(0.482) (0.547)
Ln (Bil. Distance) -0.824*** -0.881*** -0.823*** -0.891***
(0.0303) (0.0319) (0.0238) (0.0311)
Rel. skill endowment (BL) -0.383*** -0.388***
(0.0986) (0.0989)
Rel. sk. endowm. (BL) North-North -0.104 -0.130*
(0.0743) (0.0753)
Rel. sk. endowm. (BL) North-South -0.710*** -0.727***
(0.0894) (0.0920)
Rel. sk. endowm. (BL) South-North 0.219 0.333*
(0.158) (0.175)
Rel. sk. endowm. (BL) South-South -0.201 -0.162
(0.127) (0.128)
Ln (Sum GDP) -0.179** -0.161**
(0.0799) (0.0806)
Ln (Sum GDP) North-North -0.641*** -0.625***
(0.0698) (0.0708)
Ln (Sum GDP) North-South -0.0678 -0.0691
(0.147) (0.151)
Ln (Sum GDP) South-North 0.420*** 0.483***
(0.116) (0.123)
Ln (Sum GDP) South-South 0.433*** 0.431***
(0.0928) (0.0875)
Ln (sur. market pot.) 0.986***
(0.294)
Ln (sur. market pot.) North-North 1.249***
(0.316)
Ln (sur. market pot.) North-South 0.368
Continued on next page
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Table 4.3 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Hom. PPML Hom. PPML Het. PPML Het. PPML
SMP SMP
(0.310)
Ln (sur. market pot.) South-North 1.807***
(0.331)
Ln (sur. market pot.) South-South 1.002***
(0.345)
Constant -11.89 -15.49 -11.01 -18.03*
(13.29) (13.22) (10.78) (10.76)
Observations 57,687 57,687 57,687 57,687
R-squared 0.836 0.836 0.882 0.883
Source Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
outlier pair FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.4 presents the results of the homogenous KK model in the first two
columns (including the surrounding market potential (SMP) in column (2)).
We cannot find evidence for the KK model in the differences of skill endowment
itself. Only squared skill difference is significant but shows the wrong sign with
regard to theoretical expectations.
In line with theory, the effect of the squared difference in real GDPs and the
joint effect of difference in GDPs and skill difference are negative. The effect of
distance shows to be negative indicating that monitoring and investment costs,
that are increasing in distance and leading to a reduction in FDI matter more.
As predicted by the KK model the joint effect of squared skill difference and
trade costs is negative, suggesting that even if trade costs are large (and thus
providing incentives for horizontal FDI), an increase in skill difference reduces
FDI (as horizontal motives only matter if countries have a similar skill endow-
157
4.4. RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL MODELS
ment). Trade costs and investment barriers do not show any significant effect
on FDI.
As shown in column (2) the inclusion of SMP leads to unexpected results similar
to what Blonigen et al. (2007) find. It shows a significant negative effect. But
here the effect is still significant although including a set of country dummies,
which control for time-invariant unobserved country-specific effects. Since the
surrounding market potential should be very stable over time, the country dum-
mies can potentially subsume its effects over time. But the results reveal that
this is not the case. An explanation for these results is that our sample includes
a considerable number of developing and transition economies, and Blonigen
et al. (2007) find export platform FDI to be present primarily in European
OECD countries but not in non-OECD countries, which includes developing
countries.
With regard to the heterogenous KK model, differentiating between positive and
negative skill difference does not distinctly improve the model fit. But together
with the inclusion of the squared term of skill difference it can potentially reveal
the presence of vertical FDI. For the negative skill difference, where host is skill-
abundant, we find a positive sign of the coefficient as suggested by theory. As
skill difference in both countries becomes more similar, this leads to an increase
in (horizontal) FDI. Although the effect for skill difference for the skill-abundant
source is negative it is only significant at the 10 percent level in the model where
we account for surrounding market potential. Since the effect of squared skill
difference turns out to be negative, we do not find supporting evidence for the
presence of vertical FDI when skill differences become sufficiently large.
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Trade costs of source and investment barriers do not show any significant effect.
Trade costs in the host show a positive effect, which is significant only at the 10
percent level and in the model without surrounding market potential. This is in
line with theory suggesting that an increase in trade costs in the host provides
a motive for FDI to serve the foreign market to save trade costs. But the effect
diminishes in the model with SMP. The effects of the surrounding market po-
tential do not distinctly differ from the homogeneous model.
Table 4.4: Results KK Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Hom. PPML Hom. PPML Het. PPML Het. PPML
SMP SMP
Sum of GDPs 1.58e-08 2.43e-08
(4.02e-08) (3.96e-08)
Sum GDP (skilled host) 1.34e-08 2.29e-08
(3.48e-08) (3.45e-08)
Sum GDP (skilled source) 1.15e-09 8.94e-09
(3.70e-08) (3.68e-08)
Sq. diff. of GDPs -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Sq. diff. GDP (skilled host) -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Sq. diff. GDP (skilled source) -0.000* -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Skill Difference sh 0.00482 0.00360
(0.00371) (0.00359)
Skill diff. (skilled host) 0.0144*** 0.0129***
(0.00400) (0.00387)
Skill diff. (skilled source) -0.00578 -0.00665*
(0.00380) (0.00381)
Sq. skill difference -0.000127*** -0.000121***
(2.55e-05) (2.50e-05)
Sq. skill diff. (skilled host) -0.000523*** -0.000522***
(9.96e-05) (9.68e-05)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.4 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Hom. PPML Hom. PPML Het. PPML Het. PPML
SMP SMP
Sq. skill diff. (skilled source) -0.000212** -0.000187**
(9.10e-05) (9.10e-05)
Sk. diff. (BL) × GDP diff. -1.13e-09*** -1.19e-09***
(1.18e-10) (1.15e-10)
Skill diff. × diff. GDP (skilled host) -4.93e-10** -5.47e-10**
(2.50e-10) (2.38e-10)
Skill diff. × diff. GDP (skilled source) -1.15e-09*** -1.22e-09***
(1.64e-10) (1.68e-10)
Weighted distance -0.000209*** -0.000202*** -0.000203*** -0.000197***
(4.97e-06) (5.32e-06) (4.64e-06) (5.19e-06)
Sq. skill diff. × trade costs host -2.54e-06*** -2.50e-06***
(3.03e-07) (2.90e-07)
Sq. skill diff. × trade costs host (skilled
host)
-3.79e-06*** -3.72e-06***
(3.23e-07) (3.09e-07)
Sq. skill diff. × trade costs host (skilled
source)
3.95e-07 2.67e-07
(7.04e-07) (7.03e-07)
Trade costs source 0.000313 7.94e-05 0.00113 0.000958
(0.00178) (0.00183) (0.00164) (0.00168)
Trade costs host 0.00241 0.00217 0.00256* 0.00234
(0.00177) (0.00171) (0.00152) (0.00148)
Investment freedom host -0.00190 -0.00138 -0.00236 -0.00192
(0.00368) (0.00365) (0.00356) (0.00352)
Sur. market potential -2.62e-05** -2.52e-05***
(1.07e-05) (9.63e-06)
Constant 5.930*** 6.823*** 5.925*** 6.785***
(0.295) (0.512) (0.285) (0.462)
Observations 57,687 57,687 57,687 57,687
R-squared 0.884 0.884 0.894 0.894
Source Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
outlier pair FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Augmented models
We now move to the augmented model – that is ‘best performing’ from first
stage of cross validation (see below) augmented with all other factors. In each
case, the first column reports the results of the benchmark model without aug-
menting factors. This is important because the sample considerably changes due
to the fact that augmented variables are not available for all countries/years.
Most observations we lose are from developing countries.
The reduction of the sample changes the results of the benchmark model, slightly.
Again, we see more evidence for horizontal FDI than for vertical FDI. Source
GDP now shows significant positive effects for all country pairs. Host GDP
does not show a significant effect for FDI going from South to North. The
sum of GDPs does not matter for FDI from the South suggesting mostly ho-
rizontal motives for foreign investment originating from developing countries.
The sample reduction also leads to an insignificant effect of surrounding market
potential for South-South FDI, while FDI going to the North appears to be
driven by the surrounding market potential.
With regard to the added explanatory variables, we find that financial and cul-
tural factors play a role for FDI, while institutional differences between host and
source do not seem to matter.
Especially the bilateral de-jure exchange rate regime significantly affects FDI.
The negative effect supports what we expect. An increase in distance, which
indicates a more flexible regime in the host and thus is expected to involve a
higher exchange rate volatility and consequently leads to lower FDI. Similarly,
the distance in corporate tax negatively affects FDI when interacted with the
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dummy indicating a higher tax of the host relative to source. This is also what
we expect as higher taxes drive up the costs and thus reduce attractiveness of
the respective market for investment.
The most important cultural factors are having the same official language and
being in a colonial relationship (post 1945). Both variables have the expected
positive sign. The cultural measures by Hofstede also play a significant role, al-
though the coefficients are smaller compared to common language and colonial
relationship. But considering that Hofstede’s indices take values between 0 and
100, there is more variation compared to the dummy variables and thus smaller
coefficients translate into larger effects.
Table 4.5: Results Augmented Gravity Model
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Het. PPML Het. PPML
Ln (Source GDP) North-North 1.515** 1.394**
(0.671) (0.612)
Ln (Source GDP) North-South 1.370** 1.194*
(0.670) (0.615)
Ln (Source GDP) South-North 1.644*** 1.797***
(0.579) (0.583)
Ln (Source GDP) South-South 1.508*** 1.695***
(0.531) (0.541)
Ln (Host GDP) North-North 1.573** 1.721***
(0.635) (0.590)
Ln (Host GDP) North-South 2.971*** 3.459***
(0.431) (0.400)
Continued on next page
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES Het. PPML Het. PPML
Ln (Host GDP) South-North 0.852 1.065*
(0.656) (0.606)
Ln (Host GDP) South-South 2.544*** 3.099***
(0.439) (0.410)
Ln (Bilateral Distance) -0.769*** -0.680***
(0.0237) (0.0267)
Rel. sk. endowm. (BL) North-North -0.135* -0.0753
(0.0750) (0.0745)
Rel. sk. endowm. (BL) North-South -0.840*** -0.675***
(0.101) (0.0939)
Rel. sk. endowm. (BL) South-North -0.419* -0.286
(0.217) (0.219)
Rel. sk. endowm. (BL) South-South -0.503*** -0.338**
(0.157) (0.157)
Ln (Sum GDP) North-North -0.693*** -0.629***
(0.0746) (0.0933)
Ln (Sum GDP) North-South -0.549*** -0.432***
(0.0793) (0.0798)
Ln (Sum GDP) South-North -0.169 -0.105
(0.283) (0.273)
Ln (Sum GDP) South-South -0.159 -0.103
(0.149) (0.155)
Ln (sur. market pot.) North-North 1.039*** 0.851***
(0.287) (0.276)
Ln (sur. market pot.) North-South -0.388 -1.378***
(0.298) (0.303)
Ln (sur. market pot.) South-North 1.746*** 1.406***
(0.303) (0.299)
Ln (sur. market pot.) South-South 0.0783 -1.112***
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Het. PPML Het. PPML
(0.338) (0.344)
Institutional distance (t-1) -0.00615
(0.0437)
Dh>s × Institutional distance (t-1) 0.111
(0.0709)
Dist. financial dev. (host-source) 0.513
(0.514)
Dh>s × Dist. financial dev. (host-source) -0.452
(0.427)
Bil. de-jure exchange rate regime -0.0234***
(0.00715)
Exchange rate (nat. cur./US-$) source -0.000271**
(0.000136)
Exchange rate (nat. cur./US-$) host -3.53e-05
(5.48e-05)
Dist. corporate tax (host-source) 0.0213***
(0.00701)
Dh>s × Dist. corporate tax (host-source) -0.0214***
(0.00755)
Common language 0.589***
(0.0504)
Common colonizer (post 1945) -0.161
(0.146)
Pair in col. relationship (post 1945) 0.474***
(0.0946)
Dist. Hofstede short-term vs. long-term orient. 0.0231
(0.0774)
Dh>s × Dist. Hofstede short-term vs. long-term orient. 0.0110***
(0.00294)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Het. PPML Het. PPML
Dist. Hofstede indulgence vs. restraint -0.578
(0.467)
Dh>s × Dist. Hofstede indulgence vs. restraint -0.0163***
(0.00236)
Constant -42.87*** -41.58***
(8.968) (8.981)
Observations 21,596 21,596
R-squared 0.883 0.898
Source Country FE Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
outlier pair FEs Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The major difference with regard to the results of the KK model in the reduced
sample is that joint size of country pairs is now positive and significant for skilled
source and skilled source, which is in line with the KK model. Another aspect
that changes in the reduced sample is that skill difference and squared skill dif-
ference do not show any significant effects anymore, suggesting that those effects
are related to the inclusion of a sufficiently large number of developing countries
in the analysis as also noted by Davies (2008).
Extending the KK model reveals that in this framework institutional distance
plays a role. Although in general institutional distance does not show any signi-
ficant effect if we do not distinguish between positive and negative institutional
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distance of host/source. Including a dummy for a higher institutional quality of
host relative to source, reveals a positive effect of institutional distance, which
is in line with our expectations that better institutions in the host country pro-
mote investment.
With regard to financial aspects, distance in financial development and distance
in the corporate tax rates show significant effects on FDI. The negative effect
of distance in financial development when interacted with a dummy indicating
higher financial development in the host, makes sense in the way that we expect
financial development in the source to be higher than in the host. So small
distances should promote investment. Furthermore, a positive distance in the
corporate tax rate with regard to the host negatively affects FDI, which is in
line with our expectations. If taxes in the host increases this prevents foreign
investment.
The importance of cultural distance are in line with the overall results of the
augmented gravity model.
Table 4.6: Results Augmented KK Model
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Het. PPML Het. PPML
Sum GDP (skilled host) 1.78e-07*** 1.46e-07***
(4.96e-08) (4.92e-08)
Sum GDP (skilled source) 1.82e-07*** 1.55e-07***
(5.13e-08) (4.99e-08)
Sq. diff. GDP (skilled host) -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Sq. diff. GDP (skilled source) -0.000*** -0.000**
Continued on next page
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Table 4.6 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Het. PPML Het. PPML
(0.000) (0.000)
Skill diff. (skilled host) 0.000890 0.00297
(0.00541) (0.00589)
Skill diff. (skilled source) -0.00260 -0.00627
(0.00553) (0.00492)
Skill diff. × diff. GDP (skilled host) -6.55e-10* -8.31e-10*
(3.65e-10) (4.59e-10)
Skill diff. × diff. GDP (skilled source) -4.73e-10** -4.61e-10**
(2.00e-10) (2.00e-10)
Sq. skill diff. (skilled host) -0.000181 -5.54e-05
(0.000114) (0.000122)
Sq. skill diff. (skilled source) -0.000127 3.75e-05
(0.000102) (8.54e-05)
Sq. skill diff. × trade cost (skilled host) -2.99e-06*** -2.09e-06**
(7.35e-07) (8.20e-07)
Sq. skill diff. × trade cost (skilled source) -1.18e-06 -1.22e-06
(8.41e-07) (7.60e-07)
Trade cost host -0.00116 -0.00101
(0.00157) (0.00162)
Trade cost source -0.00183 -0.00158
(0.00118) (0.00118)
Investment freedom host -0.00606* -0.00673**
(0.00319) (0.00299)
Weighted distance -0.000183*** -0.000172***
(3.86e-06) (4.08e-06)
Institutional distance (t-1) -0.0516
(0.0393)
Dh>s × Institutional distance (t-1) 0.150**
(0.0659)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.6 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Het. PPML Het. PPML
Dist. financial dev. (host-source) 1.003**
(0.444)
Dh>s × Dist. financial dev. (host-source) -1.073***
(0.281)
Bil. de-jure exchange rate regime -0.00228
(0.00660)
Exchange rate (nat. curr./US-$) source -0.000237
(0.000159)
Exchange rate (nat. curr./US-$) host 6.53e-06
(5.54e-05)
Dist. corporate tax (host-source) 0.0343***
(0.00728)
Dh>s × Dist. corporate tax (host-source) -0.0619***
(0.00715)
Common language 0.760***
(0.0462)
Common colonizer (post 1945) -0.108
(0.142)
Pair in col. relationship (post 1945) 0.386***
(0.0906)
Dist. Hofstede short-term vs. long-term orient. 0.0889***
(0.0144)
Dh>s × Dist. Hofstede short-term vs. long-term
orient.
0.00742***
(0.00280)
Dist. Hofstede indulgence vs. restraint 0.0667***
(0.0159)
Dh>s × Dist. Hofstede indulgence vs. restraint -0.0130***
(0.00227)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.6 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Het. PPML Het. PPML
Constant 5.960*** 6.807***
(0.307) (0.313)
Observations 21,596 21,596
R-squared 0.897 0.907
Source Country FE Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Outlier pair FEs Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.5 Cross Validation
The main goal of our paper is to assess the performance of key theories ex-
plaining global FDI. Put differently, how well do the models presented so far
explain bilateral FDI positions? This requires analyzing their predictive power
out of sample, because an in-sample analysis would either lead to overfitting or
rely on the restrictive assumptions for asymptotic model selection criteria (see
e.g. (Zucchini, 2000), for an overview on the issue). The natural tool to use for
such a purpose is cross validation, which splits the data set into one part, where
estimation is performed, and another part, used to assess the predictive power
of the estimated model.
More precisely, the following procedure is applied for all our candidate models:
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1. From the original sample, randomly draw an ‘estimation sample’ (without
replacement) that consists of 90 percent of the original observations.14
2. Use this ‘estimation sample’ to estimate the parameters for each candidate
model.
3. Apply the estimated parameters to predict ̂FDIstocksht for each candid-
ate model in the remaining 10 percent of observations (the ’calibration
sample’).
4. For each model and calibration observation calculate the residual
εˆsht ≡ FDIstocksht − ̂FDIstocksht (4.4)
and their ‘mean absolute deviation’ (MAD) per model over all calibration
observations:
MAD ≡ 1
Nc
Nc∑
i
|εˆi|, (4.5)
where i = 1, ..., Nc are all s, h, t combinations that are part of the calibra-
tion sample.
5. Repeat 1 to 4 100 times and calculate the average MAD over all 100
iterations.
In a first step, we consider each of the following candidate models with and
without surrounding market potential: a homogeneous gravity model, a hetero-
geneous gravity model (North-North, North-South, South-North, South-South),
14We do not put any restrictions on the drawing procedure. This is motivated by the
fact that ‘wild’ procedures generally perform well for iterative inference methods such as
bootstrapping. The ‘original sample’ includes all observations for which all the variables from
all respective candidate models are non-missing.
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a homogeneous KK model, and a heterogeneous KK model (host skilled, source
skilled). Out of these 8 models evaluated, the ‘best performing’ gravity and KK
model (with the lowest MAD) proceed to a second stage.
In the second stage, the ‘best performing’ models from the first step are aug-
mented with the following variables, respectively:15
A. Institutions
B. Financial development, exchange rate, & de-jure exchange rate regime,
corporate tax rate
C. A & B
D. A, B, common colonizer, common language, & pair in colonial relationship
E. D, & Hofstede cultural distance (smallest sample)
At both stages, we compare the model performance relative to a ‘fixed effect
only’ model, which only includes the respective fixed effects and outlier identi-
fiers. Moreover, we compare the models in the second stage to a ‘pure institu-
tions’ model, which includes InstDist,1(InstDist)h>s,t× InstDist, ComLang,
ComCol, Col45, and the ‘FE only’ parameters.
Table 4.7 and figure 4.6 summarize the results from the first stage. Looking
at figure 4.6 one can see three clusters of model performance. Clearly, the FE
model performs worst. Even in the best cases (i.e. ‘most favorable’ sample
draws), the FE model performs barely better than the next class of models on
average, which are the homogeneous gravity models (with and without market
15Note that due to the increase in variables in the second stage, the ‘original sample’ con-
siderably shrinks (and is limited by all observations in the sample for model E).
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of MAD across Models (1st stage)
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potential). In the ‘best performing’ cluster on the left in figure 4.6, we see that
the heterogeneous gravity model (with and without SMP) and all variants of
the KK model perform equally well but that the MADs of the heterogeneous
gravity models are much more narrowly distributed, suggesting that their es-
timation risk with respect to the sample is lower. Close inspection of figure 4.6
reveals that overall the heterogeneous gravity model with surrounding market
potential performs best by a tight margin. Within the KK models considered,
the heterogeneous KK model without SMP performs best. Both of those models
thus move as ‘benchmark’ to the second stage.
What can we say about the overall performance of those models in describing
global bilateral FDI positions? Generally, the best-performing models decrease
the mean absolute prediction error compared to a pure fixed effect model with
additional outlier control by about 25 %. While non-negligible, one may argue
that this is a rather disappointing magnitude. Without rejecting this negative
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interpretation, we remind that the fixed effects per se already explain quite a
good part of variation in bilateral FDI positions. To interpret the results of
our assessment how well prevailing models of FDI explain global bilateral data,
consider the heterogeneous gravity model with SMP. Its average MAD of 1,137
suggests that on average one would expect this model’s out-of-sample prediction
for a randomly chosen bilateral observation to make an error equal to 52.8 % of
mean FDI. In other words, the sample’s mean bilateral FDI position is about
twice as large as the MAD of the best-performing model.
Table 4.7: Cross Validation Results (1st stage)
MAD SD(MAD) RMAD
FE only 1,523 127 100.0%
KK homo (w/o SMP) 1,167 96 76.7%
KK homo (w/ SMP) 1,171 97 76.9%
KK hetero (w/o SMP) 1,140 91 74.9%
KK hetero (w/ SMP) 1,144 91 75.1%
Gravity homo (w/o SMP) 1,248 99 82.0%
Gravity homo (w/ SMP) 1,249 100 82.0%
Gravity hetero (w/o SMP) 1,140 89 74.8%
Gravity hetero (w/ SMP) 1,137 88 74.7%
MAD stand for mean of the Mean Absolute Deviation of
cross validation. All criteria based on the same sample
of 57, 687 observations. MAD derived from 100
iterations with an estimation sample of 0.9× 57, 687.
RMAD is MAD relative to ‘FE only’ model.
Table 4.8 and figure 4.7 summarize the results from the second stage. As one can
see, all models except for the ‘institutions only’ model perform much better than
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of MAD across Models (2nd stage)
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the fixed effect only model. This is not really surprising given that we consider
augmented versions of the models performing best in the first stage. It is never-
theless assuring given that the sample size non-randomly shrinks by more than
60 %. Again, the best-performing models have a mean absolute prediction error
by about 25 % smaller than a pure fixed effect model with additional outlier
control, although this improvement is now somewhat smaller for the benchmark
models that performed best in the first stage. The best-performing models in
the second stage are variants D and E of the heterogeneous KK model, followed
by variant E of the gravity model with surrounding market potential. Perform-
ances in out-of-sample prediction between those models are not different in a
statistical sense. One may suspect that the higher MAD of the second stage
indicates a worse performance of those models but this effect is driven by the
fact that the mean of bilateral FDI positions in this considerably smaller sample
is considerably higher. In effect, the best-performing model’s MAD equals 47.5
% of mean FDI in that sample, indicating a somewhat better out-of-sample pre-
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Table 4.8: Cross Validation Results (2nd stage)
MAD SD(MAD) RMAD
FE only 2,972 253 100.0%
KK hetero 2,318 199 78.0%
KK hetero A 2,311 197 77.8%
KK hetero B 2,286 198 76.9%
KK hetero C 2,281 196 76.7%
KK hetero D 2,240 189 75.4%
KK hetero E 2,240 186 75.4%
Gravity hetero SMP 2,322 195 78.1%
Gravity hetero SMP A 2,323 195 78.2%
Gravity hetero SMP B 2,303 193 77.5%
Gravity hetero SMP C 2,297 193 77.3%
Gravity hetero SMP D 2,263 195 76.2%
Gravity hetero SMP E 2,245 188 75.5%
Institutions only 2,783 224 93.6%
MAD stand for mean of the Mean Absolute Deviation of
cross validation. All criteria based on the same sample
of 21, 596 observations. MAD derived from 100
iterations with an estimation sample of 0.9× 21, 596.
RMAD is MAD relative to ‘FE only’ model.
diction than in the best models in the first stage (in relative terms).
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this analysis we use the new ’Coordinated Direct Investment Statistics’ (CDIS)
data by the IMF to evaluate the performance of the main theories which have
been applied to determine global FDI. We assess the gravity model and the
knowledge capital (KK) model accounting for horizontal and vertical motives
of FDI and extend the models by factors suggested by theory such as financial,
cultural and institutional factors and third country effects in the form of sur-
rounding market potential (SMP) as driving forces of FDI.
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The CDIS data set has a large bilateral country coverage, including a large
share of developing and transitions economies compared to bilateral FDI data
used in previous studies. These characteristics of the CDIS data set account
for three challenges, which arise when evaluating the performance of the key
theories explaining global FDI. First, to detect vertical FDI it is substantial
to have a sufficiently large share of developing countries included, where factor
price differences arise. Second, the global South plays an important role in FDI
activity, which has not been part in empirical studies as a global region. Third,
including institutional and cultural factors in the estimation requires sufficient
cross-country variation, which is achieved by the balanced coverage of countries
of different income levels.
We follow the standard method applied by previous studies and use the PPML
to estimate the different models allowing for heterogeneity with respect to dif-
ferent regions and skill-endowment. We compare the performance of the models
in a cross-validation by calculating the mean absolute deviation of the pre-
dicted values over all calibration observations in two stages. in the first step
we evaluate the homogeneous and heterogeneous gravity and KK model with
and without surrounding market potential and in the second step we extend
the best-performing models from the first step by financial, cultural and insti-
tutional factors.
We find more supporting evidence for (horizontal) market-seeking motives for
FDI in the gravity and KK model. Export-platform FDI shows to be an im-
portant channel in the gravity model to gain market access. The heterogeneous
gravity model reveals that this channel is particularly present for FDI to the
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North or for FDI from and to the South. North-South FDI is not driven by
the surrounding market potential. This is also in line with theory as we expect
North-South FDI to be mostly driven by vertical motives.
Our cross validation procedure reveals that overall the heterogeneous grav-
ity model including SMP performs best, while the KK model performs best
when SMP is excluded. Evaluating the extended models reveals that the best-
performing models include financial, cultural and institutional factors, while
gravity model performs best when including the Hofstede cultural measures.
However including institutional factors alone results in the poorest performance
compared to the inclusion of financial factors which improve the performance
distinctly. In both steps, the best-performing models lead to a reduction of the
mean absolute prediction error by about 25 percent compared to our benchmark
model.
With regard to institutional distance although we do not find a significant ef-
fect in the gravity model, one may argue that the effects depend on the type of
country pair, that is North-North, North-South, South-North or South-South.
However, we find that in the global KK model there is a significant effect sug-
gesting that a higher quality of institutions in the host promotes FDI.
177
4.A. APPENDIX
4.A Appendix
Figure 4.A.1: Outlier Identification
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Table 4.A.1: List of Variables
Variable Description Source
Variables of Baseline Models
FDI stock Inward FDI stocks (in million constant 2011
US$).
CDIS data from
IMF
GDP Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices (in
million 2011 US$).
‘rgdpna’ series of
the Penn World
Tables (PWT) 9.0
Weighted distance (D) Population weighted distance between a country
pair.
CEPII gravity data
set
Relative skill endow-
ment (RskE)
Measured as the natural logarithm of ‘skilled’
in source relative to ‘skilled’ in source and host
minus the natural logarithm of ‘unskilled’ in
host relative to ‘unskilled’ in source and host,
where:‘skilled’ is the sum of ‘secondary com-
pleted’ and ‘tertiary total’ for source and host.
Barro and Lee
(2010)
Trade costs Trade costs measured as 100× (1− XGDP + MGDP ),
while XGDP and
M
GDP denote the export and
import shares (‘cshx’ and ‘cshm’ series from
PWT9.0) of merchandise export and imports at
PPP.
PWT 9.0
Investment barriers Investment barriers are proxied for by the invest-
ment freedom index which measures the regula-
tions imposed on investment and which takes val-
ues between 0 (where the number and scope of
restrictions is so high that investment freedom
is eliminated) and 100 (where no restrictions are
imposed and firms can move capital freely).
The Heritage
Foundation
Continued on next page
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Table 4.A.1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Description Source
Sur. market potential
(SMP)
The surrounding market potential is defined as
the sum of inverse-distance-weighted GDPs of all
other surrounding countries except for home and
host (which are included as separate regressors in
the model) for each year.
Based on GDP
data from PWT 9.0
and distance from
CEPII’s gravity
data set
Institutional and Cultural Factors
Institutional distance
(InstDist)
Institutional distance, measured as the arithmetic
average of the squared difference of each dimen-
sion d of the political risk rating (by the ICRG)
between two countries relative to the variance of
each dimension.
The International
Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) by
the PRS Group
(2016)
Common colonizer
(post 1945)
Dummy variable equal to one if a pair had a com-
mon colonist after 1945 and zero otherwise.
CEPII’s gravity
data set
Common off. language Dummy variable equal to one if a pair has a com-
mon official or primary language and zero other-
wise.
CEPII’s gravity
data set
Colonial relationship
(post 1945)
Dummy variable equal to one if a pair had a co-
lonial relationship after 1945 and zero otherwise.
CEPII’s gravity
data set
Dist. of long-term vs.
short-term orientation
Measures the difference of one dimension of na-
tional culture by Hofstede et al. (2010), i.e. long-
term versus short term orientation index created
by of host minus source. The dimension relates to
the people’s choice of focus with regard to their
efforts and determines if they are driven by the
past, present or future. It varies from zero to 100
with scores near zero indicating shorter and near
100 longer term orientation.
Hofstede et al.
(2010)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.A.1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Description Source
Dist. of indulgence vs.
restraint
Measures the difference of one dimension of na-
tional culture by Hofstede et al. (2010), i.e. indul-
gence versus restraint of host minus source. The
index relates to the people’s gratification versus
control of basic human desires relative to enjoying
life. Higher values (close to 100) indicate societ-
ies which are more indulgent compared to small
values where societies are more restraint.
Hofstede et al.
(2010)
International Financial Aspects
Exchange rate Exchange rate reports the exchange rate for each
period in national currency relative to US$. Es-
timated values are used if exchange rates are mis-
aligned.
‘xr’ series from
PWT 9.0
Bil. exchange rate re-
gime
Bilateral de-jure exchange rate regime based on
the IMF AREAER. It varies from 1 to 10, with
the lowest value denoting hard pegs and the max-
imum value representing free floating regimes.
Harms and Knaze
(2018)
Dist. in corporate tax
rate
Distance in the corporate tax rate of host minus
source. Missing values are interpolated.
KPMG documents
Dist. financial devel-
opment
Financial development is proxied by the ”Broad
based index of financial development”, which is
an aggregate index measuring the devlopment
of financial institutions and financial markets in
terms of their depth, access and efficiency. It
is a continuous index varying between zero and
one with larger values representing higher devel-
opment. The distance of financial development
subtracts the index of host minus source.
IMF; Svirydzenka
(2016)
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Table 4.A.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI stocks (in mn) 57,687 2152.9 20064.6 0.0 1158873
GDP 57,687 977523.3 2409277 2711.3 1.83e+07
Rel. skill endowment 57,687 -0.031 1.0 -3.5 4.0
Weighted distance 57,687 7382.6 4317.2 114.6 19648.5
Trade costs host 57,687 32.5 54.8 -419.0 103.9
Trade costs source 57,687 26.8 59.3 -419.0 103.9
Investment freedom host 57,687 58.7 21.6 0.0 95.0
Sur. market potential 57,687 22577.1 9841.4 6.3 58628.0
Institutional distance 48,977 1.7 1.1 0.1 875.149
Common colonizer (post 1945) 57,687 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0
Common language 57,687 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0
Pair in colonial rel. (post 1945) 57,687 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0
Dist. of long-term vs. 26,998 -1.1 32.6 -96.0 96.0
short-term orient.
Dist. indulgence vs. restraint 25,668 -1.0 30.4 -100.0 100.0
Exchange rate host 57,687 563.8 2268.8 0.3 33468.9
Exchange rate source 57,687 507.6 2313.0 0.3 33468.9
Bil. dejure exchange rate regime 53,989 9.0 2.1 1.0 10.0
Corp. tax rate host 48,715 25.1 7.3 0.0 55.0
Corp. tax rate source 48,986 25.3 7.4 0.0 55.0
Dist. of financial dev. 56,842 -0.0 0.4 -0.9 0.9
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Figure 4.A.2: FDI Stocks by Income Groups
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Conclusion
5.1 Summary
This thesis addresses the actual developments regarding trade agreements and
global investment flows. Specifically, I build on the fact that we see an ongoing
integration and newly signed trade agreements where more and more develop-
ing countries participate on the one hand and more protectionist policies on
the other hand. At the same time we can observe that trade agreements have
become deeper and today include a comprehensive set of “behind-the-border-
rules” which affect domestic policies of the member countries. In the whole
thesis, I refer to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) which include all types
of trade agreements between two countries or more and, which include rules
liberalizing trade at least to some extend. In my analysis I look at the factors
determining the formation of PTAs and the effects of PTAs and I look at the
factors explaining global FDI flows. In each part of the analysis I inspect the
role of institutional quality focusing on political aspects, specifically institutions
related to investment and the rule of law. In the respective chapters I argue
why those institutions are specifically important when considering the effect or
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factors of trade agreements and global investment flows.
In the analysis of the second chapter, I create a panel data set of North-South
PTAs building on the comprehensive database on the design of trade agree-
ments (DESTA) by Du¨r et al. (2014). I analyze the effects of the depth and
number of PTAs signed on the quality of institutions in the ‘South’ measured
as the political risk component ‘investment profile’ of the ICRG database. I
show that the system GMM is the appropriate estimator to apply for my em-
pirical analysis to account for various sources of endogeneity. I find that signing
deep PTAs between ‘North’ and ‘South’ positively affects institutions in the
‘South’. Taking a deeper look at the effect for different regions reveals that in
Sub-Sahara African (SSA) countries, where institutional quality and economic
indicators perform specifically poor, signing deep PTAs does not have any effect
on the local institutions. Isolating the effect for ‘Southern’ countries without
SSA shows that the positive effect of deep PTAs becomes even larger and highly
significant. As a robustness check I use different lags as instruments for the
system GMM and show that the effect remains highly significant and positive
independent from the used instruments. Another result is that simply signing a
large number of PTAs ignoring the depth does not have any effect on domestic
institutions, while focusing on PTAs, which include substantive rules with re-
gard to investment (TIPs), shows that the membership in such agreements has a
positive and significant effect on institutions. The results show that developing
countries form the ‘South’, which typically show poor institutions, can benefit
from the recent trend that PTAs have become deeper with regard to the qual-
ity of their domestic institutions. As highlighted by the growth literature good
institutions are a central factor for the economic development of a country and
thus promoting institutions should be a central goal in development economics.
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So signing deep PTAs can constitute a long-run development strategy for devel-
oping countries and for developed countries as part of their development policy.
The third chapter deals with the determinants of PTAs focusing on institutional
distance as a driving factor and regarding PTAs as an instrument to compensate
for missing institutions. I argue that the effect of institutional distance is spe-
cifically important (1) in a North-South trade relationship where institutional
distance is particularly large and (2) if countries trade a large share of contract-
intensive goods. For this analysis I create a panel data set including a large
number of developing countries and a variable to measure the difference of the
share of bilateral contract-intensive exports and show that a linear probability
model for discrete choice panel data is a suitable estimator to be used. I address
endogeneity using an instrument variable (IV) approach. In general, the results
show that institutional distance promotes the formation of PTAs. Comparing
this effect for North-North, North-South, and South-South country pairs reveals
that the positive effect of institutional distance on the probability of PTA form-
ation is specifically high for the formation of North-South PTAs. Furthermore,
I find that the effect is nonlinear. At very large distances of institutional qual-
ity the effect turns negative. I also find support for the argument that trading
contract-intensive goods reinforces the positive effect of institutional distance
for the formation of North-South PTAs. Robustness checks with regard to the
underlying sample reveal that the effect of institutional distance is driven by
North-South relationships involving the EU. For country pairs where both part-
ner are developing countries, that is South-South country pairs, the effect is
also positive, while for North-North country pairs the effect is negative and only
turns positive if institutional distance is large enough. The results support the
argument that trade agreements can serve as a legal instrument and that the
187
5.1. SUMMARY
formation of new PTAs are not only driven by market-access motives, but also
to compensate for poor institutions, specifically for unequal trading partners
with different income levels.
Finally, chapter 4 is dedicated to global investment flows and aims at deriving
a global model to determine the factors of foreign direct investment (FDI) by
considering investment flows between and within ‘North’ and ‘South’. We empir-
ically estimate and assess global FDI models, namely the gravity and knowledge
capital (KK) model, based on the new CDIS data set by the IMF, which in-
cludes a large number of developing and transition countries. This allows us
to detect potential vertical motives for FDI and to address the global trend of
increasing FDI from and to the global ‘South’. We account for vertical and
horizontal motives and add financial, cultural and institutional factors as sug-
gested by theory and account for third country effects by including surrounding
market potential. In our cross validation we test the prediction of the models
and calculate the average mean absolute deviation as a performance indicator.
We find that the heterogeneous gravity model including surrounding market po-
tential and the KK model without surrounding market potential perform best,
and lead to a reduction of the mean absolute prediction error by more than 25
percent. A closer inspection of the models including additional controls reveals
that including cultural factors lead to the best performance of the KK model
and the gravity model. Somehow disappointing is the performance of the model
including institutional factors, which does not lead to substantive improvements
in the performance although we find a positive effect of institutional quality in
the host, which is in line with our expectations. But institutions do not show
to be an important driver for the explanation of global FDI.
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5.2 Final Words
The main conclusion from the second chapter is that deep PTAs can potentially
promote institutions in the ‘South’ and in the long run promote the economic
development of developing countries. It should be noted in this regard, that this
conclusion only refers to the positive effects resulting from increased institutional
quality. But with regard to unequal trading partners an important aspect to be
noted is the potentially unequally distributed bargaining power of North-South
trading partners, which constitutes a notable challenge for developing countries
during the negotiation of such agreements as noted for example by (Gruber,
2000) or Weintraub (2004) and may thus impede development in the South. On
that account, Sahakyan (2016) however finds that already existing North-South
agreements can potentially raise the bargaining power of Southern countries for
subsequent agreements. And even though the bargaining power is potentially
unequally distributed between North and South, the positive effect on domestic
institutions resulting from a potential North-South agreement may foster the
long term economic development.
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